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ABSTRACT 
The present thesis titled "Relativism and the Idea of 
Rationality in the Human Sciences" starts with an 
introductory chapter which is followed by four chapters 
viz; (1) Relativism, (2) Notion of Rationality, (3) The idea 
of social science and (4) The role of relativistic rationality 
in social sciences, which together constitute the main body 
of this thesis. 
The introductory chapter gives an overview of the 
thesis. The first chapter on Relativism gives a summarized 
account of five kinds of cognitive relativism, viz; the 
relativism of rationality relativism of Truth, 
epistemological relativism, Ontological relativism and 
conceptual relativism. The chapter takes up semantic 
relativism and moral relativism as well. Furthermore, the 
chapter also discusses philosophically significant 
distinctions between subjectivism and relativism, 
multiculturalism and relativism, pluralism and relativism 
and absolutism and relativism. 
In the second chapter, we take up an analysis of the 
notion of rationality. The foremost question that we 
encounter, in this regard, pertains to the very nature of 
rationality. Like other key philosophical categories, 
'rationality' too is subjected to multiple possible 
definitions or interpretations. Its' connotation seems to 
undergo change in the hands of different authors. Among 
the several possible definitions of 'rationality, we discuss 
two philosophically significant and robust definitions of 
the concept. Additionally, we try to analyze some 
important but rarely addressed relations of the concept of 
rationality with such concepts as 'reasonableness' 
'objectivity' 'Truth' and 'consensus.' The main thrust of 
this chapter is the rejection of the traditional thesis of 
rationality wherein beliefs, propositions, truths, etc. are 
deemed to be the subject-matter of rationality. It is argued 
in this chapter that the concept of rationality can properly 
be applied only to human beings. 
In the third Chapter, we discuss the 'the idea of social 
sciences.' Firstly, we discuss the historical emergence and 
development of the social sciences. Secondly, we discuss 
social sciences with regard to two important standpoints; 
the individualistic and the holistic. The role of values in 
social sciences is also taken up in this chapter. 
Furthermore, we discuss two relatively recent methods of 
the social sciences; 'Hermeneutics' and 'phenomenology.' 
In the last chapter we discuss the role of relativism of 
rationality in the social sciences. The upshot of this 
chapter is that there is no paradigmatic rationality 
operating in the realm of natural sciences. Scientific 
rationality is not an ultimate, absolute and all-pervading 
criterion, so that we can try to justify all propositions by 
recourse to scientific procedures of investigation. Apart 
from theological and philosophical propositions, the social 
scientific discourse too can not stand to terms and 
conditions of scientific methodology. In views of the same, 
the philosophers of social sciences either formulated 
alternative notions of rationality or defended relativism of 
rationality. In this connection, the view of two 
contemporary philosophers of social sciences, Peter Winch 
and George Hans Gadamer, have been specifically 
highlighted in view of their categorical advocacy of the 
ralativism of rationality. The views of Bary Earner and 
David Bloor with regard to relativism of rationality have 
also been taken up in this chapter. The views of Benjamin 
Lee Whorf with regard to alternative rationalities also 
figures in this chapter. The concluding remarks are also 
suffixed to this chapter at the end. 
The references and bibliography have also been 
appended at their respective places. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The increasing interrogation of the objectivist claims of scientific 
knowledge received reinforcement with the advent of recent 
theories which offered a rigorous critique of foundationalist 
epistemologies. Furthermore the development of hermeneutics as a 
method for historical studies and the proliferation of 
postmodernist trends of thought in different fields have led to the 
problematisation of rationality as a privileged concept. 
While this attempt to question "rationality" along with the 
entire ensemble of universalistic notions has been hailed as a 
liberating move by some, others have expressed misgivings about 
the tenability of an unqualified relativism. 
The advent of relativism in the early 1970's as a 
serious contender for the crown of philosophical orthodoxy in our 
times has inspired a vast proliferation of academic writings. 
Developments in different fields excluding philosophy have been 
recruited both by advocates of relativism as well as by its 
opponents. The debate continued for twenty years without 
resolution. There are no conclusive arguments for relativism or 
absolutism. It so seems that neither position is simple or 
univocal.' The very notion of relativism is complex. Relativism as 
a perspective or framework can be brought to bear upon various 
key categories of human discourse such ^s culture, morality, 
knowledge, truth, reality, meaning etc. Thus, we can and do have 
multiple types of relativism; cultural, moral epistemological or 
cognitive, ontological, semantic etc. The rationale of focusing on 
these diverse forms of relativism is to establish that there is a 
range of possible relativistic positions and therefore one cannot 
discuss, defend or attack relativism in general without 
qualification. 
Here we shall try to give an overview of five kinds of 
cognitive relativism. By cognitive relativism are meant those 
forms of relativism which have to do with knowledge and with 
what we have knowledge of. The most basic form of cognitive 
relativism is the relativism of rationality. This form of relativism 
has emerged, during 1950s and 1960s, in the philosophy of 
science. More recently, post modernist thought has brought the 
issue of the relativism of rationality to centre-stage. In fact, one 
might even say that the most significant feature of postmodern 
thought is the way it has forced the question of relativism to be 
recast at the fundamental level of rationality. 
In recent years, the talk of alternative rationalities is 
widespread, in sociological, anthropological and feminist, 
discourses. In fact, the concept of alternative rationalities has, in 
our times, powerfully engaged all social scientific investigators 
and analysts. Barry, Barnes, David Bloor, (sociologist) Benjamin 
Lee Whrof (linguist) Peter Winch and Alasdair Maclntyre etc, are 
the advocates of this form of relativism. For example, Alasdair 
Maclntyre takes a radical view with regard to relativistic 
rationality. He vehemently opposes any kind of universalism about 
rationality. He holds that there are no neutral criteria to evaluate 
different traditions. According to him there are incommensurable 
traditions of thought each having its own criteria of rationality. 
Maclntyre points out that defenders of universal conception of 
rationality basically lack the sociological imagination.^ He further 
holds that there are radical cultural differences among various 
traditions, each tradition structured on its distinct system of 
evaluation and mode of social relationship etc. Each tradition 
displays subtle differences in modes of articulation, forms of 
social structure and method of justification. Each tradition can be 
equally cogently justified and argued for within the overarching 
framework of its distinct conception of rationality. 
The second form of cognitive relativism is the relativism of 
Truth. Relativism about truth is still widely dismissed by 
philosophers as incoherent or self-refuting. However, more 
recently in the works of Kuhn and Feyeranband we can make a 
partial sense of truth relativism with reference to their claim that 
same pairs of scientific theories can be semantically 
incommensurable due to conceptual variance.^ 
The third form of cognitive relativism is epistemological 
relativism. This relativism maintains that knowledge is relative. 
Philosophers have traditionally conceived knowledge to be 
justified true belief, meaning that a belief that is rationally held 
and is also true, constitutes knowledge. However, the upholders of 
epistemological relativism question the absolutistic or 
objectivistic accounts of both truth and rationality. In fact, by 
combining relativism of truth and relativism of rationality we 
obtain epistemological relativism. 
The fourth form of cognitive relativism is ontological 
relativism. Ontological relativism believes that what exists for 
human beings is relative to the concepts they possess and the 
procedures of inquiry with which their culture equips them. 
Sometimes it is said that the way the world or reality itself is, 
depends upon or is at least in part influenced by the beliefs and 
theories we hold or conceptual apparatus we operate with. 
Something like this is hinted at by Kuhn's talk of change of world 
in the revolutionary transition between scientific paradigms. As 
Kuhn says, "when paradigms change, the world itself changes with 
them".^ 
Ontological relativists do not just say that what people 
believe to exist varies from culture to culture. Their thesis is 
something much stronger, to the effect that what exists can only be 
said to exist for this or that culture. 
The fifth form of cognitive relativism is conceptual 
relativism. It represents an attempt to retain a mind-independent 
reality while holding it at an epistemic remove. This doctrine is 
often closely associated with constructivist forms of ontologica! 
relativism. According to it, there is, or might be, a multiplicity of 
alternative conceptual schemes, none of which is, or can be shown 
to be, superior to any other. Conceptual relativism argues that 
knowledge always involves conceptual frameworks or conceptual 
schemes. 
In general, a conceptual scheme is a set of concepts, ordinarily 
associated with a particular descriptive vocabulary. Sometimes 
conceptual schemes are taken as the fundamental system of 
categories by means of which the world is partitioned into various 
kinds of things. Sometimes, in a nominalist vein, they are 
identified with the set of predicates of some natural language, or 
of closely related languages. 
In addition to the above mentioned five kinds of relativism, 
we can speak of semantic relativism as yet another kind of 
cognitive relativism. According to semantic relativism, the 
meanings of words are functions of their places in particular 
languages, each of which expresses and is constitutive of a unique 
cultural complex. Though translation is possible between 
languages, it is always and necessarily incomplete and therefore 
revisable. 
The most significant form of relativism, unrelated to the cognitive 
domain is moral relativism. Moral relativism maintains that there 
are many different local conceptions of what is morally good and 
many different systems of law in which at least some of these 
conceptions are embedded. Moral relativists believe that many of 
these differences are irresolvable in moral terms. They believe that 
there are no universal moral standards to which all tribal 
moralities and/or modern value-systems can be subjected to. 
The second concept we are dealing with is "the notion of 
rationality". The first and foremost question that we encounter, in 
this regard, pertains to the very nature of rationality. The nature of 
rationality has been brought out by recourse to various approaches 
by many a philosopher. However, no single possible definition of 
the concept has been arrived at despite several decades of intense 
debate. 
Rationality acquires different meanings depending on what it is 
being opposed to. Moreover, its exact connotation seems to 
undergo changes in the hands of different authors. Here we shall 
concentrate on two most plausible definitions from among those 
operative in contemporary thought. 
Before highlighting these two plausible definitions, it is worth 
mentioning the several reasons for the return of the notion of 
rationality to the centre stage of philosophical scene after having 
remained on the periphery for quite sometime. 
Firstly, the joint assault of scientific relativism, pluralism, 
anarchism etc. on the traditional claims of scientific rationalism 
have undermined its validity and acceptability. The doctrines of 
cultural and moral relativism, historicism, hermeneutics, post-
mordernism etc. have also raised issues regarding the very 
foundations of rationalism. Consequently, the issue of rationality 
has been forced to the centre-stage of ongoing philosophical 
analysis and interpretation. 
Secondly, shortcomings of the models of rational behaviour 
used in economics and social and political theory have been 
uncovered by the progress of human sciences. Subsequently, the 
need for vastly more sophisticated models has been exceedingly 
felt by competent methodologists across the academic spectrum. 
The systematic empirical inquiries carried out at an accelerated 
speed in our times, have also necessitated a more rigorous 
understanding of 'rationality'. 
Thirdly, cognitive science has risen, at first quite slowly, 
from its formal-logical roots, then at a brisker pace, as neuro-
sciences. Later on, main-stream psychology, linguistics and 
philosophy have actually joined hands in an effort to develop a 
new, more fecund research programme covering all aspects and 
levels of the functioning of mind/brain. This opened the 
possibility of connecting the abstract study of rationality to the 
scientific investigation of the mechanisms responsible for the 
production of belief and behaviour. 
It has also led to a reappraisal of the boundaries or contours of 
rationality, in the light of the multidisciplinary approach adopted 
to get a holistic understanding of human cognitive activity. The 
image of rationality as an island in the sea of irrationality seems 
to fit no longer, in the altered methodological scenario.^ 
After making explicit background of the return of rationality 
to philosophical centre stage, let us see how the current approach 
to rationality is different from the traditional approach. The main 
difference consists in the claim of the new approach that 
rationality is attributable only to persons and not to beliefs, 
actions or propositions. 
A rational person is one who proceeds in situations of choice 
by asking himself, not the introspective question "what do I 
prefer?", but the objective question as to what is to be deemed 
preferable?, or "what ought I to prefer?" Rational comportment 
does not call just for desire-satisfaction, it demands desire 
management as well. 
In order to understand the precise scope of rationality, it is 
necessary to be attentive to the distinctions between rationality 
and reasonableness, rationality and truth, rationality and 
objectivity and rationality and consensus. There may not be sharp 
distinctions between these concepts but it will be a mistake to 
imagine that these distinctions are insignificant and without 
consequence. While comparing rationality with reasonableness, it 
may be argued that it is not necessarily reasonable to be rational. 
Sometimes, the best means to appropriate ends lie in the 
termination of the very discussion, for example, while training 
children or in certain negotiations. Moreover, sometimes it may be 
acceptable and indeed altogether rational to act in an "irrational" 
way. 
Truth and rationality are distinct in the sense that achieving 
one of them in no way entails that the other has also been 
achieved. Nevertheless there is a weaker but vital tie between 
rationality and truth which needs to be carefully analysed. 
Rationality and objectivity are also different from each 
other. Rationality is often possible in the absence of objectivity 
but objectivity without rationality leads nowhere. 
There is a significant relation between consensus and 
rationality also. Some people have confused these two terms by 
putting them in the same category, whereas the truth is that when 
rationality becomes public property it becomes consensus. 
In order to properly appreciate the issue of relativism and 
rationality in social sciences, it is imperative that we have some 
clarity on the question of the methodological and metaphysical 
assumptions underlying the practice of social science. 
The social sciences can be described as the set of disciplines 
that deal with different aspects of human reality, or human 
behaviour -- be it of individuals or groups of individuals. Distinct 
approaches to human reality have been worked out by thinkers 
from time to time. In recent times, thinkers like Karl Popper and 
Peter Winch have been the advocates of what is called 
'individualism,' whereas the approach of thinkers like Karl Marx 
and Durkheim represents collectivism or in certain contexts -
'holism'. Individualists hold that the subject matter for social 
scientists is the individual and they should focus their studies at 
individual level. On the contrary advocates of holism hold that we 
are part of the society and hence social science is the study of 
groups of individuals and not of an individual. These different 
approaches form an implicit background to any discussion of 
rationality. 
Similarly, different methodologies have been put forward by 
social scientists and philosophers from time to time. These 
different methodologies have different implications for the status 
that can be assigned to relativism as a legitimate perspective for 
the study of social reality. Here, it is not possible to carry out an 
analysis of all or even most methodologies that are in vogue. We 
will just cite or mention two very important methodological 
frameworks for social science, viz; Hermeneutics and 
Phenomenology. 
In the nineteenth century Germany there was a long-running 
debate over the nature and method of social sciences. At the one 
extreme, naturalistic philosophers of science demanded that social 
scientists should imitate the natural sciences in methodology. On 
the other hand, philosophers like William Dilthey and later on 
Peter Winch argued that social sciences should adopt a 
methodology of their own which should be different from that of 
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the natural sciences. People who advocate the adoption of the 
methodology of natural sciences tend to underplay the basic 
differences between the objects of natural sciences and those of 
the social sciences. A discussion of these basic differences 
between these two types of sciences is relevant to our problematic. 
Hermeneutics:- Originally Hermeneutics was concerned with 
interpretation of religious (sacred) texts. The term acquired a 
much broader significance in its historical development and finally 
became a philosophical position in twentieth century German 
philosophy. Subsequently, hermeneutics also became a method for 
the historical and human sciences. Hermeneutics provides a way 
for understanding social phenomena and stresses that social 
science should base itself upon 'understanding' rather than strive 
for causal explanations. Schleiermacher's analysis of 
understanding and explanation related to texts and speech marks 
the beginning of hermeneutics in the modern sense. 
Phenomenology:- Phenomenology is one among the many recent 
philosophical approaches. This approach was formulated in 
twentieth century by Husserl and some of his followers. It is rather 
a movement whose proponents for various reasons, have propelled 
it in various directions. However, all phenomenologists agree that 
Phenomenology consists in an analysis and description of the 
contents of consciousness. Later on, Alfered Schutz an American 
philosopher held that the social sciences do provide a scientific 
study of life-world. Following Husserl's Phenomenological 
method and analysis of life-world, he holds that we can know the 
meaning of an action through Phenomenological approach, 
positing 'actions' to be the 'phenomena' of social sciences.'^ 
Coming back to the notion of rationality it may be pointed 
out that apart from the philosophical difficulties arising out of it, 
the precise way in which this notion functions in the social 
sciences is not as clear as one might wish. With the rise of 
scientific methodological framework, the notion of rationality has 
been increasingly deemed to be synonymous with scientific 
rationality in our times. It appears rational to believe whatever 
science can establish and dismiss as unscientific and hence 
irrational anything beyond its scope. This raises problems in the 
study of primitive societies which are motivated by beliefs that 
seem thoroughly unscientific and therefore irrational. Besides 
primitive beliefs other types of discourse pale into insignificance 
if we paradigmatise scientific rationality into an ultimate, absolute 
and all-pervading criterion and try to justify all propositions by 
recourse to scientific procedures of investigation, viz; observation, 
hypothesis-formulation, experimentation, verification, prediction 
etc. Most of the theological, philosophical, ethical, aesthetic, 
cultural and historical discourse will be consigned to the dustbin 
of irrationality of we are solely led by scientific criteria of 
rationality. The social scientific discourse too cannot entirely 
stand to the terror of scientific methodology. In view of the same, 
various philosophers of social science have formulated either 
alternative notions of rationality or defended relativism of 
rationality or suggested alternative methodological frameworks to 
achieve the requisite understanding of types of discourse 
ostensibly falling out-side the ken of scientific criteria of 
rationality. For example, Peter Winch defends the relativism of 
rationality in his famous article "understanding a primitive 
society" in which he takes Evan-Pritchard's study of Witchcraft 
among Azande as the basis of his discussion and holds that we 
can't condemn Azande beliefs about Witchcraft as irrational. He 
further holds that rationality is not an absolute concept but 
relative to the context. He holds that the fact that beliefs of 
modern man are grounded in scientific society, whereas beliefs of 
primitive man are grounded in witchcraft, does not mean that latter 
are irrational. The primitive Azande too is rational in his context. 
Bary Earner and David Bloor too have defended relativism of 
rationality in the social sciences. They have argued that notion of 
relativism of rationality is unavoidable in the human sciences.'° 
Both these philosophers reject any claim of absolute conception of 
rationality. Rationality for them is a context-bound, history-bound 
epoch-bound, culture-bound etc. These philosophers hold that all 
those empirical conditions should be investigated under which 
beliefs arise for an agent showing how these are always local and 
particular. In fact, a number of thinkers have defended the 
relativism of rationality. Benjamin Lee Whorf, an American 
linguist, built up a case for alternative rationalities from an 
examination of wide-spread differences amongst scores of cultural 
groups by recourse to anthropological investigations. He holds that 
all languages have different sets of categories and there is no 
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single paradigmatic set operating at the back of all languages. In 
fact, languages contain different metaphysical schemes. In view of 
the same, all languages orientate their respective speakers to 
formulate their distinct procedures of argumentation and 
articulation. Thus are inspired alternative rationalities and we 
have the notion of 'relativistlc rationality ' ." 
The role of relativism is also very crucial in social science. 
Different social scientists have talked about the role of relativism 
in social science from different perspectives. However, since this 
is a very vast and very complex issue, we will concentrate on two 
philosophers who have talked about the role of relativism in social 
sciences. These are, Peter Winch and George-Hans-Gadamer. Peter 
Winch's celebrated book The Idea of social science and its 
Relation to Philosophy and Gadamer's Truth and Method have 
drawn attention in a rigorous way to methodological concerns 
within the Social Sciences. Winch holds that we can not eliminate 
the subjective and interpretive part from social science. So he 
simply finds his way to a hermeneutic understanding of the 
discourse of social sciences. He further holds that understanding 
of the meaning itself is context-specific. To get the correct use of 
the term one has to see its relationship to connecting terms in a 
system of interrelationships. Thus, he advocates a form of 
relativism in social science. 
Similarly George-Hans-Gadamer vehemently criticizes any 
single rigorous method which is absolute in nature and can be 
operated in social science. In fact G.H. Gadamer joined in the 
anti-positivistic revolt against the installation of 
positivistic/scientific methodology in the domain of social 
sciences and advocated that social sciences should not imitate 
natural sciences but devise their distinct methodological approach. 
He has radically championed the application of hermeneutic 
method in social scientific discourse and emphasized the role of 
interpretation in arriving at an understanding of social 
phenomena. 
After discussing some key concepts of this thesis, 
presentation of a chapter wise abstract would be in order: 
In the first chapter of this thesis we will discuss 
"relativism". We will discuss different cognitive and non-
cognitive types of relativism. Furthermore, we will discuss the 
sometimes minute but always philosophically significant 
distinctions such as between subjectivism and relativism, 
multiculturalism and relativism, relativism and pluralism, and 
absolutism and relativism. Finally we will discuss the standard 
criticism of relativism. 
In the second chapter we will discuss the concept of 
"rationality". Among the several possible definitions of the 
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concept, we will discuss two possible definitions, which can be 
said to be more sound and philosophically more robust than the 
rest. While discussing the crucial concept of rationality we will try 
to analyse some important but rarely addressed relations; such as 
between reasonableness and rationality, truth and rationality, 
objectivity and rationality and consensus and rationality. The main 
thrust of this chapter will be the rejection of the traditional thesis 
of rationality wherein beliefs, propositions and truth are deemed to 
be the subject-matter of Rationality. We will maintain how the 
concept of rationality can properly be applied only to human 
beings/persons. 
In the third chapter we will discuss "the Idea of social 
science". Firstly, we will discuss the historical emergence and 
development of the social sciences. Secondly, we will discuss the 
social sciences from two standpoints; the individualistic and the 
holistic. The role of values in the social sciences will also be our 
concern in this chapter. Further, we will discuss two relatively 
recent methods of the social sciences "Hermeneutics" and 
"Phenomenology". 
In the last chapter we will discuss the role of relativism and 
rationality in the social sciences. We will discuss the normative 
role of rationality in social sciences and also bring out the 
'Rationality principle' with special reference to Karl Popper. The 
17 
role of relativism is the subject of a long and burning debate in the 
social sciences. However, we will confine ourselves to discussing 
some aspects of this issue with special reference to two 
contemporary philosophers, George-Hans-Gadamer and Peter 
Winch. Finally we will discuss the role of relativistic rationality 
in social science with special reference to Peter Winch, Barry 
Earner, David Bloor and Richard Rorty. 
CHAPTER -I 
RELATIVISM 
Relativism originates and emerges on encountering 
unfamiliar cultures, races, customs and points of view. People 
experience or perceive these cultures in various ways. They may 
be surprised or curious or eagerly try to study them and appreciate 
their raision deter, locus standi and modus operandi. Sometimes, 
they may experience a sense of superiority; while comparing their 
cultural beliefs and values with those of other cultural outlooks, 
they may experience a sense of superiority. Sometimes they may 
simply feel aversion and plain hatred towards other cultural 
frameworks. However, people not only unreflectively react, but 
also reflect on their own attitudes and try to articulate and justify 
them. 
Relativism means that nothing is universally acceptable or 
nothing is absolute. The central relativist idea is that what is true 
or right for one tribe or social group or age might not be true or 
right for another tribe or social group or age. Relativism is meant 
to guard against ethnocentricism (The tendency to consider one's 
own culture as the universal standard and evaluating other cultures 
on that basis). The other rationale for relativism is that we have no 
independent basis for criticizing the way others think or act. since 
there is no rationality which is genuinely universal, ahistorical. 
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atemporal and acultural. There is no rational basis to prefer our 
standard to those of other cultures or other times. In any case, the 
notion of "preference" is not very appropriate because the totality 
of our beliefs never lies under our epistemological control.' In 
fact, the crux of the relativism thesis lies in the fact that it teaches 
us not only to understand the world of diverse cultures but also to 
respect them. The appeal of the relativistic approach lies in the 
fact that it embodies a principle of charity in the sense that it 
holds that the most 'civilized' preferences and evaluations are as 
context bound as those of supposedly primitive tribes. 
Furthermore, at the metalevel, a relativist accepts that in the last 
analysis no justification of his preference can be formulated in 
absolute or context- independent terms. Consequently, a relativist 
holds that our attitudes should be tolerant and appreciative rather 
than judgmental. For these reasons it has been argued that it would 
be desirable to incorporate the relativistic stance into the 
methodologies of social science. In fact, thinkers such as Bary 
Barnes and David Bloor have gone to the extent of arguing that 
relativism is essential to all disciplines dealing with human reality 
such as anthropology, sociology and even cognitive psychology." 
Relativists holds that there is not a single scheme which is 
absolutistic in nature by which we can describe the world "rightly" 
or "accurately". The relativist rejects the absolutist view which 
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holds that positivistic science is the only privileged conceptual 
scheme capable of capturing the way the world actually is. In fact 
the idea of "description of the way the world is" is itself 
contentious between a relativist and an absolutist. Relativists hold 
that our procedure of knowing the world is restricted in a 
particular historical or cultural context, therefore they make no 
claim about the way the world is beyond the results of those 
procedures. It is at this point that the absolutist attacks relativism 
with what looks like a clinching argument: when a relativist 
claims that the doctrine of relativism is true, then the thesis of 
relativism itself must be only relatively true. It would be 
contradictory to affirm that relativism is true in an absolute sense. 
On the other hand, the assertion that relativism is true in a relative 
sense-so the counter argument goes- has no general force. It leaves 
one without any convincing reason as to why one should accept it. 
In order for the relativist thesis to have general force it has no 
choice but to adopt an absolutist stand, thus proving the absolutist 
thesis that in the final analysis there is no coherent alternative to 
absolutism in one form or the other. But as we shall see, this 
argument is not as decisive as it appears at first sight. However, 
whatever the merits of argument against it, relativism is now being 
advanced from many quarters and for a wide variety of reasons 
whose rationale is derived from the insights gathered from recent 
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work in philosophy of science--particularly the philosophy of 
social science. 
In recent years many historians, sociologists and 
philosophers of science have espoused relativism, attracted in part 
by its apparent explanatory power. In fact, even the present trend 
of post-modernism can be said to be grounded in a commitment to 
the essential validity of relativism. 
However, the problem is that the very diversity of relativist 
positions and the controversies arising from them make relativism 
a difficult position to justify. This difficulty has resulted in a one-
sided and hostile perception of relativism as a doctrine which 
rejects universal standards thereby erasing the objective difference 
between a good idea and a lunatic one. Often an uncritically 
hostile assessment of relativism is made on the grounds that 
according to relativism any belief or action is as good, or as 
rational as any other, and that such a thesis constitutes a 
dangerous challenge to human reason, and threatens to undermine 
all the progress that has been made over the centuries by serious 
thinkers devoted to rational thought. The fact is that there are 
many different aspects to, and many different versions of, 
relativism. There are simple versions from which we all can learn 
and sophisticated versions which are for specialists only. Some 
versions are based on feeling or an attitude, others resemble 
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answers to mathematical problems. Occasionally there is not even 
a version: there is just a word "relativism" and the strong 
emotional - favourable or unfavourable - reaction to i t / 
The confusion regarding relativism is further compounded by 
the fact that different people have given different names to 
relativism and have employed different key concepts to articulate 
it. For Thomas Kuhn the central concept is the "paradigm" and for 
some others the central notion is the "conceptual scheme." In the 
context of scientific framework, Kuhn's concept of paradigm has 
been particularly influential. We will discuss this notion in the 
section on conceptual relativism. But here, let us discuss the 
more general notion of "frameworks" which is essential to any 
discussion of relativism. Once we begin to talk of relativism, we 
can not avoid talk about particular frameworks within which all 
activities are done. Hence a framework is not the mere creation of 
an individual consciousness but exists in the collective 
consciousness of a community or a group by virtue of the fact that 
the standards it proposes are upheld by that group. A framework is 
simultaneously logical as well as causal. When a set of ideas 
counting as a framework, provides standards that transcend the 
impression of particular person at a particular time, it is said to be 
logical. However as the conceptual features of a "framework" 
originate from our need to describe observed phenomena which 
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include a transmission mechanism that lies within the purview of 
social psychology, it is also causal. 
Frameworks can be defined as a collection of methods and 
habits of thought and action that determine what those who adhere 
to it regard as good and true. 
Thus, a framework can be qualified by two social 
dimensions. First, relativism is not individualistic subjectivism for 
which anything goes intellectually, nor is it a collective 
subjectivism, which would settle intellectual questions by 
consensus. Second, any framework must at least be capable of 
being taught to others as well as applied in a consistent fashion by 
those who adhere to it.'^  One may list the main features of 
(conceptual) frameworks as follows: 
1. Frameworks are not assertions or set of assertions: otherwise 
they would be subject to criteria of assessment. 
2. Frameworks are central to the ways human beings act, 
whether as scientists and specialists conducting observations 
and experiments or as ordinary people conducting their daily 
lives. 
3. Frameworks are often understood without being put into 
words and in any case not wholly and adequately expressible 
in ordinary language. 
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4. Frameworks are articulated and disseminated through some 
social groups, which teach and uphold them, often by non-
rational means, including exercise of parental authority and 
boycott campaigns directed at intellectual dissenters and 
deviants. 
5. Frameworks transcend the fact/value distinction for they 
determine what is to count as a fact partly in terms of the 
interests or ideals that prompt the discourse in question and 
shape the methods of investigation used by their adherents.^ 
Before discussing the different kinds of cognitive and other 
non-cognitive relativisms it would be in order to mention some 
main sources of relativism. 
Source Of Relativism 
There are several reasons for the emergence of relativism; 
some of its main sources are brought out as hereunder: 
Romanticism 
Relativism has always appealed to liberal and open-mined 
spirits within anthropology. There are people who feel that it is a 
human duty not only to understand the other cultures from within 
but also to learn to respect them, to interpret them without seeking 
to judge them or rather to judge other cultures only by their and 
not by our standards. These considerations inspired the perspective 
or point of view known as cultural relativism which refuses to see 
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any hierarchy among peoples or an evolutionary scale linking the 
primitive to the modern. This view was forged by Franz Boas and 
his followers. In fact, they parceled humanity into separate 
cultures, biologically and mutually irreducible, each with its own 
system of "values" determining its own individuality.^ 
This relativistic attitude can be construed as a response to 
scientific method self-professedly aiming at accumulating truths, 
and doubting the claims of subjectivity, whatsoever. Secondly, it 
is a response to enlightenment rationalism, which believed in 
universal law of human nature. Nietzche, a 19' century German 
philosopher, distilled the response to this epistemological euphoria 
into a sharp question and a perspicuous answer: 
"What is then Truth? 
A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms and 
anthropomorphisms- in short a sum of human 
relations which have been enhanced, transposed 
and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and 
which after long use seem firm, canonical and 
obligatory to a people: Truths are illusions about 
which one has forgotten that this is what they 
are; metaphors which are worn out and without 
sensuous power; coins which have lost their 
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pictures and now matter only as metals, no 
longer as coins/ ' 
The mobile army is a gang of local militants, each keeping 
order in its own province. Neitzsche's imagery may be picturesque 
but what he affirms is a serious fact: that reality is socially 
constructed. 
Scientific Methodology 
Relativism may be enlisted in the service of science. In fact, 
it has been persuasively argued that a truly scientific approach to 
the sociological study of beliefs and practices requires it. 
According to Barry Barnes and David Bloor, relativism is essential 
to all human sciences such as anthropology, sociology, history of 
ideas and even cognitive psychology, that is, all those disciplines 
which account for the diversity of systems of knowledge, their 
distribution and their manner of change. Barnes and Bloor argue 
that those who take absolutistic stand and give a privileged status 
to certain forms of knowledge, pose the real threat to scientific 
understanding of knowledge and cognition. Local acceptance goes 
with local modes of cultural transmission, of socialization and 
social control of power and authority: the scientific task is to trace 
these links investigating the specific local causes of a belief being 
held. 
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In this context relativism can also be defended on "Hermeneutic" 
and "Critical grounds" Mary Hesse asks: 
"why we must oppose those who ground their 
faith in universal rationality on a contingent 
belief that our language and science are somehow 
the high points of the historical evolution of 
ideas?."^ 
Western science is not the text book saga of cumulative reason 
and we have much to learn from 'cross-cultural understanding and 
self-reflective critique' in understanding science itself. The 
scientific approach to our own culture as to others is to grasp it 
from within, heeding the implications [of the fact] that objectivity 
is an internal standard. 
Epistemological Scepticism 
Recasting or embracing relativism is broadly inspired by a 
philosophical motive, namely a principled rejection of the search 
for the rational foundations of knowledge. Its most eloquent 
exponent is Richard Rorty, who endorses what he calls the holist, 
antifoundationaiist pragmatist treatment of knowledge and 
meaning, which we find in John Dewey, Wittgenstein, Quine, 
Sellers and Donald Davidson. Rorty draws our attention 
particularly to their abandonment of the quest for 
commensuration: 
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"a set of rules which will tell us how rational 
agreement can be reached or what would settle 
the issue on every point where statements seem 
to conflict."'^ 
Rorty proposes a way to free ourselves from the idea that 'there 
are foundations to serve as common ground for adjudicating 
knowledge claim's and that the philosopher is a 'guardian of 
rationality; indeed from the very project of epistemology itself,'*' 
that is, the misguided attempt to see the problem of justification 
within normal discourse 'as" hooked on to something such as 
reality, truth, objectivity, reason etc., rather than a practice 
adopted for various historical reasons. According to Rorty, 
'objective truth' is no more than and no less than the best idea we 
currently have about how to explain what is going on. 
It is difficult to disprove the fact that philosophers can 
construct no algorithm for choice among scientific theories. 
However, some cases seem to point to certain serious difficulties. 
For example, how do we interpret the considerations advanced 
against the Copernican theory by Cardinal Bellarmine-namely the 
scriptural description of the fabrics of the heavens? Were they 
"illogical" and "unscientific"? Rorty answers this question in the 
negative. He points out that it would be a mistake to see this as a 
black and white struggle between reason and superstition. Rather, 
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it was a struggle between the value of getting the description of 
the heavens right and that of preserving the authority of the 
church. It represented a tension within the general cultural 
structure of Europe between different 'grids' for determining the 
relevance of one statement to another and specifically for 
determining as to what sorts of evidence there could be for 
statements about the movements of the planets. Therefore, it 
would be simplistically wrong to say that Galileo won the 
argument because his 'grid' was more 'objective' and more 
'rational. ' Such a methodological stance espoused by Rorty is 
germane to the fructification of relativistic attitudes. 
After taking an overview of different sources of relativism 
let us see the cognitive relativism and its types. 
Cognit ive Relativism 
Once the doctrine of relativism was widely dismissed as 
incoherent. Yet in recent philosophy relativistic claims have 
shifted to its centre-stage. Philosophers could no longer avoid 
giving a serious consideration to relativism. For example, anti-
realist philosophers of language suggest that truth is internal to 
language or conceptual schemes. Some contemporary 
metaphysicians tell us much the same thing about reality. A 
methodologically informed reflection on the vast variety of beliefs 
and practices found among the various people of the world has led 
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many to think that what is right to do and believe depends on the 
culture to which one belongs.'^ But notwithstanding its popularity, 
relativism continues to be controversial. There are still those who 
see relativism as a profound challenge to human reason. 
When controversy surrounds a doctrine, an important 
philosophical task is to clarify the issue by making relevant 
distinctions. Differences among cultures is the root cause of 
diversity among the patterns of thought of different individuals or 
sets of individuals. The possible patterns of thought of an 
individual depend on the individuals conceptual schema that is 
itself dependent on the cognitive elements of concepts, beliefs, 
laws of logic etc., which the individual brings to experience. For 
thought and a pattern of thought are only possible in virtue of 
background or context of presupposition and assumed concepts. 
There is no such thing as an (literally) isolated thought. A thought 
is thought in the context of other possible thoughts and cognitive 
resources which make those thoughts possible.'^ Relativism which 
thus refers to knowledge and seeks to relativise the frameworks 
that make knowledge possible, can be called cognitive relativism. 
But within this broad category it is possible to distinguish roughly 
five types of relativism on the basis of the cognitive component 
which is sought to be relativised: 
1. Conceptual relativism 
2. Relativism of rationality 
3. Relativism of truth 
4. Ontological relativism 
5. Epistemological relativism 
Conceptual Relativism 
Different groups and cultures order their experiences by 
means of different concepts. So conceptual relativism asserts that 
there may be incommensurable differences between our concepts 
and those of other epochs, cultures or communities, and that there 
are no rational grounds for choosing between two such radically 
different conceptual systems. We can formulate this position in 
these terms: Different cultures employ radically different 
conceptual schemes defining what exists in the world, how things 
are organized in time and space, what sorts of relations obtain 
among things and how something influences other things. It is not 
possible to give rational grounds for concluding that one such 
scheme is more congruent to reality than others.''* 
Some modern authors discuss conceptual relativism in terms 
of the idea of "incommensurability." The general idea here is that 
two conceptual schemes are incommensurable if it is impossible to 
establish simple definitional equivalence between individual 
concepts in the two schemes. Now the question is as to what 
exactly is incommensurability. Thomas Kuhn holds that scientific 
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research is organized around a paradigm (a strong network of 
commitments) which is conceptual, theoretical, instrumental as 
well as methodological. Kuhn argues for a thesis of 
incommensurability of concepts across paradigms. He defines a 
paradigm as a set of models of scientific explanations, exemplary 
experiments and background assumptions about the world. These 
paradigms implicitly constitute systems of concepts and beliefs 
that can not be intertranslated.'^ 
In the context of scientific frameworks, Kuhn's concept of 
paradigms has been very influential. Kuhn maintains that, 
examining the record of past research from the vantage point of 
contemporary historiography, the historian of science may be 
tempted to exclaim that when paradigms change the world itself 
changes with them. Led by a new paradigm scientists adopt new 
instruments and look in new places. More importantly, during such 
theoretical revolutions scientists see new and different things even 
when looking with familiar instruments and in places they have 
looked before. It is rather as if the professional community had 
been suddenly transported to another planet where familiar objects 
are seen in a different light and are joined by unfamiliar ones as 
well. This is of course only a highly metaphorical picture. 
Nevertheless, in a very basic sense, paradigm-shifts do cause 
scientists to see the world of their research projects differently. In 
so far as their only recourse to that world is through what they 
themselves see and do, we would not be unjustified in saying that 
after a revolution scientists are responding to a different world. 
Kuhn holds that every paradigm has its own theoretical 
language as well as methodological criteria. So there is no rational 
dialogue possible to decide which paradigm is better, more 
valuable etc. He holds that in order to evaluate which paradigm is 
more scientific, we need another, third paradigm which can 
encompass both the paradigms in question which is impossible He 
compares the shift from one paradigm to another paradigm to 
religious conversion in the sense that it is not a result of reasoned 
movement from one set of opinions to another. 
However, neither a priori nor empirical arguments establish 
conceptual relativism. On the contrary, there is good reason to 
suppose that human cultures share a core set of concepts and 
beliefs defining the structures of ordinary world as to what sorts 
of objects there are, and what observable properties they have. 
This core set of concepts and beliefs establishes the possibility of 
interpretation across cultural boundaries and it corresponds to the 
real observable characteristics of ordinary objects. This existence 
of an objective shared world with observable properties provides 
the basis for a core set of concepts and beliefs across cultures. It 
is of course true that this core is surrounded by a network of 
concepts and assumptions, which are not shared across cultural 
boundaries. But this only shows that theories and concepts at the 
more abstract level produce the diversity of worldviews in 
different cultures. And such partial diversity does not entail the 
notion of relativism. 
The philosopher W.V.O. Quine holds a version of relativism 
which is different from Kuhn's version in certain important 
respects. While Kuhn holds the view that different paradigms are 
incommensurable or untranslatable into each other, Quine 
maintains the thesis of indeterminacy of translation. According to 
this view there is no matter of the fact involved about the 
correctness of a sentence. Therefore, there is no possibility of 
sentence equivalence when we translate from one language to 
another. That is to say, if you have fundamentally different ways 
of organizing reality from mine, then there is no way for me to 
discover the difference between our modes of organizing reality by 
questioning you, because the clarifications you offer could 
themselves be subject to the same confusion. However, in contrast 
to Kuhn, Quine interprets this situation not as one of 
untranslatability but as of indeterminacy of translation or over-
translatability. That is, in such a situation, one framework can be 
translated/interpreted in several different ways into another 
framework and there is no way to decide which of those diverse 
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translations/interpretations is the correct one or the one most 
faithful to the original. Conceptual relativism in any of these 
versions-can be seen as a way to retain a mind-independent reality 
while holding it at one epistemic remove by maintaining that there 
is or might be a multiplicity of alternative conceptual schemes 
none of which is, or can be shown to be, superior to any other.'^ 
Conceptual relativism arises from reflection on multiple 
conceptual schemes, as well as on the role of concepts in 
cognition. Both when one describes an observed fact and when one 
makes an observation, a conceptual scheme is interposed between 
observer and reality. It is impossible to remove one self altogether 
from all conceptual apparatus as such and view or describe reality 
in its "pure form". Reality in itself, stripped of conceptual overlay 
is not something to which we have direct access. Since it is 
impossible to remove oneself entirely from all conceptual 
schemes, it is impossible to take up a neutral God's eye position 
outside one's own conceptual scheme altogether and compare it 
I o 
with reality. But this form of relativism finds it difficult to 
explain how mutually contradictory frameworks of thought can 
capture the same reality without seriously conflicting with the 
practical consequences. 
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Relativism Of Rationality 
As we saw relativism is a reaction against the view that there 
is one and only one way of describing the world. Therefore, it 
argues that different conceptual abilities and habits are liable to 
result in different ways of seeing the world. This view is 
sometimes extended to the position that different cultures may 
have different standards or even dissimilar conceptions of 
rationality. Such a position is described as a relativism of 
rationality. Some recent sociologists and philosophers of science 
have taken such relativism of rationality as an obvious fact. 
According to this form of relativism, it is just an illusion to 
believe that there is something that might be labeled as the 
universal standard of rationality. The reason is simply that there is 
no rational basis for preferring one standard of rationality to 
others since the totality of one's beliefs never lies under our 
complete epistemological control. 
The central thesis of rationality relativism is that rational 
theory-acceptance is relative to operative standards. The doctrine 
of rationality relativism rests on that of the notion of diversity of 
methodological standards. The claim here is that the absence of a 
universal scientific method is evidence of the truth of rationality 
relativism.^° 
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One of the frequent objections to relativism of rationality is 
that according to this view, it may be rational for one person but 
not rational for another to believe the same thing. There would 
seem to be some merit is this criticism since judgments of 
rationality are typically relative to available evidence. If the total 
evidence available to two persons about something is the same, it 
can never be rational for one and not for another to believe that 
something. The relativity can be reduced to relativity of evidence, 
which does not lead to relativism as such. 
However, some advocates of relativism of rationality argue 
for a version which goes far beyond the thesis of relativity of 
rational belief to available evidence. This more radical version of 
the relativism of rationality has emerged recently in philosophy of 
science as traditional objectivist assumptions within the 
philosophy of science have increasingly been put into question. 
With the rejection of many of the assumptions on which traditional 
philosophy and science rested, a variety of positions has emerged 
which suggest that scientific rationality is relative to context or at 
any rate, that it has no higher epistemic status than any other mode 
of thought. 
Recent philosophy of science has tended, instead, to make 
standards employed in science vary with theoretical frameworks, 
contexts or traditions of research within which scientists operate. 
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In Against Method (1975) Paul Feyrabend has argued that at one 
time or another, all methodological rules have legitimately been 
broken by the practice of actual scientists. He holds that there is 
no fixed 'correct' methodology.^' 
In the structure of scientific revolution (1970) Thomas Kuhn 
argued that many of the standards used to evaluate proposed 
solutions of scientific problems are internal to the large scale 
theoretical structures which he called paradigms. He also denied 
the existence of a fixed set of methodological criteria standing 
out-side of paradigms which would be capable of providing 
unequivocal judgment as to which of rival paradigms is rationally 
to be preferred. 
This relativism about scientific rationality is not confined to 
a few thinkers like Feyerabend. It can be said to be a widely held 
thesis now. In a recent exchange with Larry Lauden, John Worrall 
has claimed that 
"if no principles of evaluation stay fixed, 
then there is no objective viewpoint from which 
we can show that progress has occurred and we 
can say only that progress has occurred relative 
to the standards that we happen to accept now. 
However, this may be dressed up, it is 
relativism." 
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Similarly, a position of relativism in recent times is also 
maintained in Alan charme's discussion of the nature of scientific 
method in what is this thing called science!, where he held that 
"The extreme rationalist asserts that there 
is a single, timeless, universal criterion with 
reference to which the relative merits of rival 
theories are to be assessed. The relativist denies 
that there is a universal ahistorical standard of 
rationality with respect to which one theory can 
be judged better than another." 
This denial of fixed scientific method is often taken to imply 
relativism about scientific rationality. 
Relativism of rationality is maintained not only in the 
context of scientific rationality but also from the cultural or social 
point of view. There are no culture-neutral standards of belief. 
Instead, various cultures embody different standards in terms of 
which we evaluate a set of beliefs, and there is no sense in which 
one set is superior to another. This problem is raised by the wide 
diversity of belief systems involving magic, witch-craft, spiritual 
forces, and the like in various cultures. In their ordinary lives, 
"primitive" societies interpret crop failures, the rise and fall of 
leaders and vicissitudes of health as the effect of a variety of 
occult forces. Some philosophers have doubted that there is any 
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culture-neutral way to argue that one way of understanding the 
world is more rational than another. Thus Peter Winch holds that 
if we wish to understand other cultures, we must start from the 
position that standards of rationality in different societies do not 
always coincide. For instance, we believe a particular disease is 
caused by a particular bacterium or virus but in "primitive" 
societies illness is believed to be caused by spirits and things like 
that. The difference is that our belief is grounded in empirical 
medical sciences and that of tribal communities in traditional 
religious cosmogony. Such contrasting systems of belief can not 
be determined to be superior to one another in terms of 
rationality.^"^ 
Relativism Of Truth 
Epistemologically speaking, relativism is basically a 
doctrine in the theory of knowledge and there are several forms of 
relativism each stressing on the relativity of a particular cognitive 
feature. Among these the relativism of truth is the most 
controversial thesis. To put it crudely, it holds that what is true for 
one is not true for another. 
Relativism of truth maintains that the truth of a given belief, 
sentence or proposition depends on and is relative to the historical 
theoretical or social context in which it occurs. Whatever the 
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merits of relativism of rationality, relativism of truth is still 
widely dismissed by philosophers as incoherent or self- refuting. 
Nelson Goodman holds that the idea of a definite world- in 
itself is of no use in philosophical inquiry since it does not 
perform any meaningful function. Goodman further rejects the 
idea that only one version of the world is right. He holds that 
when we compare the different versions of the world, we are 
basically comparing descriptions of the world with the world as 
conceptualized by us beforehand which is nothing but another 
description. In other words, we have no access to the world as an 
undescribed and unperceived entity and can not compare our 
description of the world with the world itself. This position leads 
to the notion of relative truth. We cannot test a version of truth by 
comparing it to some standard such as "the world" as we have 
seen. Nor do observational data fix or determine the truth. Each 
conception or description will employ its own guiding principles 
for the construction of truth. Thus there will be no single standard 
of evaluating statements as to their truth or falsity. That means 
what is true depends on and hence is relative to the guiding 
principles and certain beliefs adhered to. So according to 
Goodman "truth as well as reality is relative."^^ 
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The importance of Goodman thesis is that by situating truth-
relativism in the context of ontological relativism it makes the 
former less vulnerable to the charge of self-refutation. 
To see why truth relativism has seemed inconsistent, we may 
consider the following. The truth of some proposition is said to be 
relative to context. For example, the proposition 'The Sun is 
round' is said to be relative to the context in which it is asserted. 
The claim that truth is relative to the context would entail that the 
proposition that the Sun is round might be true if asserted in one 
context but false if asserted in another. On the face of it, such a 
claim of relativity is incoherent. Since it leads straight to 
contradiction: it implies both that Sun is round and that it is not 
round. 
As against this, however, the relativist may reply that the 
charge of incoherence begs the question against truth relativism. 
For a contradiction only arises from variation of truth value 
relative to context, if truth is understood in an absolute sense. No 
contradiction arises, if truth is understood in a relative sense. For 
a proposition that is true relative to a context is not true 
independent of that context. So the truth of a proposition relative 
to a context does not conflict with its falsity relative to some other 
context.^^ The notion of relative truth must be understood in a 
rather weak sense. 
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The second objection against relativism of truth is that it is 
self-refuting. According to the critics, either the exponent of 
relativism must assert that the doctrine of truth-relativism is itself 
true in an absolute sense or else concede that his doctrine is true 
only in a relative sense. In the latter event, relativism need not be 
taken seriously since it is valid only relative to the relativist's 
own framework and hence not binding on others. In the former 
event, the relativist is patently guilty of trying to argue for the 
non-relative truth of a relative concept of truth which is self-
refuting. 
This relativism of truth has come to suffer a bad reputation 
in Philosophy because philosophers have tended to assume that 
this form of relativism is fatally undermined by these criticisms. It 
must be pointed out that much of the force of these seemingly 
invincible arguments is lost when truth-relativism is formulated in 
its proper context constituted by the integration of truth to 
meaning, as is found in theories which posit semantically 
incommensurable paradigms. This means that all that can be said 
about truth-relativism is that it cannot make sense unless 
combined with conceptual relativism. But this need not worry the 
relativist of truth since he can comfortably go along with 
conceptual relativism. 
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There is however, another criticism which is based on a 
misunderstanding. According to this criticism, relativism by 
relativising truth ultimately erases the distinction between truth 
and falsity, thereby destroying the very concept of truth. But this 
is a mistaken reading of relativism of truth since the absence of 
criteria for ascertaining a single objective truth does not mean a 
denial of criteria of truth at all. For the relativist of truth, truth is 
attainable and it is also valuable and he grants that there must be 
and there are criteria-though not one set of universally valid 
criteria-for truth. Therefore we must be careful not to confuse 
relativism of truth with skepticism, which maintains that there is 
no such thing as truth or that truth is unknowable. 
However, in order to effectively protect truth relativism 
from attack, ontological relativism itself must be articulated in a 
coherent fashion. Let us see how this can be done, in the next 
section. 
Ontological Relat ivism-
Ontological relativism maintains that whatever exists, as far 
as human access of that reality is concerned, it is relative to the 
concepts human beings possess and the procedures of enquiry with 
which their culture equips them. It follows that for different 
cultures there will be different catalogues of what there is. It is 
important, however, not to dilute the strong claim implicit in this: 
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ontological relativism is not asserting merely that our beliefs 
regarding existence vary from culture to culture, its claim is that 
the limits of what exists are coterminous with the conceptual 
framework of a culture: to exist is to exist for a culture, and be 
accessed by that culture. 
The idea that in some sense the very world we inhabit 
depends on, and varies relative to the way we think, perceive or 
articulate, is the key to ontological relativism which is a 
metaphysical thesis. The view that is suggested by Kuhn's talk of 
world change between paradigms, makes the world or reality that 
is investigated by scientists dependent upon the theory or 
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paradigm they accept. Here one can criticize that accepting 
Kuhn's point of view is a kind of radical idealistic form of 
relativism, since such a view makes reality dependent upon human 
thought. But it is possible to distinguish a weaker position which 
is more intelligible than world change idealism. This weaker 
position admits the existence of an external reality that is 
independent of human thought and experience. But it denies that 
this reality itself can be known by us. To formulate this claim in a 
slightly different way; we could say that according to ontological 
relativism it is coherent, in all scientifically significant cases, to 
judge a well-specified entity as existing relative to one version of 
reality as expressed in some symbolic system/language but as not 
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existing relative to some other version of reality. The notion of 
"version" is drawn from Goodman's book Ways of World Making. 
A version of reality consists of all those classes of beings whose 
existence is required to make the use of certain symbols system 
intelligible.^^ 
Quine's Argument For Ontological Relativism 
Quine has been developing his philosophical positions for over 
seven decades now. As a matter of fact his philosophy has 
fructified into a complex system of interlocking sub-systems. The 
development of his empiricist thought has had significant impact 
on epistemology, philosophy of language and ontology. He is said 
to be defending a "desert landscape" outlook in these areas of 
philosophical investigation. His use and defence of the notion of 
'ontological' relativity constitutes one of the significant 
achievements of contemporary philosophical inquiry. 
Quine is an uncompromising empiricist. For him observation 
is the sole criterian of knowledge. However, he avoids talking in 
terms of conscious experience and instead carries on his 
epistemological debate in terms of stimulus and response. For 
Quine, the processes of acquisition of knowledge and acquisition 
of language go on simultaneously. Quine is not interested in the 
issues pertaining to evidence for beliefs. He is more interested in 
questions about evidence related to linguistic practices. In view of 
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the same, an account of the acquisition of our verbal habits in 
response to our environment constitutes the real point of departure 
in our onword quest for philosophy. 
The ontological account of Quine is rooted in the use of the 
predicate calculus, the use of pragmatist epistemology and 
espousal of a behaviourist account of language acquisition. From 
these philosophical positions, Quine advocates the doctrine of the 
'inscrutability of reference' which in effect means that the notion 
of absolute fact about reference does not make any sense. A fact 
about reference is not independent of any context, framework of 
ideas or theory. However, Quine does not repudiate the relative 
facts about references, for they are what we are actually using in 
various contexts. For example, we no longer hold to an absolute 
idea of space. Contemporaneously, we have come to realize that a 
relative notion of space is all that is required. All our 
experimentation, observations and measurements do take place in 
relation to an orbitary set of co-ordinates. Analogously, the same 
is true of reference. For Quine there are no absolute facts about 
reference, there are only relative ones. 
Quine holds to an instrumentalist epistemological position. 
We use our theories about the world as instruments for making 
predictions. These theories do provide a structure within which 
we can carry on the tasks of interpretation, systematization and 
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understanding. They unify our relationship to the world, which 
relationship is rooted in our observational linkage to that world. 
Our understanding of the world contextually depends upon 
these theories. We become deeply attached to the best of the 
theories, deem them as 'home' theories and accordingly evaluate 
the competitive theories from our cherished vantage point. This 
attitude of privileging one group of theories is what Quine calls 
his 'robust realism.' We have our chosen theory, the best theory at 
our disposal. We can not judge the situation from a superior 
vantage point outside that theory. 
At this point we need to consider the position known as 
ontological relativism. This position is intimately related to 
Quine's version of realism, which is different from traditional 
account of realism attempting to articulate the ultimate nature of 
reality independent of our theorizing. Quine's version of realism 
espouses the view that ontology is related to theory and reference 
is related to the linguistic structure used to articulate it. The 
formulation of an ontology depends as to how we present the 
evidence. The scope for the formulation of different ontologies 
will never be exhausted as there will always be alternative ways of 
presenting the evidence. However a theory is intimately linked to a 
corresponding ontology. There are no facts outside a theory which 
can force on us a particular ontological interpretation. Our choice 
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of ontology is determined by such methodological factors as 
simplicity, generality, predictive power, conservatism etc. 
Different theories lead us to different ontologies. Thus an 
ontology is theory-dependent or relative to a theory. This position 
is known as ontological relativity."'^ When we bring forward 
considerations as to whether one way of construing reality is 
better than the other, the arguments impinges on choice of a 
theory. It is an argument about which theory one prefers. Our 
acceptance of a particular theory leads to our acceptance of a 
particular ontology. 
Epistemological Relativism 
There is another form of relativism under the rubric of 
cognitive relativism that can be called 'epistemological 
relativism.' This form of relativism relativises knowledge and 
argues that knowledge is relative to the context of the knower. It 
denies that what constitutes knowledge is jointly determined by 
objective rational consideration and the way the world really is 
independently of how it is thought to be within a given culture or 
theoretical context. According to it, what constitutes knowledge is 
determined by what, in a given context, counts, as a rational 
consideration and what, in that context counts as truth. 
Epistemological relativism is basically a hybrid of two kinds 
of relativism; relativism of truth and relativism of rationality. By 
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combining these two with a "justified true be l i e f account of 
knowledge, we obtain epistemological relativism or relativism of 
knowledge/ ' 
On the assumption that truth and rational beliefs are relative 
to the context, the belief that 'P ' constitutes knowledge if, relative 
to a given context. ' P ' is both rationally believed and true. It 
follows that a belief that constitutes knowledge in one context may 
not be knowledge in another. 
Philosophers have traditionally conceived knowledge as 
justified true belief, meaning that a belief that is rationally held 
and is true constitutes knowledge. We can have three main ways of 
conceiving epistemic frameworks: 
1. The thought-styles and thought-collectives of Ludwik Fleck 
[1921-1979] are ancestors in modern times of much of the 
relativism in the interpretation of natural science, usually 
attributed to Thomas Kuhn (1970). A Ludwik Fleck's 
thought-style is not just a way of thinking but also of 
carrying on experimental investigations, measurements assay 
and so on. Furthermore, each thought-style is the way of 
thinking and acting of a particular group of people, the 
thought collective. However, it may be pointed out that 
before Fleck/Kuhn ideas did crystallize, the important 
principle that concepts are ultimately involved in the 
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construction of facts and that successive scientific theories 
are dominated by leading ideas was expounded in detail by 
William Whewell in the Nineteenth century. According to 
Whewell, there are a number of epistemological antitheses 
evident in the development of natural sciences. They can be 
lined up in mutually interrelated pairs. Whewell lists 
'thought and things' necessary and experimental truths and 
"theories and facts" among others. Each pair defines a 
progressive interaction so that what we take to be the facts 
are influenced by the theories we hold, and in their turn 
these theories are influenced by the development of our 
knowledge of facts.•^" Just such a theory/fact interrelation is 
a central feature of the relation between Fleckian thought-
style and the bodies of knowledge that they make possible. 
2. The second way of analyzing epistemic frameworks can be 
found in the writings of R.G. Collingwood (1940), an 
English philosopher and historian. He provides a powerful 
account of the structure and hierarchical organization 
of knowledge-engendering framework. Collingwood's 
conception of an intellectual enterprise is based on the idea 
of an interlinked sequence of questions and answers. Each 
question/answer pair presupposes the answer to another 
deeper question. Each question/answer sequence rests on a 
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bedrock of absolute presupposition. These pre-suppositions 
do not arise correlated from a corresponding set of 
questions." 
3. Finally we may mention an alternative formulation to both 
the above; the idea of "framework" as narrative, an idea 
somewhat deliberately set askew to that of the paradigm. 
This is the idea of epistemic judgments developing over 
time, in relation to a tradition. This more dynamic 
conception of frame-works has been advocated in various 
ways by philosophers such as Stephen Toulmin. 
According to Toulmin the scientist "begins" with the 
conviction that some fixed set of laws or patterns or mechanisms 
account for nature's following the course it does and that the 
scientist's understanding of these should guide his expectations. A 
sequence of different 'ideals of natural order' can be seen at work 
in shaping the expectations and ways of theorizing of the scientists 
of the seventeenth century."' But like Collingwood's 'absolute 
pre-suppositions', 'ideals of natural order' are not arrived at 
inductively, nor are they abandoned because they have been shown 
to be false by experiment or observation. In addition to the above 
mentioned epistemic frameworks, there are several advocates of 
epistemic relativism. However, here we wish to highlight one 
among the pioneering figures of relativism that is Protogors of 
ancient Greece. 
There is a variety of epistemic relativism usually attributed 
to Protogoras. Plato presented this doctrine in some detail in the 
Theaetetus expressed in the famous formula, viz; 
"Man is the measure of all things, of the 
things that are, that they are, and of the things 
that are not, that they are not."^ 
The first step in the argument is to confine knowledge to 
what is given by the senses. The relativism of sensory knowledge 
is obvious. In our times Protagorean relativism has been taken to 
mean that a proposition 'P ' is true for the person propounding it 
under the unique circumstances in which he or she propounds it. 
This means not just that the propounder sincerely believes ' P ' , but 
that ' P ' is true relative to the circumstances in which 'P ' is 
propounded. It means, further, that in a different context a 
different proposition 'Q ' may be propounded as true in its own 
unique circumstances. The relativist claim is that considered 
independently of the persons and their circumstances, ' P ' and 'Q ' 
may be incompatible. In which case, ' P ' propounded in the 
circumstances of 'Q ' is false. The simplest case of an 
epistemically relevant variation in circumstances might be that 
each person has a unique point of view, even just a physical 
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vantage point from which to view the passing scene. I see the dog 
from my position and record its colour as blue. You see it from 
your position, now with the sun in a different relation to the dog 
and report it to be green. No dog can be blue and green at once, 
and the proposition "the dog is blue" uttered in circumstances in 
which it was correct to say "the dog is green" is false. But 
according to protogorean relativism, a proposition should never be 
considered independent of the circumstances in which it is 
propounded and the persons who propound it. 
The simplest case of variation among persons that would be 
epistemically relevant would be when each person has a different 
way of categorizing what they see before them. One attends to the 
job people are doing, another to the physiognomy of the workers, 
and so on. I think that a group of aid workers are beautiful in that 
they sacrifice personal advantage for humanitarian ends, and you 
think they are ugly because they are lean and emaciated as a result 
of their work in famine devastated areas. We could resolve the 
problem in the same way as we resolved the problem of blue and 
green dog, by forbidding you to use the word 'beautiful' in your 
context. A critic might remark that the vocable 'beautiful' is not a 
bearer of the same word in the two contexts in that the criteria for 
applying it are so different for you and for me. 36 
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In the above mentioned protogorean relativism, we have 
assumed that each person employs the same standards as others do 
in evaluating what they declare to be the case each from his/her 
own point of view, and with respect to whatever meaning they 
locally assign to the words and other symbols they are using at 
different times and on different occasions. However, there is 
another characterization of relativism more general than that of 
Protagoras. It could be that each person has more or less the same 
point of view, or makes allowances for differences in the vantage 
points of different observers, shares a common system of 
categories with others, but nevertheless differs from other people 
with respect to the standard by which they evaluate their beliefs. 
For instance, one person may have set up a very stringent standard 
for warranting beliefs and another may have settled for a more 
permissive one. If we assume further that there could be no 
overarching set of evaluative standards by which each person's 
evaluation standards could be ranked with respect to its knowledge 
engendering power, then we have a fairly strong from of epistemic 
relativism. 
The debate pertaining to epistemological relativism has been 
further accentuated or sharpened in contemporary philosophical 
investigation. Here, we can talk of dichotomies. Foundationlist-
coherentist debate and internalist-externalist debate that set much 
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of the agenda in contemporary thought as pointed out by Paul 
O'Grady in his book Relativism, can be taken up here separately. 
The first is foundationalist-coherentist debate. Does epistemic 
justification require a hierarchical view of knowledge with basic, 
non-inferentially justified beliefs, as the foundationalists claim, or 
is it non-hierarchical, holistic and systematic as the coherentists 
claim? The second is the internalist-externalist debate. Internalists 
hold that the subject holding any belief must know in principle 
that belief he is holding is a belief which is justified by reason. On 
the other hand, externalists deny this requirement, proposing that 
this makes knowing too difficult to. achieve in most normal 
contexts."' The internalist-externalist debate is sometimes also 
viewed as a debate between those who think that knowledge can be 
naturalized (externalist) and those who don't (internalist). 
Naturalists hold that the evaluative notions used in epistemology 
can be explained in terms of non-evaluative concepts, for example, 
that justification can be explained in terms of something like 
reliability. They deny a special normative realm of language that 
is theoretically different from the kinds of concepts used in factual 
scientific discourse. Non-naturalists deny this and hold to the 
essential difference between the normative and the factual. The 
former can never be derived from or constituted by the latter. So 
internalists tend to think of reason and rationality as non-
57 
explicable in natural, descriptive terms; whereas externalists think 
such an explanation is possible. 
Moral Relativism 
This is the most familiar form of relativism. It holds that 
there is no common ethical standard. What is good according to 
one culture is bad according to another. There have been divergent 
moral codes in different communities. Moral judgments are not 
true or false, they are human or social conventions. Morality 
derives from the rules or customs that society enforces in a certain 
way. These rules and customs are conventions that have been 
accepted by members of a social group and passed on to the other 
generation by means of social and psychological forms of 
acculturation. Judgments of right and wrong are made by appeal to 
principles derived from socially and historically sanctified 
conventions. This means that values are regarded as a function of 
social frameworks and not as having 'objective' existence in a 
Platonic sense. This, in turn, implies that the question, whether 
there is a cosmic value "good' is slightly different from the 
question whether there is only one valid set of moral principles 
and moral rules. 
Now let us examine what is the status of the norms and 
values that are current in a particular culture. Are there universal 
moral norms that do underlie all ethical systems, or are moral 
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norms essentially similar to aesthetic values-highly variable and 
lacking in rational foundation? 
Moral relativism is the view that different cultures embody 
different and incompatible systems of moral values and that there 
is no rational basis for preferring one system to the other (except 
from the perspective of a contending value-system). It maintains 
that every society embodies such a set of norms and values and 
that there is a fundamental diversity among value systems of 
various cultures- and schemes of valuation through which people 
evaluate themselves and others, their social arrangements, their 
artifacts and so on. Such systems govern local conceptions of 
justice, manliness, politeness and beauty. Moral absolutism holds 
that there are some universal moral principles, mandatory, 
independently of the wishes of human beings, which must be the 
foundation of all normative systems that purport to be moralities. 
The corollary is that if moral absolutism were true, we could make 
trans-or pan-cultural and pan-historical assessments of moral 
worth. Relativism contends that we can not make such 
transcultural assessment. 
Anthropological Argument for Moral Relativism 
It was stated by Boas and Benedict that there is a great 
variety of moral systems, according to which an action, 
describable in some neutral terminology would attract differing 
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moral assessments. But which of the many ways in which cultures 
differ are significant or relevant ones is the central question for 
relativism. The dimension of differences that matters morally is 
identified by Boas and his followers by the use of the principle of 
selectivity. All human societies have their cultural institutions in 
which they have applied the principle of selection. Thus some 
aspects of life are elaborated in one culture and ignored in 
another. There is no rationale to these inclusions or exclusions 
according to Boas. The origin of these diverse elaborations as 
consequences of selectivity lies in the vagaries of history. 
Consequently this thesis of selectivity leads to moral relativism. 
For example, contemporaneously, Muslim community base their 
moral values on their religion, while as Western society base their 
moral values on secular assumptions. In the absence of a 
transcendental argument from the condition of human life in 
general, by which a philosopher could reveal an overarching 
criterion of moral worth, we can slip straight into the principle of 
tolerance that each culture's moral system is right for it. The Boas 
used two lines of defense for the principle of tolerance: 
1. Empirical evidence could be marshalled in its favour. 
2. A moral system is tolerable if and only if it is right for 
that culture."'^ 
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Radcliffe-Brown gave a clearer and stronger concept of practical 
value than Boas. He focussed on anthropological argument and 
held that institutions including moral systems are responses to 
permanent needs or local exigencies. 
Brown offered the healthier concept of "necessary for 
social/biological survival." He further held that cultural practice 
exist and persist because they are part of the mechanism by which 
an orderly society maintains itself in existence. By eliding the 
reason for the practice with the justification of the practice, we 
reach the principle of functional necessity. Practices which 
confirm to the principle of functional necessity are necessarily 
beneficial since they promote the long-term survival of the group 
that adheres to them.""' 
Semantic Relativism 
In this kind of Relativism we shall examine in detail the problems 
of meaning in relation to the fact of diversity of languages. 
According to semantic relativism the meanings of words are 
functions of their place in particular languages each of which 
expresses, and is constitutive of, a unique cultural complex. 
Though translation is possible between languages, it is always and 
necessarily incomplete and therefore revisable. 
Semantic Relativism holds that there is no absolutist account of 
meaning. There is no meaning as object signified (this means that 
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there is no absolute meaning to a word but in fact meaning of a 
word is relative to the context in which it is used). In order that 
the act of pointing to an object should work as a device for 
establishing meaning, some "stage setting" is required, that is a 
place must be prepared for a new word. For example, should I 
wish to establish the meaning of the word purple by pointing to 
something I must be able to make it clear that it is the colour of 
the object that I am referring to, rather than its, weight, softness, 
or some other perceptible property. We have to somehow make 
clear under which determinable-in this case the colour-our new 
determinate 'purple' is to fall? 
The fact that objects are indefinitely complex means that even the 
disambiguation we can achieve by stage-setting can never be final. 
No sequence of acts for example pointing (ostension), can 
guarantee that there will be no borderline cases which the original 
or exemplary cases that were used to fix the meaning do not quite 
fit in. 
If we try to recover the primordial simplicity of such cases as the 
giving of a proper name to a person by reverting to elementary 
subjective sensation as the meaning giving objects, then each 
person would have their own private meanings for their words; 
meanings, which could never be coordinated with those of another 
person. Since there can be no public access to private sensation. 
62 
no public language would be possible. But there is still a more 
damning consequence of this idea. There would be no surety even 
for the private linguist that his or her words meant the same today 
as they did at other times; since subjective, private sensations are 
ephemeral. How can one judge whether today's sensation was like 
yesterday's and therefore whether today's meaning was the same 
as yesterday's? It is no good saying that one remembers the 
sensation of the past. How do we know that we are remembering 
them correctly? The fact that we can and do talk meaningfully 
about how we feel is used by Wittgenstein in his private language 
argument, as yet another reason for abandoning the idea that the 
meanings of words are the objects that they signify. Naming will 
not do as a universal account of meaning."^' 
There is a further assumption in the background of the meaning 
theory we have been discussing: if it is to be plausible it must be 
possible to pick out the relevant objects and properties prior to the 
establishment of the appropriate words of which they will come to 
be the meanings. But in many cases the objects only become 
accessible when we have mastered the relevant concepts that is 
when we can use the relevant words. Learning the word and 
learning to identify it with the object, so to say, go together. 
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Quine holds that no matter how far a discourse would 
extend, the essential gap between stimulus meaning and intended 
referent will remain. 
Evans draws a distinction between a theory of meaning 
which purports to explain people's linguistic dispositions and a 
translation manual which purports to give linguistic equivalents 
between languages/^ The fact that no one can ever be quite sure 
that he or she has grasped the personal meanings someone else 
attaches to their words, even in listening to a member of one's 
own tribe, is of no great significance unless it undercuts the 
possibility of formulating theories about the local or personal 
significance that the members of another tribe attach to their 
descriptive vocabulary. 
Multiculturalism And Relativism 
Since every act of cognition necessarily occurs within a particular 
perspective, relativism claims that no rational basis exists for 
judging one better than any other. For example, most modern 
Euro-Americans may rate Western medicine superior to Ayurveda 
as a way of dealing with disease. But this is done not on the basis 
of some neutral criteria of assessment. Criteria used to assess 
beliefs and actions are themselves dependent on larger 
perspectives. Thus in valorizing Western medicine all that is being 
said is that it fits better than Ayurveda with Euro-American 
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conceptions and presuppositions (which is not surprising, since it 
was itself framed in these very terms). From another, say non-
Western perspective, Ayurveda may be preferable or 
therapeutically more effective in relieving us of certain bodily 
ailments. 
Relativists hold that, science is just one of a number of 
possible perspectives, no worse, but certainly no better than any 
other. It is true that science is the preferred approach in the 
"West" where it has gained hegemony and in the process silenced 
many alternatives. But this just shows that those in the West value 
the sorts of achievements made possible by science (in particular, 
the technical control of nature). But this does not prove that 
science is inherently superior as a way of knowing. 
Relativism undermines the traditional pre-eminent standing 
of science by questioning its claims to specialness. It also 
questions out implicit faith in science in another way. Relativism 
engenders a keen appreciation for the role political power plays in 
shaping what we think and do including the frameworks we inhabit 
(here the names of Gramsci and Foucault figure prominently). This 
is not accidental, since change from one framework to another, as 
Kuhn pointed out, can not be rationally justified, it must be 
brought about and enforced by extra-rational means.''^ In fact, 
Kuhn holds that shift from one paradigm to another is neither 
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rational nor irrational but arational. Thus a positivist might think 
that scientists are in power simply because their ideas are true or 
because they employ a method most likely to arrive at truth. 
However, since we know that assessments of truth-value must 
occur within a given perspective the question becomes why one 
perspective rather than another predominates; and since a 
perspective can not be shown to be truer or better without 
invoking criteria of assessment themselves located within a 
perspective, causes other than satisfying some criteria of 
assessment must be at work. Consequently extra-rational 
mechanisms by which scientific orthodoxy is enforced is being 
focused or concentrated upon in many recent studies of science. 
Thus to a relativist, the hegemony of science shows not its 
intellectual superiority, but instead, the power of certain groups to 
dominate intellectual and political institutions. 
Since we live in the world within a particular framework, 
relativism is the only way of speaking about others who are 
different from us and thereby sensitize us to these differences. In 
this way relativism is meant to guard us against ethnocentrism (the 
view that every one is just like us). We have no independent basis 
for criticizing the way others think or act, our attitude should be 
one of tolerance and appreciation rather than judgmental that has 
so often marred human thought and practice.'*'* 
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In this way relativism is meant to guard us against 
chauvinism (excessive and unreasonable patriotism. The term is 
also used to describe an attitude of superiority towards members 
of opposite sex) and encourage us towards multiculturalism. The 
term "multiculturalism" has become something of a trendy buzz 
word. Multiculturalism is a hotly debated topic. The most 
prevalent version of multiculturalism is what may be called as 
"celebration of differences." This means that we should not only 
celebrate our commonly held or shared views but highlight our 
differences as well and respect and appreciate them. 
Multiculturalism refers to something which is crucial in the 
contemporary world: that people crucially different from one 
another have to be in mutual contact and must deal with each 
other. All multiculturalists focus on understanding and living with 
cultural and social differences. In fact, this is the need of the hour 
in the contemporary world. 
Multiculturalism so conceived poses profound problems for 
the study of human beings. According to this construal of 
multiculturalism which celebrates cultural and social differences, 
each society or culture is a single unit separated from other units 
by boundaries that define it in part by distinguishing it from 
others. Moreover, individuals also are reflections of the cultural 
and social units to which they belong. Personal identity is 
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determined by the cultural and social units into which its members 
have been encultured and socialized. Because they are different, 
these cultural and social units often conflict with one another; 
indeed some of them will inevitably attempt to undermine or 
dominate the others. Strong units attempt to overwhelm weaker 
ones and in the end seek to turn the weaker units into copies of 
themselves. In so far as they succeed they thereby annihilate the 
differences between the groups. The natural impetus in a world of 
differences is thus towards the obliteration of these differences. 
Multiculturalism construed as the celebration of differences 
is a response to this natural impetus. It insists on cultural and 
social integrity and on esteeming this integrity in others. It urges 
each group to find and nurture its own center and at the same time 
to recognize and support the efforts of those in different units to 
do likewise. Each of us lives within a framework which we share 
with a limited number of others and which differs from the 
frameworks of others. On this view our job is to realize and 
celebrate this fact, to applaud the mosaic of colors and shapes 
which comprise human life on this planet. 
By multiculturalism we mean the celebration of differences 
or in other words to respect the other cultures equally as we 
respect our own. But here lies an epistemic problem; if others live 
within their own paradigm and we live within our own, the 
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question arises as to how can we understand other culture. As a 
matter of fact, we think and act in a particular paradigm and they 
in theirs, so when we try to understand them we are forced to 
consider them in terms of other than their own. In so far as their 
terms differ fundamentally from ours, it appears that we are thus 
bound to misunderstand them. A multicultural world which 
stresses ethnic, gender, racial, religious, class and cultural 
differences and where people are keen to discover and protect 
their own particularities - leads to a fragmentation of social 
knowledge. Ultimately it appears to be the case, that only those of 
one kind can know others of that kind. Only women can 
understand other women; only a Kashmiri can understand another 
Kashmiri. 
But this means that social inquiry is severely compromised. 
For, if only women can write about women or judge what is 
written about them (and the same is true about Muslims, the 
Azande, homosexuals and so on), the idea of an open community 
of scholars engaged in dialogue in terms of public evidence is 
utterly vitiated.''^ 
However, both multiculturalism as well as relativism 
fundamentally challenge our quest to understand others. This is 
deeply disturbing, not least for multiculturalism and relativism 
themselves. The power of these ideas depend on the ability to 
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enhance our capacity to understand the ways people differ. But if 
their amplifications are that such an understanding is impossible, 
then they seem to lead to their own demolition. On reflection 
multiculturalism and relativism appear to be self-defeating. 
Relativism And Absolutism 
Normally we say that rejection of absolutism constitutes 
relativism or that the absolutistic position follows from the 
rejection of relativism. In this sense relativism is traditionally 
treated as opposed to absolutism. But as a matter of fact, both 
these positions are ambiguous philosophical positions and their 
relationship is hardly straightforward. For example, an absolutist 
would hold that there are absolute moral truths, that there are 
universal standards of moral and other values, and universal 
principles prescribing how all rational human beings should 
behave. On the other hand, relativism denies that there is any one 
set of rules which legitimately dictates as to how all human beings 
should behave. In this sense, these are two rival theories regarding 
reality. The traditional absolutistic conception of reality maintains 
that things exist independently, and therefore should also be 
described in their own terms, that is, in terms of properties they 
possess by themselves, not as objects of someone's experience. 
Further, that there exists a set of necessary principles which are 
available to knowledge and are capable of grounding an eternally 
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valid incorrigible belief system. These incorrigible truths can thus 
serve as a criterion by which to evaluate all subsidiary beliefs, 
including empirical, hypothetical and prespectively determined 
ones. What counts as necessarily true must be universal and 
absolute, for it is only by means of the absolute that even the 
relativity of a particular prespective can be known as such. 
There are three ways of expressing absolutism, each 
appearing in a discursive and an ontological variant. 
(1) Universalism: this is an approach to reality according to 
which philosophical knowledge is absolute. 
(a) Discursive variant: There are beliefs which transcend all 
spatio-temporal conditions and which are valuable to all the 
communities and all the people for all the time. 
(b) Ontological variant: There are entities which exist for all 
human beings, these entities are not cultural or paradigm-bound. 
(2) Objectivism: This is an approach to reality according to 
which philosophical knowledge is incapable of making 
critical appraisals, drawing partisan conclusions or forming 
judgments of value. 
(a) Discursive variant: There are beliefs which are independent 
of subjective points of view, these are not person-dependent or 
socially dependent. 
71 
(b) Ontological variant: There are entities which exist 
independently of the point of view of a subject. 
(3) Foundationalism: this is the view that knowledge and 
epistemic (knowledge relevant) justification have a two-tier 
structure: some instances of knowledge and justification are 
non-inferential or foundational; and all other instances 
thereof are inferential or non-foundational in that they 
derive ultimately from foundational knowledge and 
justification. 
(a) Discursive variant: There are some basic statements which are 
common to all and are not capable of further analysis which serves 
in each context for each kind of enquiry for the assessment of all 
judgments of a relevant kind. 
(b) Ontological variant: There is a common ontology or set of 
basic existents incapable of further analysis out of which all other 
existents are constructed.'"' 
Relativists are suspicious of their opponents because, the 
relativists claim that all species of absolutism almost inevitably 
turn into Vulgar or Sophisticated forms of ethnocentrisms, in 
which some privileged understanding of rationality is falsely 
legitimated claiming for it an unwarranted universality. 
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Relativism And Pluralism 
There is no hard and fast distinction between relativism and 
pluralism. In fact pluralism is a justified relativism, the only 
distinction which we think worth mentioning is pointed out as 
hereunder. 
The Pluralist does not hold with the relativist that there is no 
possibility of non-natural and non-question-begging evaluations of 
alternative claims, theories, schemes, versions, or the like. The 
pluralist subscribes, rather to a willingness to tolerate and utilize a 
diversity of ideas and approaches, while at the same time 
acknowledging criteria which afford the possibility of objective 
comparison and evaluation of diverse alternatives tolerated and 
utilized.'*' 
Relativism And Subjectivism 
We should not confuse relativism with subjectivism. 
Relativism has been related to shared experiences, history, 
language etc. Hence a relative view of the world is different from 
a subjective opinion. 
A relativist is not necessarily a subjectivist. The essential 
claim of a relativist is that there can be no higher appeal than a 
given conceptual scheme/language, set of social practices or 
historical epoch. There is a non-reducible plurality; there is no 
substantive overarching framework in which radically different 
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and alternative schemes are commensurable, no universal standard 
that somehow stands outside the competing alternatives. But a 
relativist does not necessarily claim that there is anything 
subjective about these schemes, paradigms and practices. 
Let us look at the distinction between relativism and subjectivism 
in the context of moral relativism. Although relativists are almost 
always non-objectivists of one kind or another, they need not be 
subjectivists. Subjectivism itself covers a varied terrain. Some 
subjectivists claim that moral judgments have a subject-matter 
consisting of the states of mind of human beings: beliefs feelings, 
attitudes and the like. Others maintain that non-cognitive states of 
mind are the sources of moral judgments. 
Subjectivists hold that moral judgments are primarily 
motivated by feelings, emotions or attitudes. Subjectivists attach 
no cognitive weightage to these moral judgments because they 
think moral judgments are non-cognitive, affective/conative states 
of mind rather than result of a fact or evidence independent of 
such states. Emotivistists and prescriptivists fall in this category, 
who hold that moral judgments are expressions of attitudes. On the 
other hand, relativists often picture moral judgments as describing, 
as depending on for their justification or as being the response to 
moral customs or rules that are independent of how the individuals 
making these judgments actually believe or feel about the subject 
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matter of a judgment. In fact, relativists of this persuasion are 
able to show ways in which moral judgments are relative to rules 
that are independent of the current beliefs and feelings of the 
group or culture governed by the rules. Although non-objectivists, 
these relativists are not subjectivists. Of course, relativism may 
sometimes take on a subjective form. The most extreme example 
of this kind of theory is the view that interprets a moral judgment 
as being true if the person making it believes it to be true-'x is 
good' if and only if "I believe that 'x is good'.'" This 
subjectivistic form of relativism has few supporters today. Most 
current versions of relativism testify to the possibility of a theory 
that is both non-objectivist and non-subjectivist. 
Criticism 
Relativism is sometimes praised for its tolerance in 
abstaining from cross-cultural or moral judgments and sometimes 
criticized for its intolerance in violating them. A relativist may 
attempt to persuade his opponents to accept his frame-work and 
govern their lives accordingly, but he will not use rational 
persuasions in this endeavour. 
A relativist can not maintain the usual sense of "true" or the 
prespective force of moral judgments, because he admits his own 
position and other positions to be equally valid, true or well-
grounded. But the relativist need not concede any such status to 
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statements made in frameworks other than his own: the words such 
as 'true' or 'well-grounded' are satisfied only by the criteria of his 
framework. For a relativist there are no rational bases available to 
show his position or his opponent's position preferable. 
Consequently, relativism immediately proves in-coherent since the 
relativist can not in his own terms assert its truth. 
For the relativists there is no possibility of genuinely 
answering epistemological questions. Such questions can be 
genuinely answered only from the absolutistic vantage point or 
one can say that these questions require or pre-suppose 
absolutism. Hence a relativist who has given up absolutist 
conception of rightness can not assert the foundationalism/non 
foundationalism/correspondence/coherence theories of truth and 
justification or causal/reliabilist/defensibilist etc, theories of 
knowledge or the like as non-relatively right. The relativist can 
not regard those epistemological questions as serious ones which 
admit of non-relative examination. Thus, only an absolutist can 
regard epistemological inquiry as legitimate and open.'^^ 
Furthermore, it appears that the relativism/ absolutism controversy 
is prior to or more basic than other epistemological concerns such 
that it can be regarded as the epistemological bed-rock. 
^ T-62Z7 \'^  
In so far as relativism h a s ^ e e n criticized more often than 
defended, there are some s ignr f t^^ t , 9b.je.cti;€Jis which are 
frequently raised against relativism: 
1. It is very difficult to know what exactly "relativism'" means. 
There are so many theories calling themselves relativist that 
the term carries no clear denotations. 
2. The relativist invalidly derives an ethical thesis that all 
moral values are relative to the culture or society. This 
thesis holds that a moral belief is not true for all rational 
human beings or that no moral belief pictures objective 
facts. 
3. Relativist holds that people living in a particular society are 
bound to obey the rules of that particular society without 
realizing that this is in fact an absolutist thesis. This 
position is therefore incoherent. Sometimes the relativist 
inconsistently derives the claim that one should be tolerant 
of those who disagree with one on moral issues-another 
absolutist thesis from the claim that no set of moral beliefs 
is more correct than any other. 
4. It is very difficult for a relativist to identify the groups 
whose opinions, attitudes, mores, and moral standards 
determine what is right or wrong for an individual. It is 
essential, however, that this be done if the truth of moral 
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judgments depends on its being in accord with the mores or 
standards of this group or, alternatively, if people ought to 
obey the rules of their social group. If a person is a member 
of a group by virtue of sharing its moral principles and 
standards, then any person disagreeing with these moral 
convictions would not be a member of that group. This 
would make it impossible to condemn people for having 
beliefs out of accord with those of their society as some 
relativists wish to do. 
5. The relativist position becomes incoherent by virtue of 
entailing that some acts are both right and wrong, that some 
moral judgments are both true and false etc. If an act is right 
when it accords with the principles of the speaker or 
appraiser, a particular act may be right by virtue of 
according with one speaker's principle and wrong because it 
fails to accord with another speaker's principles. Or if a 
moral judgment is true when it accords with the standards of 
one group and false when it does not, the same judgment 
may be true with respect to the standards of one group and 
false with respect to the standards of another-consequently, 
such a relativistic position is judged to be incoherent. 
6. If the relativist tries to escape the kind of incoherence 
discussed above, it is often in such a way as to turn genuine 
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moral disagreements and conflicts into disagreements that 
are not genuine. Incoherence is sometimes avoided by 
interpreting moral judgments as containing in their meaning 
some essential references to a particular person, group or set 
of standards. Moral judgments that apparently conflict but in 
fact make reference to different persons, groups, or set of 
standards, are judgments that do not really conflict. They 
could all be true, each with respect to a distinctive set of 
standards or principles. This is implausible, the critic of 
relativism contends in that it would turn genuine conflicts 
between individuals and cultures into so many confused 
instances of talking past one another.^** Cannibals who eat 
their victims think such acts are morally obligatory, and do 
not feel any kind of hesitation, as they follow their 
principles. We Indians think cannibalism is morally 
repugnant, and vehemently condemn this act. For a relativist, 
both positions are logically compatible. But surely the critic 
claims, we do disagree with the cannibals, just as we 
disagree on many other issues with people from other 
cultures. The relativistic analysis of moral judgments is 
therefore false. 
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CHAPTER -II 
RATIONALITY 
The words 'Rational' and 'rationality' are so common that not only 
Philosophers or students of Philosophy but laymen also use these 
words without any hesitation. For example, driving fast is 
irrational; committing rape, loot and murder and all such activities 
are irrational. But, strictly speaking, this is not the meaning of 
'rationality'. 
'Rationality' is not as well defined a concept as one may wish. 
Etymologically, speaking, it is derived from a Latin word ' rat io ' , 
The English translation of which is "reason"' 
In fact, several definitions have been put forward for the concept 
of rationality from time to time. In contemporary discourse too, 
one comes across diverse definitions of rationality. For instance, 
the general contemporary approach to the understanding of 
rationality can be said to derive largely from Immanuel Kant, who 
attributes to human beings the full-scale rationality which places 
them on a higher plane compared to the rest. For Kant, rationality 
consists in the capacity for making Judgments or having beliefs; a 
quality exclusively human. According to Kant, there are three 
main contexts of rationality: 
i. the cognitive 
2. the practical 
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3. the evaluative 
These are united in their common task of implementing " the best 
reasons", reasons for belief, action and evaluation respectively. In 
each case, rationality requires the use of intelligence for figuring 
out the best thing to do in the circumstances. 
Rationality consists in the appropriate use of reason to 
resolve choice in the best possible way. If we call somebody 
rational or describe his behavior as rational, we are talking about 
his use of intelligence for figuring out the best thing to do in the 
circumstances. Rationality is not a matter of involuntary action. It 
is a matter of doing the best one can with the means at one's 
disposal for the best results achievable. Optimization in what one 
thinks, does and values, is the crux of rationality. 
Whenever there is a question of decision, reason comes into 
operation. 
Kant sees three major contexts of choice: 
Actions- what acts to perform. 
Belief- which beliefs to accept or endorse. 
Evaluation- what to value and disvalue. 
These three represent the spheres of cognitive, practical and 
evaluative reason."' 
Rationality is not just a matter of thought but of action as 
well. All human beings are endowed with intelligence, but some 
are more intelligent, whereas others are less intelligent. In fact 
quality of intelligence differs. But a person who performs any kind 
of action unintelligently or acts unintelligently in figuring out the 
proper thing to do, thereby commits a rational fault. Rational 
people are people whose beliefs, evaluations and actions are on the 
whole rational. Similarly, rational plans are plans based upon 
rational beliefs, assessments, and actions; rational arrangements 
based on rational plans, and so on. The entire fabric of the 
conception of rationality is spun from the threads of rational 
belief, evaluation and action."* 
When a person acts rationally in matters of belief, action and 
evaluation, then we simply say that his reasons are cogent reasons 
for doing so. Rationality thus involves the capacity 'to give an 
account', to use one's intelligence to provide a 'rationale' for what 
one does that establishes its appropriateness. It is a matter of 
conducting one's affairs responsibly, of being able to provide an 
account of proper reasons for what one does in a way that will 
enable people to see the point and to accept that it makes good 
sense to proceed as one did. A belief or an action or an evaluation 
is accordingly rational if the agent can tell a story that succeeds in 
making sense of it by showing that -- and how -- it was a sensible 
thing to arrive at in the circumstances due to its optimal 
conduciveness to appropriate ends. Where something is amiss in 
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an agent's management of his belief, evaluation or action, where 
his information and appraisals, or his decisions are inappropriate 
in the circumstances, there is a failure of rationality.^ 
Other efforts to present a reasonable picture of rationality have 
been made by Jarvie I. and J. Agassi. According to them a rational 
action is one based on the actor's goals or aims, his present 
knowledge and beliefs. At another place Jarvie states his position 
more clearly when he says almost in passing and in parenthesis, 
"For my part I accept the idea of goal directedness as the criteria 
of rationality."^ 
Mullick, M also brings into account the ends of action when she 
makes the two-fold assumption regarding the concept of rational 
action. She is of the view, first, that all actions, all beliefs are 
related to some end; second, that an action is characterisable as 
rational or irrational only in relation to that end.^ Later a shift in 
her position is evident when she makes the claim 
"that there is a sense in which the term 
"rationality" is currently used which 
identifies it with intelligibility - via the 
notion of rationale of doing things, the 
point of do into them."** 
Martin Hollis makes a strong claim that anthropology is possible 
only on the assumption that all societies are rational in precisely 
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the way of Western rational thought. If anthropology is to be 
possible, the natives must share the Western anthropologist's 
concept of truth, coherence and rational interdependence of 
beliefs. In other words, Western rational thought is not just one 
species of rational thought, nor rational thought just one species of 
thought.'^ 
Stephen lukes sums up the various definitions of rationality 
in a nutshell. 
"There are.... well used senses of 
"rational" as applied to action, such as the 
widest sense of simply goal-directed 
actions; the sense in which an action is said 
to be (maximally) rational if what is in fact 
the most efficient means is adopted to 
achieve a given end; the sense in which an 
action is in fact conducive to the agent's 
(expressed or unexpressed) 'long term' 
ends; the sense in which the agent's ends 
are ends he ought to have."'" 
Before, we highlight two possible definitions of rationality, 
which we think are more accurate and robust than the others, it 
may be pointed out that, broadly speaking, rationality has been 
declared to consist in logical consistency. For instance, we call 
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some one irrational who affirms both 'P ' and not ' P ' . By 
implication, someone who acts flagrantly in violation of his own 
interests or his own avowed objectives can be considered to be 
irrational. No doubt logical consistancy is a necessary condition 
for rationality, but it can not be the sufficient condition for 
rationality. The meaning of rationality can not be exhausted purely 
in terms of logical consistency and empirical evidence. 
Now let us discuss the two most plausible definitions of 
rationality. 
Good Reasons Theory of Rationality: 
Minimally rationality means to have reasons for one's 
actions and beliefs. But this definition as it stands is incomplete. 
What is needed is not just reasons but good or adequate reasons. 
This means that we have to analyse what are "good reasons". Good 
reasons must be cogent in themselves and comparatively the best 
available referring to the real interests of the agent rather than 
mere wants. This matter of good reasons is not something 
subjective or idiosyncratic. It is objective and lies in the public 
domain." 
Rationality accordingly pivots on the deployment of good 
reasons; I am being rational if my actions are governed by suitable 
or good reasons, if I proceed in the cognitive, practical and 
evaluative contexts on the basis of cogent reasons for what I do. 
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And the question of motivation is a crucial aspect of rationality; as 
with morality, it is a matter of doing the right things for the right 
reasons (if someone does what is, in the circumstances, the 
intelligent thing to do, but does it simply by accident or on a 
whim, he is not thereby comporting himself rationally). To be 
sure, the reasons that support beliefs, actions and evaluations may 
rest on rather general principles and lack any sort of fine grained 
particularity. My 'good reasons' for taking this medication is 
simply that the doctor prescribed it; my 'good reason' for believing 
that the population of Kashmir exceeds five million is simply that 
the encyclopedia says so. And that is quite good enough to support 
the rationality of my beliefs in the circumstances. Belief formation 
at a remove from the sort of substantive reasons at issue in first 
hand information still qualifies as rational. 
A rational agent's "reason" for taking a certain step 
(adopting a belief or performing an action or making an 
evaluation) is a consideration or line of thought which provides 
this agent with a justifying ground for taking that step, and which 
can therefore- in the agent's own view- serve to explain or validate 
it. Of course not all reasons for actions are good reasons in the 
sense of being cogent that is of such a sort that they would move 
someone who proceeded in an intelligent and sensible way. 
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So, to do something rationally is to do it for good and cogent 
reasons. And this is not the same as just having a motive for doing 
it .All of us almost always act from motives, but valid reasons are 
what motivate the rational agent and most of us do not act 
rationally all the time. All too often we are moved to what we do 
by desires or wants, and these may or may not be rationally well 
advised. The crux is that it may or may not be in one's best 
interests to get what one desires-that very much depends on 
exactly what is it that one happens to want .People automatically 
have a motive whenever there is desire but they only have good 
reason for what they do when it is recognizably in their best 
interests. The thief has reasons for persevering for theft and the 
revenge- seeker also has reasons for stalking his victim. The mere 
fact that one wants something- that it accords with one's desires-
is certainly some reason for opting for it and provides a ground of 
sorts. But such wilful agents are rational only in potentiality and 
not in act.'^ For mere unevaluated desires can provide us with 
'reasons' for acting that are not necessarily anything like 
sufficiently good reasons. Our mere wants have very little 
significance in rational domain. In fact, these wants should be out-
weighed by our interests and our needs. 
Good reasons are those whose guidance optimally serves our 
real or best interests in the matters at issue. What makes a reason 
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a good reason is the fact that its implementation leads our efforts 
in the appropriate direction and the best reasons are those that 
achieve the most in this way. But the answer to the question "what 
are good reasons" seems still inadequate and vague. I wish to 
make it clearer by referring to Dr. Sayeed's "Cross cultural 
rationality" in which he holds: 
"A reason is of course a complex 
entity, it could be logical, causal or some 
other kind. This complex entity comprises 
at least of two components. The first 
component represents a cognitive belief 
and second a network of rules". 
Let us make the above point clearer by an example. Suppose 
someone says it is going to rain. If we ask him the reason for his 
belief, the answer would be something like. "The sky is dark and 
cloudy and there is a cool breeze." But this is not the complete 
answer as far as the statement of the reason is concerned. There is 
a second component which is usually left implicit which would be 
something like. "And whenever the sky is cloudy and there is cool 
breeze, it rains." This second component states the rule which 
connects the first component with the belief in question. One 
might say that in a narrow sense the first component is the reason 
for the belief and the second component is the justification of the 
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reason, and the two constitute a unit since, properly speaking, only 
a justified reason is a reason. The first component which 
represents a cognitive belief refers to a state of affairs. It is 
connected to other such beliefs and it would ultimately terminate 
in what would be regarded as cognitively self-evident or 
foundational belief. The second component which represents the 
network of rules states a rule or a criterion and while it may be 
grounded in more basic rules or more general rules of which it is 
an instance or an application, it would constitute an element in a 
network of several such rules. Any belief system whatsoever 
involves both: the chains of cognitive beliefs and the network of 
rules. So to be rational is to have good reasons for one's total 
behavior. This implies that rationality can not be determined in a 
significant sense by the presence or absence of good reasons for 
occasional behavior. It also implies that rationality is not a matter 
of isolated good reasons. Rather it is a matter of an entire network 
of good reasons.'^ Here we wish to emphasize one more important 
point regarding which there has been considerable confusion, viz; 
who is 'rational'? Traditionally it is thought that beliefs, 
propositions and actions are rational, but as Dr. Sayeed argues, 
beliefs can only be true or false, similarly a proposition can only 
be true or false but not rational or irrational. In fact, no inanimate 
material object or an abstract entity can be rational or irrational."' 
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Let us examine why beliefs, belief-systems and practices or 
even facts are not rational- irrational. Let us begin with facts:there 
are no such things as rational or irrational facts. Facts might be 
intelligible or unintelligible. But this feature of facts does not 
warrant us to say that facts are rational or irrational. 
How about practices? At first sight, practices would seem to be 
amenable to the definition given above. Practices must have 
reasons. Irrational practices, then, would be those which are 
backed by bad reasons while rational practices are those that have 
sound reasons behind them. But as Dr. Sayeed says, as far as 
practices are concerned it is not probably so difficult (as opposed 
to beliefs) to sort things out. Practices are deliberate, purposive 
activities and to say that a practice has a good reason behind it is 
to say that it will achieve the purpose intended. But intentions, 
once again, are entertained only by persons. Strictly speaking, a 
practice does not have an intention. In other words, if an action P 
is such that it leads to the consequence Q, and if I intended Q, I 
would have good reasons for doing P. In fact, actions have neither 
purposes nor intentions. To say that an action has a purpose is just 
an elliptical way of saying that the person performing the action 
intends the consequences that would follow from that action. This 
in turn means that to say that a practice has good reasons behind it 
is to say that the agent engaged in that practice correctly believes 
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that consequences intended by him will result from the actions 
which constitute that practice. Hence in the strict sense practices 
do not have reasons, and consequently the question of their being 
rational or irrational does not arise. To say that a certain practice 
is irrational is just a loose way of saying that the person engaging 
in that practice does not have good reasons (however determined) 
for doing so. Let us now analyse beliefs in the same way. One 
does hear a great deal about rational/irrational - beliefs and by 
extension about irrational belief-systems and cultures and so on. 
Superstitions are usually defined as irrational beliefs. Discussion 
on notions like relativism and other related issues one way or the 
other involves taking a stand about the rationality and irrationality 
of beliefs. But in precisely what sense are there such things as 
rational or irrational beliefs? Well, one does speak of reasons for 
beliefs. It would appear reasonable to say that an irrational belief 
is one without good reasons for holding it. But certainly this does 
not mean that beliefs have reasons. We have reasons for holding 
the beliefs. Beliefs are by themselves simply true or false. They 
would be taken as true or false depending upon their relations to 
facts or on logical relations to other beliefs whose truth is not in 
question. That is to say, we decide whether they are true or not on 
the basis of their relations to facts etc., or more accurately on the 
basis of our perception of their relation to facts, etc.'^ 
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Furthermore, propositions by themselves do not point to the 
corresponding facts nor do facts point by themselves to the 
corresponding propositions. We identify a fact and this 
identification is not always a matter of simply picking out one fact 
from a collection as the one corresponding to the propositions 
under consideration. To put it more simply, beliefs are true or 
false and they have criteria which determine their truth or falsity. 
But criteria are applied by us according to certain rules. And rules, 
as Wittgenstein pointed out, are not part of the furniture of the 
world. We make the rules and we decide which rules to apply. 
Which rules are to be applied in turn depends on the contexts. 
However, we must be very clear as to what such an assertion 
means. Contexts are not given. It is not as if its respective context 
surrounds a fact or a belief or a rule like atmosphere and all we 
have to do is to refer to it. Nothing exists in a vacuum. But 
everything has infinite number of overlapping facts surrounding it, 
standing in some relation to it. Whatever has a relationship with 
an entity - no matter how remote the relation - is an element of its 
total context. But when we talk about contexts what we mean is 
not that total context but the relevant context. And relevance is a 
matter of selectivity, of decision. But the decision in turn is 
guided by our reasons. So, persons decide whether or not a belief 
is acceptable on the basis of what they regard as pertinent reasons. 
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Therefore, rationality is not an attribute of facts, beliefs, practices 
or theories. It is an attribute of persons and it has to do with the 
rightness of the reasons which prompt them to say, believe or do 
something. Any talk of rational or irrational belief and practices is 
at best a rather misleading short-hand for saying that a person is 
rational or irrational in connection with those particular beliefs or 
practies. 
Instrumental Theory Of Rationality 
The second possible definition which we wish to highlight is often 
called "instrumental rationality," that is, to achieve our desired 
ends by successful means. Usually it has been accepted by 
philosophers that rational action is one which is based on agents 
aims and goals and upon his beliefs and knowledge at the time. 
Thus from above lines we can conclude that goal - directedness 
and conformity with beliefs and knowledge are necessary for 
rational action. A creature that possesses the capacity for rational 
agency ought to realize this potential - it ought to act so as to 
develop itself as a rational being. For, to lose out on such an 
opportunity to realize the good is simply unintelligent and thus 
contrary to the impetus of reason. Human beings are free agents, 
and as such do well in the path of reason, not because 
consideration of necessity dictates that human beings must, but 
because desirability indicates that this affords the greatest real 
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advantage for us as the sort of creature we are. Rationality is not 
something which has been programmed into human beings. When 
we claim that we are free rational agents, we simply justify our 
position in the world's scheme of things. Consequently, rationality 
becomes a matter of duty for us, of ontological obligation. 
Aristotle was of the view that we deliberate not about ends but 
about means. Successful means lead us to some end. 
Apart from the formal issues of logic and mathematics, 
reason merely deals in description-information about the world's 
states of affairs and relationships of cause and effect. Accordingly 
reason is strictly instrumental; it can inform me about what I must 
do if I wish to arrive at a certain destination.'^ 
In fact, both, the efficacy of means and validity of goals are 
essential aspects of practical rationality. A rational agent certainly 
can not say "I adopt G as a goal of mine, but I am indifferent 
regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of means towards the 
goal". A person is considered as rational only when he proceeds in 
a situation of choice by asking himself an objective question, as to 
what is to be deemed preferable. He should not ask questions like 
what do I prefer. In fact, a rational agent does not only satisfy his 
desires but should demand management of desires as well.^^ 
To proceed rationally we must care not just for the efficacy 
of the means but also for the worth of the ends. The most 
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fundamental judgment we make regarding even merely 
hypothetical developments, is whether they are or are not "a good 
thing". Being rational involves endeavoring to do well 
(intelligently) what we must by nature do, and evaluation is 
emphatically a part of this. 
Now the question is what are the rational desires? 
Action in pursuit of what we desire is not rendered rational 
by this fact alone. The crucial issue is one of evaluating the desire 
itself, of determining whether the desired object is actually 
desirable, something worthy of desire (desires may be enough to 
explain an action, but it is not thereby enough to qualify it as 
rational). Desiring a thing does not make that particular thing, a 
rationally desirable thing. As a mater of fact one can not act all 
the time rationally or in other words, as existentialists pointed out 
irrationalities are embedded in the very condition of man. 
Sometimes we can be irrational in the adaptation of ends. 
Apparent interests are not necessarily real, getting what one wants 
is not necessarily to one's benefit, goals are not rendered valid by 
their mere adoption. Sometimes our desired ends can be self-
destructive, self-defeating or they can not meet our true needs. 
Rationality calls for objective judgment-for an assessment of 
preferability, rather than for mere subjective expression of 
preference. 
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John Rawls, a contemporary American social philosopher, 
emphasizes the idea that specific aims and desires must be 
evaluated in a "life plan". While the expression "life plan" may 
suggest a rigid over-intellectualized conception of rational living, 
this interpretation is not necessarily warranted. By "life plan" 
Rawls means a system of aims. He further holds that there are 
some aims which are concerned with immediate future goals, 
whereas there are some aims which are concerned with long-term 
goals. Some are passing and others are relatively stable. Some are 
central to our lives and others peripheral, even trivial. In 
evaluating possible actions, we need to consider how attempts to 
realize some ends will affect others. A rational person is one who 
gives greater weight to desires that cohere with and enhance the 
prospects of satisfying our central goals rather than interfering 
with them. One wants to achieve as many of one's important goals 
as possible. For example, if I act on my desire to speed down the 
highway, this will jeopardize my chances of realizing other 
desires, including my desire to reach the hostel safely, to protect 
my friends from trauma, to avoid killing or injuring others on the 
road, and to finish the writing of this thesis etc. 
Finally, nothing in the means/ends account requires that 
there is always a single act that is the very best act for the agent to 
perform, when there is more than one rationally permissible 
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action, reason allows us to do any one of them. There is no reason 
for a rational person to suffer. For means/ends theorists, then, 
there is no reason for people to act on behalf of ends they do not 
desire. Since desiring some end necessarily involves some 
motivation to achieve it, we can express this view by saying that 
something can be a reason for a person's acting only if a person is 
motivated to act in accord with it. Motivation plays an important 
role in achieving some goal. In fact motivation is necessary for 
our reason. Reasons must always possess some motivational force 
in order to be reasons at all. Thus, when we determine what it is 
rational for a person to do, we must base our assessment on 
information about what that person is motivated to do. If someone 
thinks that something is good or that some act ought to be done, it 
follows that she/he must want that thing or want that act to be 
done. She/he may be motivated to act out of self-interest, out of 
concern for another person, or because the action conforms to a 
principle, she/he holds. The motivations can be quite diverse, but 
there must always be some form of motivation underlying a 
person's reasons and evaluations. This view is often called 
"internalism" because it links reasons to motivations, that already 
exist in what Bernard Williams calls a person's "motivational set". 
In contrast, "externalism" is the view that there can be reasons for 
a person to act that are not linked to his actual motivations. 
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According to externalists, there may be reasons why a person 
should perform an action even though she has no desire to act that 
way and no desire for the result that the action will produce. 
Williams, after analyzing both internal and external reasons, 
concludes: 
"It is very plausible to suppose that all 
external reasons are false. The only real 
claim about reasons for actions will be 
internal claim". 
Later he suggests that statements asserting the existence of 
external reasons for actions are 'false,' incoherent, or really 
something else, misleadingly expressed. 
The implications of internalism for morality are most clearly 
brought out by Gilbert Harman, who both defends the internalist 
view and makes explicit its striking implications about the status 
of moral principles. Applying the internalist view of a reason to 
morality Harman writes "to think that you ought to do something 
is to be motivated to do it." Moreover, he says if someone else 
asserts that you ought to do something and that you therefore have 
a reason to do it, his judgment presupposes that you have some 
motivation to do it. If the act they claim you ought to do is not 
connected to anything you care about, then Harman says you have 
no reason to do it. 
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When we criticize someone for failing to respond to a reason 
that we believe ought to be taken seriously, we are using "reason" 
in a normative, evaluative sense and not in a neutral, explanatory 
sense. A person for example who is never influenced by the 
exposure of contradictions in his belief would be a person with a 
severe cognitive defects, an inability to respond to a reason that 
normal people can respond to. Let us come back to desires. 
Bernard Gert argues that there is a limited set of desires that are 
intrinsically irrational. According to Gert it is irrational for people 
to desire any of the following things for themselves; death, 
disablement, pain, deprivation of freedom or opportunity, and 
deprivation of pleasure. Because it is irrational to desire these 
things, an action that is effective in causing them will not qualify 
as rational.^"' 
Gert does not deny that there are some circumstances in 
which it is not irrational - or we can even say it is rational - to 
prefer one of these evils to some alternative. He insists however, 
that it is irrational to want them for themselves. As he notes: 
"we would all distinguish between a 
terminally ill person, who prefers death to 
pointless suffering and someone who for no 
reason wants to die. Likewise, we 
distinguish between someone who prefers 
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to have a gangrenous leg amputated rather 
than die and someone who simply wants to 
have the leg removed. If the choice of an 
evil is rational, it must be a means to avoid 
some greater evil or to bring about some 
good.2^ 
Richard Brandt develops and defends a version of the 
means/end theory which explicitly attempts to show what makes 
certain desires irrational. Brandt's theory is grounded in 
psychological theory of motivation. Brandt claims that a desire is 
irrational if it would cease to be felt after a person has undergone 
"cognitive psychotherapy". This is a process in which desires are 
confronted with repeated, vivid, presentation of facts about the 
origin and nature of the desires themselves. A desire is rational, 
Brandt says, if it survives this process and irrational if it is 
extinguished by it. Our beliefs can and do influence our desires. 
Focusing on relevant facts often does have the kind of effect he 
describes. Second, he does not deny that much time and energy 
may be required to extinguish some desires and aversions Finally, 
he does not claim that all "mistaken," desires and aversions will 
extinguish as a result of cognitive psychotherapy. 
If a desire will not extinguish then it is not irrational. This 
result is consistent with the general view that a desire is rational if 
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it has been influenced by facts and logic as much as possible. 
Inextinguishable desires meet this condition. This extinguish-
ability criterion is a formal criterion of rationality in the sense 
that it leaves it entirely open as to what things will be rational to 
desire. 
Consider Brandt's case of the person who wants an academic 
career because his parents are academician and he thinks they want 
him to follow in their foot steps. Suppose that he is unsuited to 
academic life, that he does not enjoy the work, that his prospects 
are not very good etc. Finally suppose that his parents do not want 
him to duplicate their career choice. In spite of this and after 
repeated efforts at cognitive psychotherapy, he continues to desire 
an academic career and the desire does not extinguish. According 
to Brandt's formal criterion, we have to call his desire for an 
academic career rational, in spite of its unsuitability and the false 
basis on which the desire is founded. Yet, Brandt's account of how 
desires can be irrational because they are founded on false beliefs 
seems to provide strong grounds for judging this desire to be 
irrational. 
If one is trying to determine whether he is acting rationally, 
one must look both at the evidence and the values he is in a 
position to know and understand. Part of what makes means/ends 
theories plausible is that our most common evaluations of the 
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rationality of action have to do with efficacy. We assume that 
people have certain practical needs, desires and goals and we 
judge their behavior to be irrational, when they fail to do what 
will obviously promote the attainment of their own goals. Of 
course, we do not always use the word 'irrational' in such 
evaluations. We are more likely to describe such actions as silly, 
stupid or foolish. 
Lastly we want to highlight the normative role of rationality. 
The key point is that the significance of rationality does not 
ultimately lie in its role as descriptive characterization of human 
proceedings (in how people do function) but rather in its 
normative role as an indication how people should function in the 
best interests of their cognitive and practical concerns. 
Rationality, like morality, is of normative bearing, 
concerned with the correct, proper and intelligent way of doing 
things, and not with the merely usual, customary course of things. 
The norms of rationality - like those of morality - are in no way 
undermined or invalidated by the fact that people violate them. 
Natural forces are a-rational; foolish and unreasonable 
people are often irrational; mystics and visionaries comport 
themselves in ways that are extra - rational in proceedings by 
"purely intuitive" means when in circumstances, where reason is 
rather silent than negative. In particular it warrants to be noted 
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that the a-rational is one thing and irrational another. One can 
only be actually irrational if one has the capacity for reason and 
proceeds to neglect, misuse or abuse it. The violations of 
rationality that are at issue in irrationality generally fall into three 
main groups: 
(1) The incorrect assessment of ends: adopting ends unsuited to 
one's needs or interests. 
(2) The inadequate management of means to ends: adopting acts 
geared to means unsuited to one's ends. 
(3) The seriously inappropriate allocation of resources: 
investing one's limited resources of time, efforts, attention, 
money, or the like in such a way that some interests are 
grossly overemphasized at the expense of others that are no 
less important. '' 
Rationality And Objectivity 
A central assumption of large research as in physical sciences is 
that scientists are attempting to understand items that exist and 
have properties independently of the researcher's beliefs. When a 
physicist maintains that all matter is constructed out of electrons, 
neutrons and protons, or that every bit of matter in the universe 
exerts a gravitational attraction on every other piece of matter, 
she/he is claiming, correctly or incorrectly, that these are features 
of the physical world. To be sure, such claims are made by 
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individuals who live in a certain historical epoch and culture, and 
are made in a language that is characteristic of that epoch and 
culture. However, these are not claims about that epoch, culture, 
or language as such. One of the things that language permits us to 
do is to make claims about items that exist apart from us; claims 
that are either true or false, and for which we can have evidence. 
While this point is particularly clear in physical sciences, it also 
holds in other fields. For example: 
(1) Biologists claim that genetic information is encoded in 
DNA. 
(2) Anthropologists describe the role of poison oracle in Azande 
culture. 
(3) Some theologians claim that the universe was created out of 
nothing at a definite point of time. 
In many of these cases there are difficulties about how we 
assess the truth or falsity of the claim, and there are cultural and 
linguistic prerequisites that must be met before we can understand 
the claim. In addition, a given claim may have a function in the 
social setting that is quite independent of its truth and falsity. But 
once all of this has been acknowledged, the point remains that 
many claims make assertions about some states of affairs that are 
independent of those claims. 
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Consider now the kind of evidence that is required if we are 
to arrive at a rational assessment of these claims. Scientists seek 
this evidence by carrying out observations and experiments and 
one feature of these procedures is particularly important: scientists 
attempt to get information about an item by interacting with that 
item. Thus physicists study electrons by experimenting on 
electrons. Biologists study D.N.A by observing D.N.A .An 
anthropologist who wishes to study a particular culture begins by 
traveling to the place where the people in question are to be found, 
and the discussion of that culture must be based on evidences that 
were derived by interacting with that culture. Scientists undertake 
to evaluate a claim about some item by examining that item. 
Anthropologist examine some other item whose relationship to the 
item of study is a bit more tenuous. Scientists base their claims 
about items in the physical world on an examination of those 
items. Similarly anthropologists try to mix up with that culture 
and learn the local language in order to study that culture. We take 
cases of this sort to be paradigm examples of the pursuit of 
objectivity. Consequently we accept a claim about some item on 
an objective basis when we do so as a result of assessing evidence 
derived from a study of that item. But the question is whether all 
subject matters can be studied objectively or not. There are some 
subjects which do not deal with those items which have the 
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required ontological status. For example, in Ethics, we do not 
have objective basis for evaluating ethical claims. The reason for 
this is simple - that there is ethical diversity among cultures. This 
does not mean that there is no role of rationality in these fields. In 
fact there is an objective basis for deciding which of the moral 
rules exist in a particular society/culture. For example, one might 
have reasons for believing that an ethical system ought to have a 
certain degree of coherence, and this could provide grounds for 
rational analysis. Objective study does not mean that there should 
be an object having some material reference and then we will 
study that material entity as such. But as a matter of fact, 
objective study means that we study items that are independent of 
the claims we make about them. For example, when we study 
mathematics we do not have entities as such, but even then we 
have grounds for evaluating mathematical claims that do not 
depend on the existence of special kinds of entities. 
Second, there are cases in which the contents of a text can be 
a source information about something other than itself. Examining 
an item is clearly a legitimate means of obtaining information 
about that item, while we need an account of why it is legitimate 
to get this information by examining some other item. In many 
cases, this justification will consist of tracing out a set of relations 
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between the item before us and the item that ultimately interests 
us. 
There are some objective studies of entities in which entity 
does not exist at all. We can see such cases in the history of 
physical sciences. To understand this possibility we need only to 
note that interesting claims do not just assert the existence of 
some item, they also make a set of assertions about how that item 
will interact with other items. When we test these assertions and 
do not get the expected results a number of options become 
available including the possibility of reconsidering whether a 
postulated entity actually exists. 
Finally, sometimes it is worth to follow a non-objective procedure, 
or we can say it is rational to follow a non objective method, even 
if there is an objective procedure available. For example, while 
constructing a social structure, we usually ignore a certain kind of 
objective evidence which leads to destruction of the set of beliefs 
on which social well - being depends. Cases of this sort are tricky. 
It would seem that any group that wishes to survive ignores such 
evidences only at its peril, yet there may be social groups that do 
not take survival as their highest goal. Our point here is only that 
these cases are complex, and that we should not automatically 
write off such groups as irrational even though they eschew 
objectivity. 
107 
Objectivity and rationality are not one and the same thing, 
though objectivity provides us with an especially powerful source 
of evidence. In fact objectivity tries to bring us in contact with the 
object (item) we are going to study. But as a matter of fact 
objectivity without rational assessment leads us nowhere. Then by 
evidences provided by objective procedure, we must still decide 
what to make of this evidence. Is the available evidence sufficient 
to justify accepting a claim, or do we need more evidence? Does a 
negative result disprove a claim or is the problem somewhere else? 
Should we seek a completely different hypothesis that is in 
conformity with the available evidence? These questions and 
others fall within the realm of rational decision making on which 
we must rely once the evidence that can be gleaned from the 
application of objective procedure is available. Objectivity is still 
epistemically important because it provides us with an especially 
powerful body of evidence to be used in the rational assessment of 
claims. Gathering objective evidence can be extremely difficult 
and time-consuming, but objective procedures provide evidence 
that may well offer the best path to substantive truth. 
Science provides an especially important test case for a 
model of rationality. Rationality requires the assessment of 
evidence, and we should be able to get our best examples of 
rationality by looking at cases in which the most valid and reliable 
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evidence is systematically gathered and deployed. It we were to 
look at fields in which decision must be made on the basis of 
minimal evidence, and in which decisions could not be checked by 
gathering further evidence, we are likely to get a very distorted 
view of the significance of evidence in arriving at beliefs. 
Objective procedures provide the richest and most reliable 
evidence, and one of the characteristic features of science is its 
systematic pursuit of objective evidence. This is sufficient to 
justify the selection of science as a prime instance of a field in 
which we should expect to find rationality at work. Of course, 
science is not the only field in which rationality is possible, but 
the special power of cognitive science, including its claim to be 
the best approach to truth in its domains, derives from the way in 
which objectivity and rationality interact, that is, on the way in 
which rational assessment is applied to a particularly powerful 
body of evidence. 
Rationality And Truth 
Traditionally it has been assumed that only true as against false 
propositions can be rationally accepted or deemed to be 
acceptable. In fact, this classical model of rationality holds that 
truth and rationality can not be separated. In recent decades the 
significance of the notion of truth has been subject to much 
criticism. Relativists have emphasized that people from different 
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societies accept radically different sets of claims as true, and have 
maintained that there is no way in which we can choose between 
these 'Truths'. And even if we do not accept relativism, we must 
still acknowledge that there are cases in which it is extremely 
difficult to determine whether a claim is true or false, and cases in 
which long-held beliefs about the truth-value of some propositions 
have had to be revised. There are also numerous cases in which 
people function successfully in the world on the basis of beliefs 
that they later reject as false, and we have seen that there may be 
propositions which are neither true nor false. Indeed, most of these 
points can be made by a reflection on the history of science and 
some have argued that the notion of truth has no significant role to 
play in the philosophy of science. One common and important 
response to attacks on truth is that the attackers are making claims 
that they take to be true, and that if not, it is difficult to see their 
point."' What are we to make, for example, of such claims as, 
"different societies have radically different views about the nature 
of the world" or " claims that were taken as established truths at 
one stage in the history of science can not be formulated in a new 
paradigm", if it is not being asserted that these claims are true? It 
is certainly possible to show that the notion of truth is not relevant 
in some domain in which it was previously thought to be 
important, but that is not the same as showing that we can do 
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without this notion altogether. Presumably the point of such 
arguments is to establish a truth about the domain in question, and 
in doing so we are assuming that the concept of truth is relevant to 
some other domain. It seems that the notion of truth is so deeply 
embedded in our thinking about cognitive matters that we can not 
get along without it. And while there remains the radical 
alternative of constructing a new framework in which this notion 
does not occur, no such framework is available to us now. Thus we 
have little choice but to work in terms of a framework that is 
currently available. 
We must distinguish between possessing truth, and being 
able to recognize that we possess the truth. For example, a voice 
in a dream may announce that the stock of Reliance industries is 
going up, and this may be true, but this provides no basis for 
deciding to buy the stock unless, I have reasons for believing that 
the revelations of the dream are true. Without such reasons I might 
buy and benefit because in fact the dream told me the truth, but 
this would be a coincidence no better than a random choice that I 
might abandon tomorrow just as easily as I accepted it today. A 
similar point holds for induction and judgement as well. True 
premises do us little good unless we have reasons for believing 
that they are true. This is where rationality enters the picture. 
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since rationality is concerned witii good and adequate reasons for 
believing one claim rather than another. 
Here we can see the great attraction of the classical model of 
rationality and the search for foundations. We want to accept only 
those claims that we have reasons to accept, and if the 
foundationalist project had been successful, we could know that 
rationally founded claims are true. The failure of this project 
leaves us in a genuine quandary: we are still in a position in which 
the only basis we have for accepting a claim is that we have 
reasons for it, but our new model of rationality "of having good 
reasons" does not assure us of achieving truth.^ 
Our reasons rest on the best available judgments but those 
judgments are tied to the evidence available at a particular time. 
The significance of this evidence is never beyond question, and 
further evidence may show any judgment to be wrong. Again, this 
is not just a bare possibility, and a bit of historical reflection will 
serve to underline this somewhat melancholy conclusion. There 
are many cases in which those who possessed the relevant 
expertise came to what seemed the best supported conclusion, after 
assessing the best available evidences, but were eventually seen to 
be mistaken. In the ancient and medieval periods the thesis that 
the earth is stationary at the center of the universe had powerful 
observational and theoretical support. The people who held this 
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view were mistaken, but they were neither foolish nor irrational, 
and it may well have been irrational, at that time, to believe that 
the earth moves. Similarly, there were once powerful rational 
grounds for believing that every event must have a cause, that the 
geometry of space must be Euclidean, that space and time are 
distinct and many other claims. We now have more powerful 
evidence that these claims are false, but it does not follow that 
those who doubted these views in the past must have done so 
rationally. 
Though rationality and truth are two different notions yet 
there is close connection between the two. In fact, we adopt 
rational procedure in order to discover truth. But it will be 
meaningless to say that achieving one of them entails that the 
other has also been achieved. We take those conclusions that are 
rationally acceptable as our best estimates of our truth. In other 
words, while a rationally supported claim need to be true and a 
claim chosen at random need not be false, it does not follow that 
either choice is as good as the other. We need not only truth, but 
reasons for believing that we have the truth and it is through the 
process of assessing evidence and submitting our view to criticism 
that we develop those reasons."'^ The function of rationality is to 
carry out organised and coherent procedure for the search of truth. 
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Rationality And Cognitive Relativism 
It is supposed that rationality is homogenous; it is uniform for all 
rational beings. However, is rationality uniform? Are the rulings 
of reason same for all rational beings? Or, is rationality context-
bound? Can a good reason for one person to believe in a certain 
way fail to constitute a good reason for another to do so.^'* 
It certainly seems that a good reason for one person is not 
necessarily a good reason for another, that is to say that a certain 
action which is fruitful or well-advised for me is not necessarily 
the case with someone else. For example what is good and healthy 
food for me is not necessarily good for someone else. In fact 
rationality is situation-bound; what is rational to believe for me 
may not be rational for others. The reason is simple that different 
cultures or different people occupy different situations-these 
situations make the rationality a relative concept. The claim that 
rationality is circumstantially bound, puts in question any claim of 
objectivity and universality. And so, the problem of relativism 
arises - one person's or group's rationality may conceivably be 
another's foolishness. 
But would not this sort of pluralistic relativism destroy 
rationality as such? Does it not make every man his own arbiter, 
so that reason collapses into chaotic fragments? Any adequate 
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treatment of rationality must address this vexing issue of 
interpersonal diversity and its ramifications. 
Let us begin by focusing on cognitive relativism. It is only 
rational to conform one's belief to the course of one's experiences. 
And this makes a relativistic plurality of beliefs inevitable. For, 
rationality itself requires differently circumstanced people to have 
different beliefs. The possession of the information that provides 
good reasons does not automatically transfer from one rational 
believer (or group) to another. Seeing that they have different 
experiences on the basis of which to form their judgments, it 
would not be rational of them not to differ in what they (quite 
rationally) believe. 
In principle, at least, it is thus entirely possible that the 
people living in tribal areas accept that some sort of disease is 
caused by some spirits. In believing this or accepting this we can 
not say that they are less rational than people living in modern 
scientific society who believe that a certain disease is caused by a 
particular virus. Very possibly, that is, each is making equally 
adequate use (by prevailing standards) of the best evidence 
available to them. And this conformation of acceptance to 
potentially variable evidence is what cognitive rationality is all 
about. 
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In fact, in cognitive spheres, pluralism is inescapable. The 
decisions made by the people are relative to or linked to variable 
evidence, rules and methods that people can rationally make about 
matters of factual truths. Here we simply have to proceed from 
where we are, making our determinations as best as we can on 
whatever basis the circumstances of our era and culture place at 
our disposal. My evidence may not point the same way as yours, 
nor need my criteria be your criteria, given our differences in 
education and experience. And so different cultures, different eras, 
different people can quite appropriately play the truth 
determination game by different rules. No world spirit legislates 
that one self-same inquiry process must be used by all men in all 
times and places and circumstances, (treatment to any kind of 
disease does not operate on the same principles here today as in 
ancient India), whatever be our stand regarding relativism as a 
philosophical doctrine, we have to accept the fact of relativity -
the fact that different people can, quite appropriately and 
rationally, proceed differently in the conduct of their intellectual 
business. A specifically cognitive relativism is in fact 
unavoidable; it is rationally appropriate for different people, eras 
and cultures to have not only different bodies of accepted beliefs, 
but also different standards and criteria of rational acceptability -
different bases for the rational conduct of affairs. Whatever may 
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be the way in which rationality binds all rational beings alike, it 
has to ultimately come to terms with this sort of relativity at least. 
Rationality And Reasonableness 
Human intelligence is intimately linked to rationality. To rest 
content with unquestioned habit is a defect of intelligence that is 
not consonant with rationality. In fact, rationality is not just a 
passive matter of making good use of the materials one has on 
hand - in cognitive matters, say, the evidence in view. It is also a 
matter of actively seeking to enhance these materials in the 
cognitive case by developing new evidential resources that enable 
one to amplify and test one's conclusions. 
Logicians take consistency to be the bulwark of rationality, 
scientists evidential cogency, and economists efficiency. All are 
right, but each only partially so, each focuses up on what is no 
more than a part of reason-that one particular aspect of intelligent 
procedure that is of primary importance for his own field. The 
crucial point is that rationality as such is something complex and 
many - sided - though all of its parts are embraced with the one 
over-all generic formula that rationality consists in the intelligent 
conduct of one's affairs. 
There is a difference between rationality and reasonableness-
between being rational and being willing to "listen to reason", for 
it is not necessarily rational to be "reasonable" - sometimes, the 
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best means to appropriate ends lie in terminating "mere 
discussions" (in training of children, for example, or in certain 
negotiations)."''' 
Sometimes, moreover, it is sensible and indeed altogether 
rational to pretend of irrationality. Though an act may be very 
rational as we may have good reasons for that action but it may 
apparently seem irrational to others. For example, when a chess 
master makes some occasional mistakes to keep his opponent in 
the dark. This sort of thing may well prove rational after all, since 
there are perfectly good reasons for proceeding in such a manner 
as to fail, in certain circumstances, to do the rationally appropriate 
things. But the fact is that rationality means having good reasons 
for one's actions and beliefs, so in the above mentioned case we 
have good reasons to behave in a certain apparently irrational way. 
A deeper rationality may, on occasion, counter-demand the 
obvious seeming requirements of reason. 
Sometimes, rationality is contrasted with 'feeling' and reason with 
human sympathy. But this overly cerebral conception represents a 
far too narrow and one-sided view of reason's domain. Rationality 
is broad and comprehensive. Feelings are generally not a matter of 
reasoning, but they are certainly not outside the province of 
reason. As Pascal saw: 
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"the heart too has its reasons which are 
unknown to the mind. Feelings too can 
provide reasons and canalize the operations 
of intelligence. The human spirit extends 
beyond the human body that determines our 
'material' interests and the human mind that 
determines our "cognitive" interests."^^ 
Neither man's material interests nor yet his cognitive 
interests exhaust the realm of appropriate values. Reason herself 
recognizes the utility and appropriateness of our higher (aesthetic 
and effectively social and even spiritual) values. The realm of 
rationality is as large and comprehensive as the domain of valid 
human concerns and interests. 
Rationality And Consensus 
Some theorists equate rationality with consensuality, deeming the 
prospect of attaining a consensus among all rational minds to be 
an indispensable requisite of reason. But there are deep problems. 
The idea that the lack of consensus undermines factuality is very 
questionable. In fact, when rationality becomes public property, it 
becomes consensus. 
The validity of judgments of rationality is not destroyed by 
finding that there are some who dissent from them. The abstract 
thesis that other things being equal, all rational people choose 
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recognizably more effective problem-resolutions over less 
effective ones is quite correct-but of course people can (quite 
defensibly) disagree about what sorts of measures are effective/^ 
It is often said that failure of consensus raises doubts about 
the reason. The dismissive relativist argues; "no consensus - no 
objectivity." In fact, if different people can (justifiably) think 
differently about some issue, then there just is no objective fact of 
the matter with regard to it: but in fact it becomes mere opinion or 
arbitrary decision or an irrational allegiance. 
There is a link between consensus and factuality but this 
link is only at the level of idealization. Consensus is needed only 
on ideal or perfectly competent inquiries on factual matters. 
Consensus among rational inquiries across the divide of time and 
culture is not something that often happens in the real world. In 
this imperfect sublunary dispensation consensus is too much to 
expect - or to ask for. The sort of consensuality at issue with 
objectivity is a matter of ideal circumstances. It is not something 
on which we should insist here and now. Objectivity co-ordinates 
not with actual but with ideal consensus. (Actual 
consensus/dissensus can be no more that a matter of providing 
relatively weak evidence for or against objectivity). 
The linkage between consensus and rationality is not descriptive 
or explanatory, but normative. With rationality the crux is not 
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what does work towards achieving consensus, but should work to 
do so - what indeed would do so among fully rational people. How 
consensus is achieved is crucial for validity and thus for the whole 
issue for "good reasons". Good reasons are not good because they 
lead to consensus but because they are good. Only at the ideal 
level there is a linkage between rationality and consensuality. 
To say matters of rationality are objective is not to say that 
people will reach agreement about them - it is to say no more than 
that they would reach agreement if they proceed in a totally 
adequate way. Rationality is a matter of idealization. It gazes 
towards idealities and away from the actualities of an imperfect 
world. Different cultures will no more agree about the world's 
character than different eras will agree about the factual truth of 
science. And the reason for this in both cases is much the same: 
different groups have different bodies of experience. But, the 
evidential relativity of our contentions does not show that there 
are no facts of the matter on the topics to which they relate, and 
no objectively rational decision to be made. ' The different views 
of those who have different data at their disposal no more destroy 
factuality and objectivity than the fact that different associates 
have different opinions of him annihilates a person. 
A salient demand of rationality is that we resolve the issues 
that face us in matters of belief, action and evaluation as best as 
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we can on the basis of the experience at our disposal. But, as a 
matter of fact, we experience things differently; consequently we 
must resolve the issues before us differently or we can say that we 
are a plurality of rational beings with different bodies of 
experience (it is at bottom this fact that makes the achievement of 
an actual consensus on substantive issues - and even on those 
procedural matters that reflect substantive commitment 
something that is altogether dispensable for rationality). But does 
abandoning the requirement for consensus not make rationality 
into something variable and culture-dependent? Not at all. It 
means no more than that the ideal of rationality is pursued --
within those cultures which happen to pursue it at all -- in variable 
and circumstantial - conditional ways. And this is quite harmless. 
After all, rationality is in this regard like communication. What 
communication is, is the same everywhere and for everyone. But, 
of course, different places and times go at it rather differently. 
The cultivation - hierarchy perspective shows how different 
solutions reached in different circumstances can be justified by the 
same defining principles of rationality. 
The normative aspect of consensusility however becomes 
crucial; for to say that a rational resolution of an issue is 
universally binding on everyone is ambiguous. It can be construed 
descriptively that everyone in fact considers himself to be so 
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bound; or prospectively that everyone ought to consider himself to 
be so bound. It is this second prescriptive mode of universality 
that is appropriate in our present context. No sensible rationalist 
has ever failed to recognize that the prescriptions of reason are 
non - universal in the former, consensus oriented sense. 
Consensus does not have any particular rule to follow. 
Consensus is basically a matter of the development of people's 
views. Theses views are basically deep-rooted on the evidences, 
education and climate of opinion. Consensus thus turns on what 
people do think: whereas objectivity, on the other hand, demands 
what they ought to think. And the two converge only in the ideal 
limit - only where people do as they ought to.'*^ Only 'ideal' 
consensus - consensus in an idealized community of perfectly 
rational agents with shared evidence and experience bears on 
rationality as such. No doubt consensus is a good thing. When we 
have it, we can feel optimistically reassured of being on the right 
track. But we should not insist for consensus so vehemently that 
we dismiss as inappropriate or worthless ideas and views that lack 
the benefit of its reassuring presence. For rationality, objective 
and interpersonally operable standards are essential. In fact, the 
rational deliberation comes into operation only on objective 
issues, at any rate not in the way of an achievement or even of an 
expectation as contra - distinguished from an aspiration and a 
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hope. Consensus is not an eventual destination but merely a 
hopeful aspiration. Rationality itself is, after all, a project that we 
are bound to pursue by variable means amongst varied 
circumstances of a difficult world, where the consensus that 
objectivity ideally involves may well be unattainable in practice 
(the extent to which reality co-operates with the demands of 
rationality is limited). Rationality must, for us, remain something 
of an ideal which we can only realize to the limited extent that the 
circumstances of our situation permit. 
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C H A P T E R - I I I 
IDEA OF PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 
The concerns, themes, questions and issues pertaining to 
contemporary social science discourse are as old as human 
scholarship. Ancient Chinese, Indian and Greek philosophers 
pondered over them within their respective civilizational 
paradigms. The medieval Europeans scholastics also presaged the 
discussions and controversies that form the mainstay of ongoing 
social scientific investigations.' 
It is usually assumed that social science emerged some two 
centuries ago. However, the origin of social science goes all the 
way back to the Greek rationalist inquiries into the nature of man, 
state, and morality. The heritage of both Greece and Rome, as in 
so many other areas of Western intellectual endeavours, has been 
powerful in the history of social thought as well. We need have no 
hesitation in saying that had there not been the initial Greek 
determination to study all things in the spirit of dispassionate and 
rational enquiry; there would be no social science today. Ideas of 
social sciences are found in medieval Christian theological 
prognostications as well. St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica 
contained and fashioned into a synthesis ideas about man and 
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society that may indeed be seen to be political, social, economic, 
anthropological and geographical in their substance. 
With the ushering in of the age of reason in seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, the same impulses that led man to explore the 
Earth, stellar regions and the nature of matter led him also to 
explore the institutions he had developed over a course of time. 
Accordingly, such institutions as state, economy, religion and 
morality were taken up for dispassionate study and analysis. 
Above all, the study of the nature of man became the focal point 
of social scientific investigations in contemporary times and 
climes. 
Historically speaking, the fragmentation of medieval 
philosophy and theology and the shattering of the medieval world-
views after Sixteenth century was the starting point of the rise of 
several strands of specialized thought that were to become in time 
the social sciences. 
Though social science was recognized as a distinct discipline 
of thought in the Nineteenth century, it would be unjust to 
discount the significant contributions that were made during the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries. The first and the most 
significant contribution made during these centuries was the 
widespread acceptance of the idea of a science of society. The 
second contribution was the appropriation of the rising awareness 
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of the multiplicity and variety of human experiences in the world. 
Ethnocentricism and Parochialism, as states of mind, were more 
and more difficult for educated people to maintain, given the 
immense amount of information about - or, more importantly, 
interest in non-Western peoples as a result of intercontinental 
trade and growing explorations. The third was the acceptance of 
the sense of the social, historical and cultural character of human 
behavior. In view of these developments, a science of society was 
inaugurated as a distinct discipline or a set of disciplines, with its 
own distinctive scope, subject matter and methodology.^ 
In fact, history of the social sciences usually considers Eighteenth 
century as a period of transition. In Eighteenth century, a number 
of thinkers put forward the agenda of later social sciences. Such 
thinkers as Montesquieu and Smith established some major 
precepts. But the professional development of the social sciences 
is usually located in the first half of Nineteenth century. There are 
several reasons responsible for the development of social science 
as a separate discipline in the first half of Nineteenth century. 
In late Eighteenth century, the concept of system, what 
constitutes a system and how it should be portrayed was the major 
theme in Germany. The clearest indicator of how the new model of 
science was appropriated into the social sciences revolves around 
the concept of system. Everybody seemed to use the word 'system' 
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and assumed that its definition was self-evident. August Ludwig 
Schlozer, a leading German historian, while discussing the nature 
of system drew a distinction between two types of ordering 
procedures which he called 'aggregate' and 'system'. He wrote: 
"Aggregate arises when the whole 
human race is cut into parts, all of these parts 
numbered, and the available information 
about each is correctly presented." 
He further held that such a view was unsatisfactory because 
it did not give a living representation of the whole. Schlozer 
created a true system in which he encompassed the whole by 
looking at things with a generalising vision. This vision changes 
the aggregate into a system. The efforts made by Schlozer and 
other German thinkers (Anthropologists - Historians) was to 
establish a real connection that would make clear the natural, 
immediate, and obvious interconnection between phenomena such 
as the varieties of human race, culture, religion etc. 
The fact is that all the people belonging to different fields of 
work, i.e., farmers, merchants, scholars, poets etc. did the real 
work that kept the social-body alive. These groups are the hidden 
active power in an organised body. On the other hand, there are 
conventional subjects of social- political analysis. These represent 
the external characteristics of a state's history, among whom are; 
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nobles, monarchs and warriors. The first only had the goal to 
designated creatures, the second of bringing them under law.5 
These are a few theoretical factors involved in the emergence of 
the social science as a separately discipline. 
Later on, in the Nineteenth century, when social science 
developed as a separate discipline, social scientists directed their 
attention at conflicts which were disturbing social order. Marx and 
Engels, for instance, were searching for the explanation of class 
conflicts. Weber was fascinated by the question of why precisely 
rationalization occurred in a western context and why it resulted in 
frozen conflicts between individuals and bureaucratic apparatuses. 
Despite the differences between these great figures, they devised 
their theoretical conception either in a direct way or in a more 
indirect way, as a means of gaining practical results in a conflict-
ridden world. Even Weber, who explicitly recognized conflict as 
inherent in modern social structure and who did not subscribe to 
the idea that social science should have an immediate impact on 
social policy, was motivated by the personal concern that social 
science should ultimately contribute to counter-balancing the 
increasing number of value-conflicts in Western world; conflicts 
which he considered as consequences of the paradoxical outcome 
of rationalization: the expansion of irrationality.^ 
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Whatever be the factors involving in the development and 
emergence of the social sciences, we can reasonably put forward 
the opinion that the social sciences were originally designated as 
the most rational way to deal with conflicts in the constantly 
changing world. 
What Is Social Science About 
The social science is the study of human behaviour in its 
social and cultural aspects. Under the heading of social sciences 
we deal with the disciplines such as Anthropology, Sociology 
Political Sciences, Psychology and Economics. Social science is 
supposed to make social life intelligible by making actions and 
patterns of action intelligible. However, the long-debated 
controversy in social science is as to whether it is a study of 
individuals or groups of individuals. 
In order to know what social science is, it is necessary to 
know the different views regarding the essence of social science; 
the holistic point of view, the individualistic point of view and a 
less addressed view christened as systemism. The view systemism 
has not received a detailed consideration till date, although it is 
the intermediate position between the above rival radical 
methodological viewpoints. A good number of articles have been 
published on the post-war debate over methodological 
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individualism and its rival methodological holism. Let us describe 
each of them briefly. 
Individualism: There is a view of social explanation, which 
confirms that human sciences are concerned only with people, that 
is what people do and what happens to them. The fundamental unit 
of social reality is individual. Consequently it has been maintained 
by advocates of individualism that explanations of social 
phenomena are to be reduced to what individual people do and 
why they do it. Individualists tend to insist that there are not both 
societies and their individual members. For example, when we say 
India modernized her social structure during early twentieth 
century, we are basically talking about what Indians did. This 
individualistic position is further extended to methodological 
individualism, which maintains that the explanations of social 
phenomena if they are counted as genuine, must be couched slowly 
in terms of facts about individuals. 
According to individualism, a society is just a collection of 
individuals; consequently all social studies are ultimately studies 
of individuals. Individualists focus on individuals and either deny 
the existence of social bonds and social systems or assert that 
these are fully reducible to individuals and their action. 
Individualists hold that social reality is constituted only by 
individual people whose behavior can be understood only in terms 
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of their dispositions, capacities and understanding of their 
situation. Individualist's fundamental tenet is that all purported 
explanations of social phenomena, it they are to count as genuine 
or rock bottom explanations must be couched slowly in terms of 
facts about individuals. They typically believe that there are no 
social entities over and above human beings that could provide the 
basis for any sort of social explanation. Consequently, they hold 
that reasons-explanations needed to be formulated in terms of 
individuals behavioural patterns. Margaret Thatcher summarized 
this thesis in her famous dictum 
"There is no such thing as society: there are 
only individuals."^ 
Individualism is still going strong in social science and its 
philosophy. In fact, individualism is even stronger in social, 
political and moral philosophy. Some of the well-known 
individualists are Karl Popper, Peter Winch, Ernest Gellner, etc. 
Karl Popper claims that there are no social wholes, so social 
scientists can study only individuals, for instance, soldiers rather 
than armies. Popper holds: 
"Institutions have lives of their own but they 
do not have minds of their own, the capacity 
of institution to exert independent influence 
over the lives of individual." 
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Popper further holds: 
•'Institutions (and traditions) must be 
analysed in individualist terms, that is to say 
in terms of relations of individuals acting in 
certain situations, and of the unintended 
consequences of their action". 
This position is further advocated by Watkins, who holds that the 
individual being referred to need not be any particular individual. 
He further holds: 
"An explanation may be in terms of typical 
dispositions of more or less anonymous 
individuals. The identity of these anonymous 
individuals should be identified by their role 
in social contexts".'" 
This individualist position is also advocated by Peter Winch, who 
holds that social scientists study only intentional and moreover, 
rule-directed behavior and not social groups. As a matter of fact 
intention and behaviour which is the subject matter of social 
scientists is the quality exclusively of individuals; hence social 
science should be studied at individual level. Social scientists 
must discover the same rules and criteria that the participants 
employ: even if the social scientist's account is supposed to be 
superior, it must use terms and concepts internal to the activities 
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and practices under investigation, otherwise, it fails to be genuine 
undestanding." If Popper and Winch were consistent they should 
deny the very possibility of social science. In fact, Winch does 
deny it, asserting that social science belongs to epistemology. 
Winch further holds that an action is first made intelligible as the 
outcome of motives, reasons and decisions being set in the context 
of the rules of a given from of a social life. The rules logically 
determine the range of reasons and motives open to a given set of 
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agents and hence also the range of decisions open to them. 
Thus the contrast maintained by Winch between explanation 
in terms of causal generalization and explanation in terms of rules 
turns out to rest upon a version of the contrast between 
explanation in terms of causes and explanation in terms of reason. 
The current popularity of individualism can be explained by 
the fact that it is clear and simple: It is rationalistic; it claims to 
cover all the sciences of man from Psychology to History. 
Individualists hold that institutions are nothing but conventions 
governing individual behavior. Individualists further maintain that 
the interaction between two given societies is basically the 
interaction among their individual members. Change in society is 
basically the change in the individual components of society. 
Consequently individualists hold that the appropriate theme or 
topic for social investigation is the 'individual' . To explain a 
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social fact amounts to explaining the actions of individuals 
involved in it. Hypotheses and theories in social science can be 
tested only by observing the behaviour of individuals. " This 
individualistic approach is also defined as rationalistic approach. 
WSe will discuss this rationalistic approach in chapter fourth of 
the thesis under consideration. 
Holism: Holists are also called collectivists. They hold that nature 
and society are "organic wholes'* which cannot be understood by 
breaking them down into their components. This view is attractive 
because of its insistence on the need to study everything as part of 
some whole and because of its thesis that "The whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts".'"* Holists tend to insist that whatever 
people do they do it because of their place in social wholes. For 
example, we can understand the behavior of a solider only by 
understanding an army in its entirety or totality. Some famous 
holists are Karl Marx, Durkheim, Bourdieu, et al. 
Bourdieu holds that individuals are a product of fields or social 
wholes existing above individuals. He further holds that an artist 
exists only because there is an artistic field. Marx and Durkhiem 
hold that ideas that are held by social groups constitute social 
facts. Holists hold that the social sciences themselves typically 
have very little to say about actions directly. Sociology, 
anthropology and economics rarely if ever deal with individual 
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actions as such; they rather tend to study human societies.'^ An 
understanding of human society that is based on such findings is 
one that concentrates not on individuals but on families, 
bureaucracies, political parties and the economy. One talks not so 
much about people as about phenomena such as; population 
growth, stratification, international relations, war etc. Institutions 
are treated as though they have lives of their own and societies are 
represented as complex wholes, whose elements consist of things 
other than individuals. Holism is a tacit premise among 
management experts, who write about a firm's goals, intentions 
and strategies as if it had a mind of its own. ' ' 
Finally, systemism maintains that a society is a system of 
interrelated, interacting individuals and that it possesses emergent, 
or supra-individual properties so that it ought to be studied at both 
micro and macro levels. Individualists proceed from bottom up and 
holists from top down and systemists start from individuals 
embedded in a society that pre-exists, and then watch how their 
actions affect a society and alter it. 
Whether social science is the study of individuals or groups 
of individuals, one cannot answer the question in black and white 
terms. However, one can definitely say that whether social science 
is concerned with individuals or groups of individuals, it can 
contribute to the betterment of society either way. In fact, anyone 
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of the three approaches can promote the unity of social science: 
individualism because its unit of analysis in the fields of social 
research is the individual, holism because it views society as a 
whole, whose parts can be singled out only in an arbitrary fashion, 
and systemism because it regards society as a system composed of 
strongly linked sub-systems ultimately composed of individuals. 
Social sciences were originally designated as the most rational 
way to deal with conflicts in a constantly changing world. It is 
methodologically assumed that arriving at or discovering of truth 
may provide the key to the settlement of conflicts. Social sciences 
are supposed to play their part in helping to find solutions to the 
conflicts by investigating their causes. 
Explanation In Social Sciences 
The social sciences seek to illuminate either an action or the 
consequences of that action. Thus we can say that a phenomenon, 
whose occurrence is independent of human action, cannot be a 
social phenomenon. Human actions can be explained by intentions 
and reasons and never by causes.'^ We usually put forward reasons 
to explain actions by showing how what was done was appropriate 
in the given circumstances. Sometimes reasons of a person are 
sufficient to explain as to what got him to act in that way at that 
particular time. The fact is that people act from reasons rather 
than causes. 
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But here is a very crucial question, which we think should be 
addressed properly; how are we to explain an action when 
sometimes we do not have any good reason to behave in the way 
we actually do in a particular situation. Are there such social 
phenomena or occurrences that are either infrarational or 
suprarational? If the answer to this query is in the affirmative, 
then there must be other modes of explanation apart from rational 
explanation. But the fact is that there is no escape from rational 
paradigm even if one does not have sufficient reasons for one's 
behavior 19. Let as make it clearer by an example of deviant 
behavior. The behavior of a deviant in one way or the other is a 
voluntary behavior and consequently his behavior in one or the 
other, is a form of voluntary action. It can be examined from a 
rational point of view. It is possible to explore the rationale of any 
deviant act and one way of understanding the non-confirming 
individual is to discover what that person's reasons are for what 
he does. R.D. Laing, a psychologist, who has pursued this 
approach with schizophrenics has tried to show that psychotic 
behaviour makes rational sense, within certain sets of perception. 
Similarly sociologists have sometimes tried to show various forms 
of criminal behavior as a rational response to an irrational 
situation. 
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The sociological or psychological study of deviance is based 
on the principle that testimony and the individual's rationale are 
not an adequate source of information for understanding why such 
behavior occurs. A deviant act, if it is not one for which an 
adequate rational explanation can be adduced, must be regarded as 
an act for which the person's reasons, even those that might be 
uncovered through psychoanalysis, are at best of limited value in 
enabling us to grasp what made him act as he did. If sociological 
approach is pursued, what are important are social variables; facts 
that the agent would not himself cite but that are presumed to 
exert a causal influence on his behavior. 
On the other hand, there is in some cases, an aspect of 
deviant behavior that seems to call for more than rational 
explanation can provide. This aspect is revealed by the apparent 
compulsiveness of some deviant action, the fact that some people 
seem neither able nor inclined to control their actions. No doubt, a 
person's unusual beliefs and intense desires would help us to 
explain his extraordinary behavior. However, what is worrisome is 
that acquiring of such beliefs and desires are left un-explained by 
a rational account. As a matter of fact, individual actions whether 
deviant, or not are not explained by statistical correlations. There 
is a further respect in which the explanations of deviant actions is 
dependent on the paradigm of rational explanation. No matter 
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deviant actions do appear compulsive or irrational but yet they 
have the logic of intentional actions. All the intentional actions 
are purposive and pre-suppose an agent's grasp of the meaning of 
his behaviour. 
The person who commits an act that we cannot rationally 
comprehend has behaved in a way that we cannot understand at all. 
All the actions that we perceive as irrational, or crazy, are 
determined by how effectively we can represent them in terms of a 
rational paradigm. Any act done by a deviant does not mean that 
he/she did it without any reason. The fact is that an act done by a 
deviant has insufficient or unacceptable reasons operating thereof. 
It is because of the availability of 'good reasons' that we identify 
'bad reasons' when we look for objective conditions as a means of 
trying to explain puzzling or anomalous actions. What we seek are 
sources of reasons, good or bad, that will help us to understand 
why certain courses are pursued rather than others. The external or 
non-rational study of deviance is, therefore, at most, a supplement 
to a rational account of behavior. 
Social science is based on explanation or we can say reason 
explanation. Brain pay in his celebrated article ''General laws and 
explaining human behavior'^ holds that reasons explanation does 
not rest on general laws. He further holds that there is a close 
connection between that which explains an action and the action 
140 
itself. This connection is logical one and therefore it is both 
intuitively clear and quantitatively different from the relationship, 
which exists between events, which figure in causal explanations. 
Walliam Aray maintains that reason explanation invokes 
principles of action to explain human behavior. He further holds 
that the relationship between principles and their outcomes is not 
essentially one of recurring patterns but is rather one in which the 
outcome is intrinsically connected with the principles itself. 
Reason gives grounds for which the action is a consequent and 
since the relationship between ground and consequent is logical 
rather than empirical, he argues that reason explanations do not 
7 1 
require general statements linking to a certain kind of action." 
Explaining an action involves specifying the reason that 
rationalizes it. In other words, we can say that reason explanations 
succeed in explaining when they show that it was because the 
agent thought that the act was appropriate way to achieve his ends, 
that he acted as he did. In other words, an act is not explained by 
reason but rather by the agents' having his reasons and this having 
caused him to act in the way he did that explains it. 
To explain something is to overcome an obstacle, to make 
unintelligible things intelligible, or we can say the function of 
explanation is to resolve puzzlement. But explanation alone cannot 
resolve puzzlement or make some unintelligible action intelligible. 
141 
until the idea of rationality is not added to these explanations. 
Thus when an investigator tries to resolve the obstacle with regard 
to any human action, his problem is usually that he does not know 
what reason an agent had for doing it. To analyse the perplexing 
actions he seeks information about what the agent believed to be 
the facts of the situation including the possible results of taking 
various courses of action considered open to him and what he 
wanted to accomplish; his purposes, goals or motives. 
Understanding is achieved only when the investigator can see the 
reasons of a man or an agent who undertakes a particular action, in 
the light of his beliefs and purposes. Only within the context of 
reasons, beliefs and purposes can an action be explained to be 
either appropriate or inappropriate.^^ 
Thus a conceptual connection between understanding of 
man's action and its rationale is brought out. To explain the 
phenomena in the world of our experience is not to answer the 
question 'what' but to answer the question 'why' which is the 
fore- most objective of all rational inquiry. All social phenomena 
or events call for explanations; viz; the interests of people, 
motivations of learning, the inertia of institutions the behavioural 
patterns of politicians or bureaucrats etc. We explain social 
conflicts by divergence of interests, we explain wholes by parts 
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and conversely and we explain the present by past actions and so 
on and so forth. 
Explanation always implies general framework. There may 
be more than one explanation for a single event. These may be 
commensurable or incommensurable. This does not mean that an 
explanation or for that matter an incommensurable explanation is 
wrong.^'' For example, we can have a good number of explanations 
as to why militancy occurred in Kashmir. There may be an 
economic explanation political explanation or ideological 
explanation of the event. All these explanations may be right 
within their own universes of discourse. Thus within the social 
scientific discourse itself, there are substantial differences both at 
the inter and intra-disciplinary levels. An explanation in sociology 
can be substantially different from an explanation in economics. 
There can only be explanations and not an explanation. Now the 
question is as to whether all explanations of an event are correct. 
The fact is that there may be different plausible and appropriate 
explanations of an event. There may also be some incorrect 
explanation. There is no readymade mechanism to tell incorrect 
explanations from correct ones. Explanations are tentative or we 
can say adhoc particularly when we are attempting to explain 
complex social phenomena. An explanation is always from a point 
of view and is relevant only within a universe of discourse. 
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There are different kinds of explanations for example an 
explanation is reductive if and only if at least one premises 
occurring in it is a reductive one. Similarly there are scientific or 
causal explanations. A causal explanation is one activated by 
certain kinds of events. There are two kinds of causes; internal and 
external. Internal causes are mental events, such as, decisions, 
which in turn are motivated by intentions. External causes are 
usually called reasons.^'* Reasons are causes which are presumably 
understood and moreover, under the agent's immediate control. 
Human actions can be explained only by intentions and reasons 
and never by causes, as the people act from reasons rather than 
causes. 
Explanations in recent times are modeled on scientific 
explanations, which are known as deducto-nomologial model of 
explanations. This was developed by two American philosophers 
C.G. Hempel and P. Oppenheim. This is also called as 'covering 
law thesis ' . 
According to this view scientific explanation must have 
three types of components. 
1. It must incorporate one or more general principles or 
laws. 
2. There must be some particular fact or facts. 
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3. There must be a statement describing whatever it is that is 
being explained. 
Explanations do have a vital role in social scientific 
investigations. However, in view of the multicomplexity of the 
social or behavioural variables, there cannot be any identifiable 
set of explanations which can cumulatively bring out the 
resolutions of social scientific questions. Explanations in social 
science have to encompass such multiple factors as intentions, 
motives, purposes, goals, reasons etc. Therefore, social scientific 
research in the ongoing march needs to be methodologically for 
more nuanced and circumspect than the investigations carried out 
by natural sciences. 
Difference Between the Nature of Social Sciences and 
Natural Sciences. 
It is a long - standing problem as to whether the social 
sciences should adopt the method of the natural sciences. But 
before making any claim regarding the methodology of social 
science, one must know the fundamental differences between the 
nature of the social sciences and the natural sciences. There are 
some arguments, which add up to the contention that the social 
sciences are fundamentally different in nature from the natural 
sciences. 
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The difference between the social sciences and the natural 
sciences was particularly emphasized in Germany and is perhaps 
embedded in the German language, which distinguishes between 
naturwissenschaft and geisteswissenchaft. The issue here can be 
expressed briefly in this way: On the one hand, there is a 
conviction that scientific knowledge is unitary with the 
implication that there can be no other kind of knowledge, and on 
the other hand, there is an intuitive sense that social knowledge is 
somehow different, at least because of the peculiar difference 
between the subject matter of the two fields, for human beings 
whether as individuals or as societies-seem to be so wholly 
different from the objects in the world of nature. 
The idea of the ultimacy of person, according to many 
western thinkers means that it is impossible to go beyond the 
human individual as an explanatory entity in accounting for 
individual and social behavior; and of course, if so, this would 
impose corresponding limits on the level of explanatory theories 
that would be possible in the social sciences. In the natural 
sciences it is possible to have a theoretical explanation and then to 
have another level of theoretical explanation behind, above or 
beyond that one, and then it is possible to go above that level as 
well. However, if the limitations indicated here are valid, this 
would not be possible in the social sciences and, indeed, there are 
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influential thinkers in several schools who believe this to be the 
case. The contention has the look to most Westerners of being 
self-evident or a priori, but it is difficult to see how it could be 
proved or disproved. One way, however, in which it could be 
shown that kinds of explanatory entities or the kinds of 
explanatory theories in the social sciences go beyond the level of 
the individual human being would be to produce a satisfactory 
theory that in fact does just this. 
Establishing frameworks, paradigms and things like that and 
then carrying out their investigations rather than investigating 
themselves are main concerns of the social sciences. This is a 
position, which is not rule-bound. But the natural sciences are not 
in this position. The natural scientist need not be trained in the 
general procedure or methods of science. He learns the details of 
the method on the job, the problems are clear; he knows how to 
carry them out. On the other hand, in social sciences, there is no 
consensus on the general procedure of how the social sciences 
should be pursued at all. In other words, the entire question of the 
philosophy of the social sciences is at center stage and the 
foundational questions are wide open and without a universally 
accepted answer.^^ 
Social sciences undertake the study of individuals or groups 
of individuals. However, individuals or groups of individuals are 
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obviously people and people exercise free -will. We do not know 
what they will do next as individuals, nor do we know what a 
group of people will do next. Hence there can be no orderliness in 
the domain of social science. But, as a matter of fact, modern 
natural science does have orderliness, even though physical 
particles are said to be exercising some freedom in so far as they 
operate randomly. The uncertainly principle of Heisenberg 
propounds that there is an unpredictability about measuring 
precisely the position and momentum of fundamental particles. 
Yet none of this disturbs the possibility of having regular laws. If 
this is so, freedom of will need not prevent the social sciences 
from being scientific and presenting some sort of orderly picture 
either.^^ 
In the social sciences we do not have facts which are purely 
objective as we have in the natural sciences. Social facts have to 
speak something subjective about them. For example, it is an 
objective fact that water freezes at zero degree on earth. This fact 
may depend on physical conditions, but it does not depend on 
attitudes of human beings. Social facts, on the other hand, seem 
culture- relative and apparently lack objectivity or reality in them. 
Not all but a majority of cases of social facts are culture-relative 
at least in the sense that they can be understood only in the 
context of the culture in which they occur and may not be 
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understandable otherwise. Nonetheless, given a certain cultural 
structure, a social fact is objective for that culture and is in no 
sense arbitrary or subject to alteration at will by any group of 
people within that culture. Social facts are not commonly so 
general as natural facts. Social fact usually needs understanding of 
the culture of which it is a part. In fact, some social facts are so 
emphatically culture-relative that they do not even make sense 
except in their cultural context. Social facts are not intelligible in 
the same way as natural facts are intelligible in the light of a 
physical theory used to describe them. 
Lastly, in the natural sciences questions are clear and 
problems are objective in nature. But in the social sciences, for 
some reason, problems are obscure. Most of the problems are 
alluded to in vague descriptive terms and are not made specific. 
There have been a lot of differences between natural sciences and 
social sciences. The social sciences are the natural sciences of 
social life and hence naturally look to the most successful natural 
science as the standard of what they might achieve and how they 
might achieve it. Before discussing what are considered to be the 
proper methods for social science, it is worthwhile to throw some 
light on the role of values in social science. 
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Role of Values in Social Science 
Values play a very important role in the construction of the 
social sciences. But the first and foremost question arises as to 
what we mean by value. People usually equate value with 
preferences, which is' not the case. Though there are some 
similarities yet this does not mean that values can be reduced to 
preferences. We have at least two kinds of preferences; firstly 
preferences are related to pleasures of life, that means we prefer 
something to another for our enjoyment and secondly, there are 
preferences which are loaded with meaning or are worthwhile in 
themselves. In short, the notion of values underlines meaning and 
fullness in human affairs.^ Values enter the scene only when we 
talk of worthwhileness and meaningfulness. The values work both 
at individual as well as holistic levels. Social scientists cannot 
work in the manner in which natural scientists operate. In fact, a 
social scientist is one of the people he is studying; he is making an 
abstraction of himself and indeed abstraction of the society under 
investigation. For example, anthropologists, to begin with, 
encounter questions in raw form. In order to get a broader 
understanding of any tribe, they become participants of that tribe. 
Consequently, an anthropologist has to spilt himself into two; 
being on the one hand an observer outside the society under 
consideration, while at the some time living in the society as one 
150 
of its members. When a person becomes part of his study the 
notion of value starts operating. People have aims, they value 
something more highly than others; cultures, groups and so on, all 
have certain values and they enter into the picture of social 
science and this way make it fundamentally different from natural 
science. Even if social scientist isn't the part of that culture which 
he is going to study, will study them with a definite stand point, 
what Gadamer calls as prejudice. He holds that we cannot 
overcome this prejudice. 
In sum, the concept of values, used so widely, does not seem 
too hard to designate. Values do not designate individual or group 
satisfactions as such but rather their worthwhileness. This is so, 
irrespective of whether a value is common to mankind or is limited 
to a group, or is purely individual. The concept of value 
underlines meaningfulness in human affairs. 
Methodology of Social Science 
Philosophers and methodologists have tried for decades to 
unify the complex and diverse activities called "social sciences". 
However, they have not registered much success in this regard. At 
the one extreme naturalistic philosophers of science have 
demanded that the social sciences should imitate the natural 
sciences in methodology. But the social sciences have never 
achieved much in the way of predictive general laws. Social 
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scientists have failed to come up with answers or significant 
contributions or discoveries. This failure has been widely felt 
among the social scientists themselves and consequently they have 
concentrated on the questions pertaining to methodology as such. 
There is no accepted method in social science as such. 
Broadly speaking, there are two groups of social scientists 
favoring two different methodological approaches. Firstly, there is 
the methodological exclusivism. This position is centered around 
the following thesis; that there exists just one proper method for 
the social sciences. This view is supported even by those who 
maintain that there exist some fundamental and irreducible 
differences between the social sciences and the natural sciences 
such as William Dilthey, Peter Winch and others. Winch argues 
that the social sciences should adopt a methodology of their own 
which should be different from that of natural sciences. Winch 
further holds that social scientists should adopt a methodology 
which should be free from all pretense of objectivity leading to 
radical relativism. Winch sharply separates the social sciences 
from the natural sciences. Winch was deeply influenced by the 
notion of "language game" as advanced by later Wittgenstein. He 
made it a point of departure and holds that just as meaning of a 
word in a "language game" is rule-governed; similarly the 
understanding of a social practice must be relative to its context. 
152 
He further holds that the data available to social scientists always 
requires some interpretation and any understanding of different 
social practices must be relative to a particular language-game and 
form of life. Winch concludes that there is an essential 
"subjective" and "interpretive" element in sociology and 
anthropology which cannot be eliminated. Consequently, Winch 
stresses on the hermeneutic understanding of social science."' 
Another group of social scientists favor methodological pluralism, 
which is just a denial of methodological exclusivism. According to 
methodological pluralists we cannot make sense of the notion "one 
proper set of rules" that defines the study of human behaviour."" 
Different Methods for Social Sciences 
There is no single method acceptable to all social scientists. 
Some natural scientists hold that social science should imitate the 
method employed in the natural sciences, but some social 
scientists hold that they should have their own methodology. Let 
us discuss some of the methods, which are considered proper for 
the social sciences: 
Hermeneutics as the Appropriate Method for the Social 
Sciences 
The term "human sciences" is generally meant today as describing 
a set of disciplines that include history, literary criticism, 
philosophy, psychology, sociology etc. But the status of these 
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sciences is as much in dispute as ever. When the social sciences 
were contrasted with the natural sciences, it was claimed that only 
the social sciences are interpretive, so they need imitate 
methodology of the natural sciences. In fact there was a long 
running and often bitter debate over the nature and method of the 
social sciences. In reaction to this burning debate. The German 
philosophers William Dilthey and Schleirrmacher wanted to 
provide what they regarded as a genuine method for cultural and 
human sciences. After rejecting the model of the natural sciences; 
the social scientists tried to formulate an alternative methodology 
for the social sciences. Since then, an attempt has been made to 
bridge the gap between understanding and explanation by showing 
that interpretive understanding could be combined with causal 
explanations. It has been argued that the method of the natural 
sciences does not allow social scientists to pursue understanding, 
and that this only means that cultural sciences are not inferior to, 
but simply different from the natural sciences." 
The method offered by William Dilthey and Schleirmacher 
for the social sciences is hermeneutics. The word is derived from 
the root word' hermes' which means messenger. Originally, 
hermeneutics was concerned with the interpretation of sacred texts 
with a view to update them. But, later on, hermeneutics came to 
refer not just to the study of historical texts and the problems of 
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translation, comprehension and contexualising associated with 
them, but to a broader endeavour - that of discovering or 
uncovering the meanings of all artifacts and actions. The way that 
these meanings were grasped through a process of interpretation; 
through which actions, events, artifacts or texts were perceived as 
the expression of a deeper underlying, unifying spirituality, 
characterised the core of recent hermeneutic elucidations/^ 
Hermeneutics has two different functions:-
1.) Interpretation 2.) Understanding 
Interpretation: - Originally hermeneutics was concerned with the 
interpretation of texts, texts being the historical documents in 
their own right. These texts are the reflections of societies and 
cultures, which were different from those of the scholars who 
sought to understand them. Such an assumption provided 
hermeneutics its central question, viz; how could we gain an 
understanding of past through its texts and other remains. 
Interpretation throughout appeals to our understanding. Now the 
first and foremost question arises as to which is the correct or 
successful interpretation which makes the meaning clear that is 
originally present in the text in a confused, fragmented or cloudy 
form. The next question arises as to how does one know that a 
particular interpretation is the correct one or makes sense of the 
original text? How does an interpretation clarify what is 
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presumably strange, mystifying and contradictory in the original 
text? All the hermeneutists unanimously agree that there is no way 
out of the interpretation circle through a reference to an 
independent non-interpretive "reality." 
Understanding:- The second function of hermeneutics is 
understanding. It is not a special intellectual exercise but is in fact 
inherent to human beings. William Dilthey, a Nineteenth century 
German philosopher holds that understanding is essentially a self-
transposition or imaginative projection whereby the knower 
negates the temporal distance that separates him from his object 
and becomes contemporaneous with it. Thus for Dilthey, the 
present situation becomes a negative value to the knower. The 
interpreter has to transcend all these spatio-temporal conditions. 
In fact he has to put his feet into that of other's shoes and try to 
interpret a text as faithfully as possible. Historical understanding, 
according to the above view of Dilthey, is the action of 
subjectivity purged of all prejudice, and it is achieved in direct 
proportion to the knower's ability to set aside his own horizons by 
means of an effective historical method. But Gadamer objects to 
this view of Dilthey and holds that our prejudices do not cut us off 
from the past but initially open it up to us. For Gadamer, prejudice 
does not mean the narrow-mindedness or bias but the fundamental 
and orienting pre-understanding that the understanding brings to 
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bear whenever there is anything to be understood. There is never a 
point when we are totally free from this productive prejudice/ ' ' 
Understanding and interpretation go together. In fact 
understanding and interpretation are indivisible and indissolubly 
bound up with each other. There is no sharp line, which separates 
these two functions. As a matter of fact, once we understand 
something we interpret it. There are different kinds of 
interpretation. But we are here concerned with hermeneutics as the 
foundation of the science of human spirit, as the methodological 
foundation for the human sciences. 
It was Schileiermacher and William Dilthey who vehemently 
opposed the positivistic view that we can study social phenomina 
objectively and held that the human sciences are a matter of 
understanding. They offered the possibility of an interpretive 
social science rather than an objectivist one. Consequently, they 
held that we should follow the method of understanding. 
Human life is the expression of subjectivity rather than a 
consequence of causally determined objects. Therefore, the goal of 
human sciences is not causal explanation but understanding. Such 
understanding recaptures the meaning of social objects and 
actions. Peter Winch supports this view and holds that the social 
sciences emphasize the rules that govern our way of life rather 
than its causes. So his work also marks a switch to the notion of 
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meaning as central to the understanding of human activity. In fact 
advocates of the social sciences have placed interpretation and 
meaning at the center of the social sciences. 
It was Schileiermacher who struggled to take hermeneutics 
away from its routine philological tasks and apply it to the 
problem of historical knowledge. His central problem was as to 
how we are to grasp the sense of the past from the standpoint of 
the present. Since all history was to be seen as the expression of 
human meaning, we could not treat history and historical events 
and artifacts as if they were 'objective' and merely causally 
determined. To understand the past, the historians had to identify 
with it. Schleiermacher developed a method for achieving that 
identification. 
Schileiermacher holds that the job of the historian is to put 
his feet in that of author's shoes who created the text, artifact or 
whatever. While doing this a historian will submerge himself in 
the totality of life that gave them meaning. This literally means 
that the interpreter has to submerge his own identity in that of the 
author. If this were possible the act of interpretation would allow 
a gradual movement out toward the understanding of the totality. 
The meaning of part is determined from its place in the whole, and 
that of the whole from the way it contextualises the parts. The 
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movement back and forth from parts to whole is one way of 
characterising what is often described as the hermeneutic c i r c l e / ' 
Later, it was Dilthey who built up on Schleirmacher's 
bearings and argued not just that hermeneutics offered one way of 
grasping the character of human life but that it was essential for 
any understanding of human life. Dilthey challenges the 
paradigmatic status of scientific knowledge, and holds 
hermeneutics as the key to the human sciences. Since the essence 
of human nature is the creation of meaning, the world which they 
have created - that is, their social institutions and practices --
'objectifies' their subjectivity and can only be understood by other 
subjective beings, other people. Our knowledge of human life can 
only be gained through a hermeneutical interpretive procedure 
based upon the possibility of 'imaginatively' recreating the 
experience of others. We know the nature of other subjective 
natures from analogy with our own. We can come to understand 
the cultural and social complexes of meaning of other historical 
eras by immersing ourselves in the interpretive study of 
'objectification' of meaning of complexes, the actual historical 
artifacts, texts and so on. Dilthey recognized that all such 
interpretations must take account of the point of view of both the 
creator of the artifact as well as the interpreter. We can not 
achieve the proper understanding of such figures as Rene 
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Descartes or Karl Marx by treating them entirely as figures of 
their own times, entirely alien to us, nor by assuming them to be 
contemporaries of ours. Interpretive understanding is not an 
attempt to recover what it was like to be Rene Descartes or Karl 
Marx and what they were doing, but to understand them in relation 
to our concerns. Accordingly, because interpretation involves our 
experiences as well as those of others, Dilthey holds that 
interpretive understanding is essential to grasping the meaning of 
human life. At the same time, it remains inescapably historical and 
culturally delimited because our experiences are integral to the 
40 
process. 
As mentioned earlier, human life is the expression of 
subjectivity and consequently cannot be treated as causally 
determined objects. As a matter of fact the goal of the human 
sciences is understanding and not causal explanation. Such 
understanding recaptures the meaning of social objects and 
actions. Consequently Dilthey holds that we cannot compare 
cultural sciences directly with the natural sciences. He further 
holds that undertaking such a comparison smacks of 
methodological confusion and misunderstanding. Such 
incomparability is justified by recourse to drawing a strict 
distinction between subjectivity characterizing human behavior 
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and objectivity presumably deemed to be the hallmark of natural 
scientific investigations/ ' 
Schleirmacher and Dilthey, tried to develop a distinct social 
scientific methodological approach, an approach aiming at 
bringing out the differences between the procedures employed by 
natural scientists and strategies appropriate to an investigation of 
social phenomena. There was a long running debate over the 
method in the human sciences particularly in Germany. The 
vehement rejection of the relevance of natural sciences model of 
methodology, in social scientific investigations compelled the 
social scientists to formulate their alternative procedures of 
interpretation. Since then attempts have been made to bridge the 
disjunction by showing that interpretive understanding could be 
combined with causal explanation. 
Phenomenology As The Method For Social Science? 
One of the consequences of the success of natural science was a 
persistent attempt to export its method to the social sciences. 
Various arguments put forward to justify this move could be 
collected under the banner of "positivism". However, some 
intellectuals felt that, this scientific and positivistic 
methodological onslaught on philosophy and the human sciences 
would lead to their dissolution. 
From its very inception, phenomenology has resisted this 
scientism and the consequent all-prevasive scientific vision of 
modern man. Phenomenology did not reject the achievements of 
science nor deny its power. What it did question was the claim that 
scientific knowledge had somehow wrenched itself free of 
subjectivity. Phenomenologist's argument was deceptively simple. 
All knowledge, even science begins in consciousness, in 
subjectivity. In fact, phenomenology is an approach that tries to be 
as free as possible from conceptual pre-suppositious and 
constitutes an attempt to describe things as faithfully as 
possible."*^ Before pointing out as to how phenomenology is the 
proper method for the social sciences it is important to know what 
is phenomenology. 
The term phenomenology has been used in as many widely 
varying senses in modern philosophy as has the term which names 
the subject matter of this science "phenomena". The word 
"phenomenology" is derived from the Greek word "Phainein" 
which means to show. The word 'phenomenology' was first used 
by Kant and Hegel, but it was Franz Brentano who established it 
as a concept as well as method. Later on, Edmund Husserl, a 
German philosopher, who is supposed to be the fountainhead or 
real originator of phenomenology tried to make it a rigorous 
science. 
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Husserl came to the conclusion that Western culture had lost 
its true direction and purpose. His mood is reflected in the title of 
his last major philosophical work "Philosophy and the Crisis of 
European Man". The "crisis" consisted of philosophy's departure 
from its true goal. Philosophy has provided the best possible 
answers to human questions and concerns. It dealt rigorously with 
man's quest for the highest values, and, also tried to develop the 
unique capacities of human reason. Husserl described "crisis" as 
the seeming collapse of rationalism and he set his lifetime 
objective or mission to save human reason or deliver it from it's a 
crisis-ridden condition. Husserl thought that the main cause of 
crisis of Western man is not the development of theoretical and 
technological sciences. He was in fact impressed by the 
achievements of the natural sciences. His criticism was on faulty 
attitude inspired by the natural sciences with regard to what world 
is like and how best to know it. Husserl rejected the natural 
scientist 's view, which he thought rests upon a fatal prejudice that 
nature is basically physical. He further holds that apart from 
physical aspect of world there is a realm of spirituality or soul. 
Rejection of this aspect of world is the root cause of "crisis" of 
modern man. 
Husserl begins by proposing that all forms of knowledge 
have their roots in consciousness. Consciousness is always 
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intentional; it is consciousness of something, be they ordinary 
objects in the world, mathematical proofs or scientific discoveries. 
AH of these enter our consciousness as phenomena for us. Husserl 
holds that we have to suspend our presuppositions regarding the 
reality. We have to constitute the objective character of objects in 
consciousness. By reflecting upon experience, we will have to 
transcend it. This attempt was earlier made by Descartes and Kant 
but they could not achieve what Husserl thought he had achieved, 
namely the constitution of pure consciousness or what he termed 
the transcendental Ego. 
Husserl insists that philosophy involves a distinctive cast of 
mind. He contrasts it with what he terms 'the naturalistic attitude'. 
This naturalistic attitude has two essential features. First, it 
presumes that there is a world of objects existing independently of 
us, which we can know. Second, the possibility of our having 
knowledge of this world is indubitable. Thus the reality of the 
world and of our knowledge of it is never questioned. This 
naturalistic attitude was not confined simply to ordinary common 
sense. It could be seen in science, mathematics etc. Husserl holds 
that we should transcend this naturalistic attitude and should adopt 
the philosophic attitude. The philosophic attitude is predicated 
upon the questioning of all presuppositions; there are no 
presuppositions that cannot be questioned and suspended. By 
164 
extending the premise of doubt to all presumptions, philosophy 
can transcend the naturalistic attitude and so transform the 
premises of science, commonsense etc. into phenomena of 
consciousness. The shift from naturalistic attitude to philosophical 
attitude, Husserl called the phenomenological reduction or epoche. 
This phenomenological reduction does not mean that reality 
disappears; it only entails seeing the reality in a new way. This 
shift from naturalistic attitude to philosophic attitude is very 
difficult to bring out in an abstract theoretical formulation.'*'' 
Husserl further holds that bracketing the physical world 
means returning to the consciousness of the world. We cannot take 
bracketing any further. We cannot in consciousness bracket 
consciousness. This consciousness purified of assumptions, beliefs 
and knowledge which I might have about the world is a 
transcendental consciousness, the consciousness not of particular 
thinking being (Ego) but of the transcendental ego. Husserl argued 
that the phenomenon which we have in pure consciousness is 
basically the essence of the object which we have experienced in 
the naturalistic attitude. The 'essence' or 'edios' of a phenomenon 
is that which is present in pure consciousness, and hence that 
which makes the object knowable, experienceable by 
consciousness. The method for isolating or intuiting essence is the 
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eidetic reduction, whereby the object's location in consciousness is 
set aside and its unchanging, universal characteristics revealed/^ 
The eidetic reduction is Husserl's attempt to steer between 
the twin alternatives, viz; empiricism and psychologism. Such an 
attempt was undertaken; it seems, by earlier philosophers as well. 
If carried out successfully, the method could provide the 
possibility of a foundational transcendental science illuminating 
the data constituted as phenomena in each of the derived sciences. 
Husserl holds that each and every science has its particular way of 
defining its objects and a particular mode of study. These are the 
means by which phenomena are selected and conceptualized. The 
eidetic reduction would enable the sciences to see the ground on 
which they were standing; the essential character of the 
phenomena which they studied. Each of the derivative sciences 
was a science of appearance under particular attitudes; the eidetic 
reduction would enable the formulation of an 'eidetic science', a 
first philosophy on which all sciences must be based. 
Husserl's method gradually became transformed into a 
critique of the natural sciences. Husserl was particularly 
contemptuous towards psychology. In Husserl's view psychology 
claimed to be the science of consciousness but actually committed 
itself to the strategy of experimentalism. Consequently, it could 
not study consciousness as such but presented a ridiculous picture 
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of consciousness. Husserl further holds that human subjectivity 
and inter-subjectivity are not amenable to experimentation and 
'objective observation' of this sort. Instead of blindly following 
the natural sciences psychology ought to devise a methodology, 
which fits its subject matter's essence, namely; the immersion of 
human consciousness into the flow of inter-subjectivity in the life-
world. Husserl holds that all the disciplines had failed to reflect 
seriously and rigorously upon their own foundations in the life-
world and consciousness. They had failed to see just what they had 
and what they had not taken from the life-world. 
The American philosopher Alfred Schutz says that this 
phenomenological analysis was of particular importance for the 
social sciences because they have claimed to provide the 
'scientific study' of the life-world. Alfred Schutz was greatly 
impressed by phenomenology and Husserl's analysis of life-world. 
He uses Husserl's philosophical method and tries to suggest what 
sort of ontology and conceptual framework interpretive social 
sciences must have and how it could be arrived at. 
Like Husserl, Schutz also begins his exploration with a 
rejection of 'positivism' and naive use of the 'natural science' as a 
model for social sciences. Following the Husserlian point of view, 
life-world of ordinary understanding is carried through from the 
naturalistic attitude into the scientific outlook. Schutz holds that 
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social reality has its origin in life-world, of ordinary social actors, 
which is the subject matter of social sciences. The constitution of 
the social reality is the outcome of the actions of the inter-
subjective social actors. Now the first and foremost question is 
how social scientists constitute the inter-subjective life-world as a 
phenomenon for study. What objects will it investigate and what 
concepts will it need? The answer is to be found in the 
phenomenological analysis of the life- world, and the concepts of 
inter-subjectivity, subjective meaning and actor. 
Phenomenology being the study of phenomena, it becomes 
necessary to know the phenomena studied by the social sciences. 
The phenomena studied by the social sciences are social actions. 
In fact we do not see behavior and infer meaningful action; we see 
meaningful action. We do not see someone moving his hand and 
infer he is waving, we see that person waving. It is only an 
occasional feature of our lives that we have to interpret behavior 
at the level of consciousness. Now the second question arises 
regarding the meaning of actions or how we can make sense of our 
own and other actions. Schutz holds that the social world is inter-
subjective and the meanings which are given to action are shared. 
He further holds that we have a "common stock of knowledge" 
which we all share, though this knowledge is partial and 
idiosyncratic (because it is formed out of particular biographically 
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defined experiences wliich every one has). But this common stock 
of knowledge is also formed out of knowledge which we inherit 
simply because we are members of a given society. In this way we 
are not only able to make sense of our own and other's actions but 
others can also make a sense of our action.''^ 
The social scientist is not concerned with the experience 
and meaning of actual individuals. He is concerned with typical 
actors with typical motives who seek to realize typical goals by 
means of typical courses of action. Schutz felt that the social 
sciences had failed to grasp this fundamental feature of their 
method. Schutz made some recommendations to serve as the 
foundation of the social sciences. He proposed a set of postulates: 
1. The first postulate is logical consistency. Schutz holds that 
the social sciences should make it sure that there is highest 
standard of consistency, clarity and logical connectiveness 
in order to secure the objective validity of theories in its 
system of constructs. 
2. The second postulate is subjective interpretation. Social 
scientist must seek to attribute to social actors in their 
theories typical consciousness, typical motivations and 
typical stocks of knowledge. They must treat actions as 
meaningful for social actors. 
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3. The third postulate put forward by Schutz is that our 
explanation of courses of action and social behavior must be 
in terms of the models we have utilized. We can not attribute 
more to actors than they can meaningfully have in the social 
world of which they are part and in which they are acting/'^ 
Schutz' work in the foundations of the social sciences is a 
direct application of Husserl's phenomenological method. 
In fact, the use of the phenomenological method in the social 
sciences will make them more rigorous and appropriate. For 
example, if we want to know a particular tribe, we should 
observe their culture without any presupposition. We should 
not evaluate or judge their actions by our standards of 
rationality. In fact, we should suspend every kind of 
presupposition regarding the tribe, which we are going to 
study. This could be done simply if we extend our premise of 
doubt. We could observe a thing without presupposition and 
finally we could be in a position to have an objective look of 
that tribe. 
Some problems Relating to Social Sciences 
There are some problems that are extremely general and concern 
both the society and social studies. They are philosophical and are 
currently the object of spirited controversies. They may be 
summarized as follows: 
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1. What are the social facts? Whether they are the constructions 
of the individual observer or of the community of social 
scientist? What is the status of the so-called social facts? 
2. Whether social facts are objective social patterns? Whether 
they follow any law or are these social facts utterly lawless?. 
3. What is society? Is it the collection of individuals without 
having any regular shape or an unanalyzable block or a 
system? [this is the individualism - holism - systemism 
trilemma involving an ontological problem with an 
epistemological counterpart] 
4. Whether societies change under the pressure of external 
forces or through their internal dynamics or, are both types 
of factors operating in bringing about social change? 
Alternatively do societies change as a result of new ideas or 
as a result of material factors or do both ideas and material 
factors cumulatively bring about social change? 
5. What prevails in society?, solidarity (cooperation) or 
conflict (competition) or a combination of both these 
phenomena? 
6. Whether people have total freedom of action or are they used 
as tools by historical forces? 
7. Are the social sciences ideographic (limited to particulars), 
nomothetic or both? 
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8. Whether the theories of social science represent social fact 
or are they mere metaphors? 
9. How do different philosophical schools of thought such as 
empiricism, rationalism, and idealism etc. impact on social 
science. Are these impacts positive - negative or nil? 
10. Are the basic social sciences value -free and morally 
neutral? And can the same be said about the social policy 
sciences? 
11. Is there unity of method in studying society and nature? or 
do we have to take into account the perceptions, delusions, 
interests, intentions, and decisions of the agents while 
studying a society? 
12. Is predictability possible in all social events? And is 
predictability (or lack of it) inherent in social reality or is it 
merely a reflection of human knowledge or ignorance? 
13. Is social conflict the engine of history, or is cooperation 
equally powerful? 
14. Are there laws of history? 
These are some problems relating to the social sciences. All of 
them have been answered both positively and negatively at one 
time or the other:''^ 
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CHAPTER -IV 
RELATIVISM AND RATIONALITY IN 
SOCIAL SCIENCES 
Presently we shall attempt to examine the 'role of relativism in 
human sciences' with special reference to G.H. Gadamer and Peter 
Winch and 'principle of rationality in human sciences' with 
special reference to Karl Popper and the 'normative use of 
rationality'. Lastly we shall take up the role of 'relativistic 
rationality' in human science with special reference to Peter 
Winch, Barry Barnes, David Bloor and Richard Rorty. 
Role Of Relativism In Social Sciences 
Relativism is a very crucial and serious problem in social 
scientific discourse. The crucial question is as to whether it is 
possible to have social science which is not relativistic in nature. 
Answering such a question is not so simple as social science is the 
study of social events and social actions both at individual and 
holistic levels. Social science is dependent on the socialization of 
experiences or beliefs of the individual or more likely of the 
groups. 
We do not have any choice to live our life without a standpoint of 
values. We have short-term and long-term needs, desires, 
preferences and goals. These dimensions of our existence 
determine our courses of action. It is impossible to divest 
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ourselves, even for an instant, of our needs, desires, preferences 
and goals. The fact is that, even if we wish to check our 
preferences, we can do so with reference to a parameter which 
parameter will again be a preference and so on and so forth. Thus 
we never look at world or ourselves from a completely neutral 
way. This inescapable life-condition powerfully impacts our 
modes of cognition and methods of analysis, which consequently 
opens us up to the recognition of relativism. Our way of 
understanding world is inherently relative to our motivations 
needs and preferences etc. Furthermore, our preferences and needs 
are relative to or they grow out of our particular situations.' 
Social scientific research carried out in late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century has methodologically sophisticated and 
sharpened our awareness of the phenomenon of cultural diversity 
across the globe. For example, anthropological field-studies have 
revealed widely different practices governing human relationships, 
sociological investigations have made us aware of substantial 
differences in the moral beliefs of different social groups and 
ethnographers and historians have detailed different frameworks of 
belief about the world in different social settings. These 
methodologically informed studies have persuaded philosophers 
and social scientists of the unavoidability and inescapability of 
cultural relativism; a deep and abiding feature of human society in 
174 
its historical evolution as well as contemporary setting. Different 
or diverse societies ascribe distinct meanings to human 
relationships. Each and every culture has its specific way of 
acquiring beliefs about the world and evaluating human actions. 
There is no trans-cultural standard by which we can describe and 
evaluate these different cultures. This perspective is particularly 
appealing to interpretive social scientists, for it validates their 
view that each culture is unique and that the social inquiry must 
begin with the meaningful self-definition of the culture under 
study. 
Such a field situation lands social scientific research into a 
paradoxical position. If we take as one of the goals of science the 
discovery of generalization, then this radical diversity appears as a 
large obstacle to progress in the social sciences. However, many 
of the arguments provide a basis for narrowing down this relativist 
conclusion; in particular, the explanatory frameworks of rational 
choice theory and materialism. However, each purports to offer a 
basis for explaining human behavior via cross-cultural universals; 
for example, the idea that human societies must adopt social 
arrangements that function to satisfy material needs and the notion 
of rational self interest. To the extent these components do 
provide a basis for successful explanation in a variety of cultural 
settings, the strong claims of cultural relativism are undercut. 
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There are several versions of relativism; conceptual 
relativism, belief relativism and normative relativism. We have 
discussed them in the first chapter of this thesis. To recapitulate 
briefly, conceptual relativism (following some strands of recent 
thought in the philosophy of language and science) holds that 
different languages embody incommensurable ways of categorizing 
the world, belief relativism maintains that different cultures 
possess different standards of belief assessment (they may be 
fundamentally irresolvable, and as a result they possess 
Incommensurable systems of belief), and normative relativism 
states that different cultures embody radically distinct value 
systems, so the social scientist must start anew for every cultural 
group in attempting to identify the norms and values that underlie 
everyday life. In each case the core idea is that there is no 
common theory or standard of evaluation with which to compare 
concepts, standards of rationality or norms. 
The problem of relativism is tied up to the search for cross-
cultural universal features; conceiving, reasoning and acting, that 
are found in almost all societies. If such universals do exist, then 
it is tempting to conclude that these derive from human nature, 
prior to culture and socialization. 
Different social scientists have talked about the role of 
relativism in social science from different perspectives. Let us 
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discuss two contemporary philosophers, Peter Winch and G.H. 
Gadamer, who are seminally significant in perspectivising the role 
of relativism in the social sciences. "The idea of social science 
and its relation to philosophy" by Peter Winch and "Truth and 
Method" by Hans - George - Gadamer have been crucially 
significant in generating a vigorous hermeneutic and 
methodological debate within the discourse of social science. 
Peter Winch On Relativism 
The social sciences, during their formative phase, manifestly 
appropriated the methodology of the "empirical" natural sciences. 
Anthropologists modeled their investigations pertaining to 
understanding the differences among various cultures on 
Darwinian evolutionary hypothesis. The adoption of general 
scientific approach also led to an appropriation of the 
epistemological assumption and underpinnings of modern 
philosophy. For example, the social science incorporated the 
dichotomy between the knowing subject and the known object and 
desirability of objective unbiased knowledge in their 
methodological programme. The social sciences in their search for 
identity tried vigorously to approximate natural sciences, for they 
were considered to be the only model for understanding the 
multiple aspects of human culture constituting the subject matter 
of the social sciences.'' 
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Winch vehemently criticizes any kind of imitation to natural 
science. He offered an analysis of the nature of the social sciences 
which place them in sharp contrast to natural sciences. Winch 
argues that social sciences ought to embrace a different kind of 
methodology - a methodology which abandons all objectivist 
pretensions. Winch must be credited with generating potentially 
revolutionary consequences for the social sciences, by applying 
the techniques of analytic philosophy to its issues. Winch was 
deeply influenced by Wittgenstein, especially by his notion of 
"Language-Games". In fact he used Wittgensteinian notions of 
"Language-Games" and "Forms of Life" as his point of departure 
and cogently argued for sharply demarcating the natural scientific 
and social scientific spheres of investigation. Winch abandons the 
notion of unified and formalist account of science, which includes 
social sciences as well. He draws a parallel between different 
'Language-Games' and different 'Social practices' by arguing that 
since both are rule-governed, meaning and understanding must be 
relative to context whether it be linguistic or social. Indeed, for 
Winch the notion of "social" comes to include some grounds in a 
particular set of social practices. These sets of practices may be 
fruitfully construed as what Wittgenstein calls "forms of life."'' 
From this Winchian analysis of the nature of social science, 
we can reasonably infer that any research in the social sciences or 
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any understanding of various social practices in various cultures is 
not the result of the scientific methods employed in natural 
sciences. The fact is that the subject-matter available to social 
scientist always requires some interpretation, and any 
understanding of different social practices must be relative to a 
particular 'language-game' and the underlying 'form of life'. He 
further holds that in sociology and anthropology, there is an 
essential 'subjective' and 'interpretive' element which can not be 
eliminated. Thus Winch uses a straightforward analytic argument 
and finds his way to hermeneutic understanding of social science. 
For many, the path from Winch's analysis of social science 
to a radical relativism is short, straight and wide. His 
understanding or interpretation of all social practices is subjective 
and relative. As Richard Bernstein points out; 
"Winch seems to be suggesting that forms of life 
may be so radically different from each other, 
that in order to understand and interpret alien or 
primitive societies we not have to bracket our 
prejudice and biases but have to suspend our own 
Western standards and criteria of rationality. We 
be confronted with standards of rationality about 
beliefs and actions that are incompatible with or 
incommensurable with our standards."^ 
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The stakes have suddenly been escalated to the point that 
from Winch's concern about the notion of 'social ' and about the 
methodology of social science, we have moved to an examination 
of our notion of "'rationality" and "human reason". Indeed Winch 
goes on to say: 
"The forms in which rationality express as itself 
in the culture of human society can not be 
elucidated simply in terms of the logical 
coherence of the rule according to which 
activities are carried out in that society. For 
there comes a point where we are not even in a 
position to determine what is and what is not 
coherent in such a context of rules without 
raising questions about the point which 
following these rules has in that society."^ 
In other words, we cannot impose our criteria of rationality 
upon different cultures in order to understand them. Winch set the 
context of rationality in that particular culture, where one must 
determine what counts as following the rules. Winch, consistently 
juxtaposing the early and later Wittgenstein, insists that since "the 
limits of my language mean the limits of my world" and since 
there are different languages, then each of us is faced with a 
limitation of our understanding-a limitation which is rooted in our 
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language and "form of rationality". The main issue according to 
Winch, becomes one concerned with difference in criteria of 
rationality. Any time we talk about standards of criteria of 
rationality, we are to ask "whose". To complete Winch's analogy 
to Wittgenstein's notion of 'language-game' and 'rule-governed 
nature of language', we might say that the main issue becomes 
whether there is a single game of rationality with a single set of 
rules or whether there are different games of rationality with 
different rules. Winch's position is clear. He holds that 
intelligibility takes many and varied forms and consequently there 
are no norms for intelligibility in general. Winch makes his 
position clearer by analysing E.E. Evans-Pritchard's research 
concerning the African Azande. Azande's believe that events do 
occur through a power; this power comes through mystical means. 
This practice is frequently manifested in terms of oracles which 
the Azande use to direct their lives. Winch says that Azande would 
be utterly lost and bewildered without his oracle. The mainstay of 
his life would be lacking. Winch goes on to say that oracle 
functions for Azande as mathematical calculation functions in 
modern scientific society. But the question is as to how one 
understands and makes these facts about Azande beliefs 
intelligible. The fact is that Azade see, the same events differently 
as we do see them from our perspective. They see them as events 
controlled by witchcraft. Their understanding of causality and why 
and how events do occur is so different from that of modern 
science. Consequently, it became difficult to make any sense at all 
of these practices for a modern man.^ Now the question arises 
about the intelligibility of Azande's practice of witchcraft. Winch 
is quick in responding to this question. He argues that this 
question itself presupposes a question as to whom the question is 
being put too. He relativizes intelligibility itself. Thus we might 
say that witch-craft is intelligible to the Azande and it is not 
intelligible to modern scientific society. It is quite possible that 
how we explain the occurrence of an event might be unintelligible 
to them. It might be asked that some practices of witchcraft are 
full of contradictions. Winch is not bothered about the so-called 
contradictions in the practice of witchcraft. He holds such 
comparisons cannot be made and such objections cannot be raised 
in a world bristling with cross-cultural criteria of rationality. He 
argues that since the basic epistemological notions of evidence, 
confirmation and contradiction of modern scientific society are 
different from those of Azande, we can not arrogate to ourselves 
the right to repudiate the Azande beliefs with impunity.** The 
following example indicates categorically the impact of the thesis 
of relativism in the discourse of social science. It further 
authenticates the Winchian position in social scientific discourse. 
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Example:- Benjamin Le Whrof was a linguist and ethnographer 
who devoted much of his time during 1030s to the study of the 
Hopi language. His study persuaded him that Hopi conceptions of 
space, time, causation and other fundamental metaphysical 
categories appeared to be radically different from those embodied 
in European languages. The philosopher Kant had argued in 
Eighteenth century that all knowledge depends on a universal set 
of concepts in terms of which the agent analyses the empirical 
world: physical object, space, time and causation were the ideas 
that Kant believed to be these fundamental and universal 
categories. But Whrof argues that the Hopi conceptual scheme was 
fundamentally different from this Euclidean-Laplacean framework. 
He writes: "The Hopi language is seen to contain no words, 
grammatical forms, expressions that refer directly to what we call 
'time' or to 'past', 'present', 'future' or to enduring or lasting... 
At the same time, the Hopi language is capable of accounting for 
and describing correctly, in a pragmatic or operational sense, all 
observable phenomena of the universe"^. According to Whrof, we 
can infer from the above study that different cultures may embody 
conceptual systems so different that they categorize the world in 
radically different ways. 
Thus, we can say that language and subsequently culture play a 
vital role in 'orienting' us towards a particular worldview and 
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value-system. Our modes of articulation, understanding, analysis 
and interpretation of reality are deeply embedded in our symbols 
of representation. The symbols direct or persuade us to look at the 
world from a particular perspective. As there are different 
symbolic perspectives, correspondingly there are different 
ontocosmological and axiological outlooks we bring to bear upon 
the world. A universal outlook or a translinguistic and trans-
cultural weltanchauung is impossible of formulation and 
realization. In view of these considerations, relativists argue that 
we can never achieve a consensual account either of natural or 
social dimensions of reality. Therefore, there is no escape from 
accepting the relativistic position, viz., that all accounts or 
interpretations are context bound in terms of language, culture, 
history etc. 
Winch's account of the social science constitutes an attack on the 
traditional opposition between epistemology and sociology. 
Traditionally, sharp distinctions have been drawn between 
epistemology and sociology and history: epistemologists 
emphasizing on nature of knowledge, source of knowledge, 
validity of arguments, authenticity of evidence etc, and 
sociologists and historians underlining the significance of cultural 
and social factors in the acquisition of knowledge. An attack upon 
this distinction lies at the heart of philosophical hermeneutics. For 
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example, Aristotle's characterization of man as a rational animal 
is clearly an essentialist claim about the nature of human beings. 
To be rational according to Aristotle is true of human beings as a 
species. Such as characterization is deemed to be transcending 
time and place. This trans-spatial and trans-temporal 
characterization gives us one classical picture of human beings 
and human endeavour as being essentially epistemological. 
However, historians and sociologists offer a different account of 
man. Philosophers of social science such as Peter Winch also take 
a radical position Winch underscores that man cannot be deemed 
to be rational without any regard to culture, history, society and 
language etc. They emphasize that man is a function of socio-
historical and cultural dynamics and any epistemological account 
of human project will be devoid of any content and will have no 
connection with how he actually operates within a given context. 
Man cannot be deemed to be abstractly or essentially rational, for 
rationality itself is a product of a long drawn-out historical 
evoluation. Rationality is a function of historicity. The 
epistemological investigations themselves are relative for the very 
nature, scope and subject-matter of knowledge changes across 
space and time. Therefore, the Aristotalian definition of man is 
misleading. Man cannot 'rationally' appropriate universal and 
eternal knowledge. Being intimately linked to history and culture, 
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his knowledge can be finally 'historical' and 'cultural ' as would 
be his 'rationality'. 
Gadamer On Role Of Relativism In Social Sciences 
We have mentioned in the beginning that both Peter Winch 
and Hans George Gadamer have been responsible for working out 
a particular variety of relativism which abounds in the social 
sciences. So for we have worked out the views of Peter Winch. 
Now, let us try to see how Gadamer advocates a kind of relativism 
(without using the word directly) in social science. Hans George 
Gadamer's 'Truth and Method' constitutes a philosophical 
hermeneutical critique of method. In hermeneutics, the question of 
rationally and truth are usually being addressed to. Gadamer 
hermeneutics talks of relativism in the context of text reading. The 
focus of Gadamer in 'Truth and Method' is history, literature and 
art. However, the applications of Gadamer's critique to other 
social sciences have been direct and immediate. 
Gadamer vehemently criticized the epistemological method, 
the characterizing feature of modern philosophising, the 
pioneering exponent of which was Rene Descartes. Gadamer holds 
that this method generates and is dependent upon dichotmies 
which separate and divide the universe in an arbitrary manner. 
Consider the distinction between the knowing subject and the 
known object, self and others, experience and reality etc. Consider 
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also the kinds of epistemological issues to which these distinctions 
have given rise to: conditions of Icnowledge, the problem of other 
minds, theories of perception etc. Gadamer holds that these 
distinctions are the consequences of our "alienation" from the 
natural world." According to Gadamer, they are the result of the 
industrial revolution and the imposition of the model of the natural 
science upon the human science. What should be the normal parts 
of our experience and nature such as our understanding of our past 
and of other fellows, get artificially objectified and are 
relinquished to the status of "data" to be studied or collected or 
researched in order to impose the distinctions which are necessary 
for the upkeep of the epistemological project. We must impose (or 
presuppose) distinctions upon our experience and nature which 
separate and isolate us from nature, from art and literature and 
from history. Thus method originates from a process of alienation 
and fragmentation which is most evident in the way in which the 
natural sciences claim to produce knowledge of an aspect or 
process in nature only when we are able to reproduce it 
artificially. For Gadamer, method creates a need for itself by first 
artificially separating people from those parts of their existence 
which ought to be familiar and natural and then preferring itself as 
the only way of bridging the gap and overcoming the separation. 
However, Gadamer claims that the attempt to use epistemology to 
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reestablish the unity of experience is deemed to failure Joel 
Weinsheimer captures this aspect of Gadamer's critique nicely: 
"Like nature, art and history no longer belong to 
us, nor we to them. They no longer belong to 
selbstverstandlich: the things which are to us self-
understandable, self-evident matters. Of course, 
method, then aims to redeem this loss by 
substituting itself for the kind of understanding 
that is not reflective knowledge, because 
understanding, everything in advance by 
belonging to it, before knowing and its 
methodological regulations come into play. But 
the paradox of the substitute is operative here as 
elsewhere: method finishes the very craving for 
home coming that it is designed to satisfy".'^ 
According to Gadamer we must abandon what Richard Rorty 
calls "the desire for constraints and confrontations", artificially 
imposed by epistemology and give ourselves to hermeneutical 
understanding. 
The epistemological project was formally inaugurated by 
Plato. He contrasted knowledge with opinion. He was of the view 
that knowledge is objective and opinion is something subjective 
based on prejudice and biases. The fundamental purpose of 
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epistemology is to provide a method by which we can objectify the 
experience. Moreover it provides a way to analyze and justify an 
experience. Gadamer says: 
"Experience is only valid if it is confirmed; 
hence its dignity depends on its fundamental 
repeatability, but this means that experience, by 
its very nature, abolishes its history. This is true 
even of everyday experience, and how much 
more for any scientific version of it". 
Gadamer holds that knowledge based on model of the natural 
sciences has a problem, it tolerates no restriction on its claim to 
universality. However, Gadamer's criticism of epistemology and 
method is in fact the criticism of its claim to universality. As 
Weinshneirner aptly describes: 
"The fundamental hubris of method consists in 
its presumption that it exhausts the sphere of 
truth this blanket claim of universality is what 
Mary Hesse calls the 'imperialism' of empiricist 
philosophy of science."'"* 
But Gadamer insists that method and the natural sciences do not 
exhaust truth. 
For Gadamer Philosophical hermeneutics is the way by 
which we are able to explore the understanding of experience in 
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the human sciences. Hermeneutics goes beyond the limits that the 
concept of method sets to modern science. 
Hermeneutics tries to seek that experience of truth, which 
transcends the jurisdiction of scientific method. It also addresses 
itself to inquire into the legitimacy of such experience. In view of 
the same, human sciences are joined with modes of experience 
lying outside the sphere of natural sciences. Philosophy, history 
and art are all modes of experience in which a truth is 
communicated that is not amenable to verification by recourse to 
natural scientific methodology. Thus Gadamer points out the 
limitations of science and the kind of truth dependent upon the 
method of the natural sciences. He further holds that truth lies 
outside and in opposition to the methodological control of the 
natural science. There is no monopoly of natural science on truth. 
For Gadamer tradition plays an important part in all 
understanding. It is an inescapable facticity. He further holds that 
tradition possesses an ontological efficacy for determining the 
very nature of human being; part of what makes us what we are is 
our understanding of our history and our place in it. Each 
generation's understanding of itself and of various cultural 
institutions and beliefs and values, is filtered through a 
hermeneutical understanding of its history. Gadamer holds that as 
different texts from time to time have been interpreted differently, 
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by different generations, these interpretations produce effects 
upon the present generation. They develop a tradition. For 
Gadamer, these current effects are a part of the meaning of the 
texts. What develops is a reciprocal interaction between the texts 
and interpretation. Our reading and interpretation of a text is 
conditioned by the text and the meaning of the text is conditioned 
by the present interpretation. 
Gadamer holds that we cannot reconstruct original meaning 
of the text, which the author has assigned to it. It will be a mistake 
if hermeneutic understanding of a text is to be characterised as an 
attempt to reconstruct the original meaning. In fact such an 
attempt is to recast artificial distinctions of method - knowing 
subject and known object. Understanding essentially involves 
interpretation which can not be reduced to knowledge in the 
traditional sense. Gadamer emphasizes the mutual importance of 
the original text and current interpretation to understanding. 
Gadamer holds: 
"It is undoubtedly true that compared with the 
genuine hermeneutical experience that understands 
the meaning of the text, there construction of what 
the author really had in mind is a limited 
undertaking. It is the seduction of historicism to 
see in this kind of reduction a scientific virtue and 
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regard understanding as a kind of reconstruction 
which in effect repeats the process of how the text 
came into being. Hence it (the reconstruction of 
original meaning) follows the ideal familiar to us 
from our knowledge of nature." ^ 
Mere reconstruction of the meaning is never possible. 
Hermeneutic understanding always includes the historical self-
mediation of present and tradition. The fact is that the nature of a 
human being is ontologically determined by the historical situation 
in which he exists and any understanding of that historical 
situation will always involve the interplay of 'subjective' 
prejudice and tradition.'^ 
The aim of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is not to 
challenge the claim of objectivity, but simply to show its 
limitations. To search for objectively in human or social sciences 
is a task impossible of realization. Our understanding and meaning 
we ascribe to a text within the context of a tradition cannot be 
characterised by objectivity and universality supposedly achieved 
by natural sciences. History, tradition and culture pile upon layers 
of interpretation and meaning and all these layers cumulatively 
determine our contemporary or current interpretation and meaning. 
The role of our presuppositions, predilections and prejudices 
cannot be entirely eliminated in the crystallization of our 
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understanding and derivation of our meaning. Therefore, a 
wholesale de-subjectivisation of social scientific arguments or 
judgments is beyond the ken of human endeavour. 
Role Of Rationality In The Social Sciences 
The problem of the role of rationality is crucially or seminally 
significant in any outline or overview of the philosophy of social 
science. The significance of the role of rationality in the social 
sciences stems from the fact that explanation and prediction of 
human behavior, both individual and social, entails bringing out 
the reasons they have or suppose themselves to have for their 
behavior. 
The concept of rationality is surrounded by several 
confusions in its deployment in the social sciences. In fact, social 
scientists use the word 'rationality' in various and even different 
senses. Broadly speaking, 'rationality' is presumably used in the 
causal sense in natural scientific explanations or predictions and 
in normative sense in social scientific explanations or 
interpretations as social behavior in contradistinction to the 
behavior of the physical or material phenomena, is supposed to be 
heavily laden with normative content in terms of approvals or 
disapprovals, likes or dislikes, acceptability or unacceptability, 
respectability or derespectabiltiy etc. Presently, we shall 
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therefore, take up the normative role of rationality in the domain 
of human or social sciences. 
Normative Role Of Rationality In The Social Sciences 
In the social sciences the terms 'rational' and 'rationality' do 
figure in different theories. In fact, these terms characterise the 
crucial or operative judgments in entire social scientific discourse. 
Thus sociological, anthropological, economic, political and 
historical narratives ascribe the titles of 'rational ' and 
'rationality' to their evaluations or expositions. However, there is 
no unanimity as to the meaning and definition of 'rationality' as 
such. The use of 'rationality' in different social sciences makes 
this absence of unanimity on the definition of rationality all the 
more glaring. 
The social scientific theories, therefore, can be disputed. 
The claims of these theories as to what constitutes a belief or an 
action to be rational are also disputed. Economists dispute what 
constitutes rationality for an economic agent. Similarly 
sociologists dispute as to what constitutes rationality for a social 
agent. One school of psychologists claims that all human beings 
are genetically equipped with certain mental "heuristics" for 
dealing with complex aspects of reality. But they fall short, in 
some circumstances, of perfect rationality. Clinical psychologists 
claim that we may distinguish 'rational' from "irrational" beliefs 
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and motivations.'^ In all these cases a common question arises as 
to whether the actions, beliefs etc, as declared by theorists to be 
rational are really rational and the actions, beliefs, as declared by 
theorists to be irrational, are really irrational? This dispute of 
rational/irrational gives rise to normative use of rationality. For 
example, when we disagree about what kinds of acts are rational, 
we disagree as to what norms to accept as governing an action. 
Similarly, if we disagree as to which beliefs or preferences are 
rational we simply disagree an to what norms to accept as 
governing a belief or a preference. 
We are free to qualify the disputes that can be explained in 
this style as normative disputes. In the following account we move 
from initial - theory light characterization of normative terms to a 
consideration of the problematics about a central range of use of 
such terms as 'rational' , 'ought' etc. These terms are not employed 
to describe causal/explanatory facts. They are used to express, a 
speakers acceptance of norms. In this sense, the conflicts about 
what is rationality can hinge on questions as to what norms to 
accept. The term 'rational' can be used both descriptively and 
normatively. In the present context we are interested in 
highlighting the normative use of the term 'rational ' . 
In our search for developing an account of what the term 
'rational ' means in a genuinely normative sense, we try to bring 
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out how normative languages and discussions might work in 
human thought. It may be asked as to why normative speech 
framed in terms of the concept ' 'rational" does play a crucial role 
in human affairs. One possible response to this query may be that 
we are biologically adopted to think and discuss in such terms and 
to be guided in part, in our acts, beliefs and feelings by the 
inductions and deductions worked out thereof. 
The above model of the term "rational" for all its negative 
aspects, has its positive gains as well. The model helps us to 
explain as to why normative convictions are sternly social. The 
mechanisms that produce them have it among their biological 
functions to co-ordinate by persuading people towards consensus. 
Genetic designs of these mechanisms are not shaped only by the 
selection pressures, but form an important part of the story.^' In 
fact, they are partly shaped by the advantages of co-ordinated 
action. Consequently, they are shaped to achieve normative 
consensus through mutual influence and to motivate people 
according to that consensus. 
There is no straightforward definition, in causal explanatory 
terms, to the term 'rational' in a genuinely normative sense. The 
norm-acceptance and normative discussion in social dynamics 
could be explained without ever saying what makes a normative 
judgment correct or what makes an act rational. What is crucial in 
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this regard is an individuals' thinking pertaining to human action 
in general. It is the individual who qualifies certain human actions 
to be rational and refuses to accord the same status to other 
actions. The interplay of such a dialectic influences our thought 
and, in the process, we at times do achieve consensus on 
normative matters. 
It depicts as to what it is for people to make assertions and 
come to the conclusion as to what sorts of acts, beliefs and 
feelings are rational. One does not one self make assertions about 
rationality, while offering causal/explanatory account of 
judgments and assertions about rationality. 
The model does suggest, why no one-scientist or otherwise-
could satisfactorily lead a human kind of life without having 
normative convictions and probing deep into normative questions. 
It suggests why normative judgments are an indispensable part of 
human life. The above account should not be deemed to be 
suggesting that a human scientist should necessarily be devoid of 
normative convictions as to which actions are rational and which 
are not. What is being suggested is that normative concerns need 
not be highlighted while formulating causal explanations. Even 
during working hours the scientists looking for causal 
explanations must make normative judgments and heed them. They 
must be guided by judgments of what theories and hypotheses it is 
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rational to accept given the evidence, and what lines of inquiry 
and experiment it is rational to pursue. Norms apply both to acts 
and to beliefs and scientists in their work need norms for both. 
They need to settle practical normative questions as to how to 
proceed in their investigations and what experiments and 
investigations it is rational to pursue. They also must settle what 
to believe on the basis of their evidence: what, given the evidence, 
is it rational to believe on the basis of investigation. This goes for 
all of the sciences, not only just for the human sciences. In fact, 
normative questions are questions of what norms to accept. Of 
course, causal/explanatory questions are factual. However, they 
also raise normative questions about how to investigate them and 
answer them.^" Among the factual questions a social scientist can 
investigate, are questions about people's normative judgments and 
assertions, and the social dynamics of such judgments and 
assertions. 
Rationalist ic Approach To Social Sciences 
One of the foremost methodological issues of social sciences is to 
arrive at an explanation of human action in a given social setting. 
The question of predicting human behavior entails an enquiry 
which can supply us extensive behaviorasl data to discern 
regularities in the functioning of human personality. Answers to 
question of this type have been of paramount interest to social 
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sciences such as sociology, economics, anthropology and 
psychology. 
Several methodological approaches, in this regard, have been 
put forward by philosophers of social science. Presently, we wish 
to highlight the rationalistic approach, part of which we have 
already discussed in the third chapter of our thesis. 
The question pertaining to explanations and predictions of 
human behavior can be approached variously. One of the standard 
approaches is rationalistic one which tries to explain and predict 
human behavior in terms of a deductive schema. The schema 
contains the agent's preferences, goals and objectives. It embodies 
an analysis of his situation as well. The general assumption 
underlying such a rationalistic schema may be called 'the principle 
of uniformity of human nature'. It is assumed that human agents 
behave adequately or appropriately in response to a given 
situation. This assumption, is generally associated with such 
social scientists and philosophers a Pareto, Schutz Popper and 
Telcott Parsons etc. This is sometimes called as "rationality 
principle".^'' 
This rationalistic approach is sometimes supposed to be 
synonymous with individualistic approach wherein social 
phenomena are sought to be explained in terms of an individual's 
intentions, desires, goals etc. In this approach, social phenomena 
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are often deemed to be the result of countless individual actions in 
a given social framework. 
In rationalistic approach we usually study the intended and 
unintended outcome of the behavior of one or many individuals 
acting in a social situation. The rationalistic approach is 
concerned with direct outcome of behavioral uniformity which 
may in turn be rationally explained. The uniformity assumption is 
the main explanatory/causal factor in the rationality schema.^^ 
Thus, it can be said that the rationalistic approach does not 
confine itself to investigating behavioural regularities, it also 
addresses itself to an exploration of the cumulative effect-
intentional or unintentional of countless individual behaviours that 
exhibit some uniformity or constancy. However, the rational 
structure of the cumulative behaviour of an individual is hardly 
mentioned as an explanatory factor. The explanatory schema is not 
usually so organized or rationally structured as to give us a view 
of human behavior at the micro-level. The institutions, traditions, 
systems of behavior, rules and the like are treated as potentially 
analyzable into individualistic terms in the rationalistic approach. 
These are also treated as obstacles in the individual's explanation 
to behavior. Only such structures or systems or wholes which have 
the character of initial conditions or constraints are deemed 
acceptable in the explanation of social phenomena. The systems 
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themselves do not behave, they do not possess rational properties 
which can explain social phenomena. They are environmental 
features of a behaving individual and may be likened to a boulder 
blocking a mountainous track of a climber. The individual 
concerned undertakes a rational assessment of these blocking 
features and initiates appropriate action with a view to realize his 
goals.^^ 
Karl Popper On Rationality Principle 
The 'rationality principle' has been formulated and analysed 
by Karl Popper, an outstanding twentieth century philosopher of 
science. Rationalistic explanation of social behavior is usually 
characterised by two features; firstly, the 'situation in which an 
action takes place and, secondly, some assumptions of rationality 
as "rationality principle". For example, it is generally assumed 
that human social behavior is an equal and opposite reaction to the 
relevant circumstantial or situational dynamics. Such a behavior 
should always be viewed as 'appropriate' or 'adequate' to the 
challenges posed by situational factors. However, it can be asked 
as to whose circumstance and situation is rational behavior 
appropriate to? Is it the situation as conceived by the actor or is 
there some objective notion of the situation as such. It can be 
questioned as to what were the relevant circumstances at the time 
an action took place. The best available knowledge is also a 
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crucial and relevant factor in this regard. The actor's view of his 
situation at some particular time must correspond with the best 
available knowledge at that time. The behavior appropriate to a 
subjective situation can not be deemed to be rational, if on the 
basis of best information available, such a situation turns out to be 
false. 
According to Vilfredo Pareto, a well known sociologist of 
the nineteenth century, a rational action is that which is 
appropriate to an objective situation or to a subjective one which 
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mirrors it. Talcott Parsons, a well known sociologist of twentieth 
century shares this view in his book ''Structure of Social Action'' 
wherein he says: 
"Action is rational in so for as it pursues ends 
possible within the conditions of the situation, 
and by the means which among those available to 
the actor, are intrinsically best adapted to the end 
for reasons understandable and verifiable by 
positive empirical science."' 
The situational analysis and the rationality principle together 
constitute the rationality in the Popperian explanatory schema of 
behavior. The situational analysis, in its turn, comprises firstly, of 
goals or aims and secondly, of knowledge and information. The 
psychological features of the agent such as desires, wants etc, are 
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objectified as 'abstract' situational features in the Popperian 
schema. Firstly, our desires and wants catalyze us to undertake an 
action for the realization of our aims ad objectives. Secondly, an 
agent's beliefs or knowledge-claims turn into abstract situational 
information. Here the theories and facts of an individual impinge 
on his situation in its relevant physical and social aspects. The 
technology required for the attainment of one's goals also becomes 
a sub-component of the agents' situation. The above components 
correspond to the initial conditions or as Popper calls them 
'typical conditions' of a deductive explanation of some physical 
event. Thus, what differentiates a social event from a physical 
event, is the higher degree of specifity attainable in the 
explanation and prediction of a physical event. While conducting 
situational analysis we do not want to predict a spatio-temporally 
singular event. We rather want to stimulate behavior via a rough 
and ready model. 
Nextly, Popper raises the question of the manner of 
interaction between the various components in the explanatory 
schema. He asks as to which components of the model stand in for 
the law. Responding to his own question. Popper asserts that 
rationality principle may be linked to the law in case of social 
models. However, the principle does not have the status of a law 
or of an empirical hypothesis. The over-all Popperian analysis 
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seems either to be confused or deliberately elusive. On the one 
hand, Popper thinks that "rationality" principle is to a social 
explanation what Newton' laws of motion are to a physical 
explanation, and, on the other hand, he thinks that the principle 
does not play the role of an empirical theory. Popper is aware of 
this confusion when he writes: 
"My views on the rationality principle have been 
closely questioned: I have been asked whether 
there is not some confusion in what I say about 
the status of the principle.^' 
However, this awareness notwithstanding. Popper hardly 
tries to give a plausible and coherent account of the 'rationality 
principle' . 
Role Of Relativism Of Rationality In Social Sciences 
The concept of 'rationality' we are dealing with is far more 
nuanced, multi-layred and multidimensional than its usual or day-
to-day employment in ordinary parlance. Our concept of 
rationality involves more than logical consistency and some 
absolutistic connotation. In fact, the concept of rationality we are 
dealing with is typically relative to available evidences. This kind 
of rationality is relativistic in nature. 
Human rationality was declared to be essentially captured by 
scientific method when posltivistic philosophical programme was 
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on the ascendent. However scientist can not monopolise rationality 
once empiricism is challenged to its foundations. The implication 
of such a development maybe the very denial of rationality itself. 
Several philosophers have effectively given up on the very idea of 
rationality instead of confessing that methods of physical science 
are too restrictive a model. 
The question of rationality challenges the social scientist at 
two levels: first, how rational are the people being studied and 
second, how rational is the social scientists while undertaking an 
investigation of a given phenomenon. If scientific rationality in 
taken as the model, social scientists can criticize those whose 
investigations do not accord with the model. On the other hand, if 
it is accepted that science merely forms one set of practices along 
side others, social scientists are left without any standard for 
judging a society. This might appear a gain but the corollary is 
that their own discipline can no longer claim to embody the 
application of any kind of rational principle. The aftermath of 
positivism can produce a paralyzing nihilism. Understanding, 
instead of causal explanation may seem to be the new goal of 
science, but mere understanding is of questionable value.^^ 
The social science aims at more than a simple understanding 
of other cultures. There are several examples available in the West 
that some anthropologists joined the cannibal tribes and lived like 
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them. This actual participation through field-work may have been 
effective for anthropology but this however does not mean the 
total absorption in that tribe is necessary for the anthropologist 
who is studying that particular tribe. Yet the fundamental problem 
remains of how one treats the knowledge gained about the life of a 
tribe. Anthropology is a useless discipline if the assumptions of 
the social sciences are dismissed at the outset as the product of a 
particular society. Some people may just happen to enjoy visiting 
exotic parts of the world and seeing strange customs, while others 
prefer to stay at home.''^ 
Social scientists should detach themselves from their 
respective cultures, if they want to examine other cultures. But the 
fact is that they will not be detached from their own cultures. The 
very notion of scientific detachment is itself a particular cultural 
assumption. Yet the contention is analogous to the response in a 
fierce argument viz; "that is only your opinion". Every opinion is 
the opinion of someone and the important question is whether 
good reasons can be produced for the belief. The point of any 
argument or discussion is lost if you are told that an apparent 
reason can only be, what you think is a good reason. Without the 
ability to discuss what are good reasons, what is true, what is real 
etc. all arguments become the expressions of non-rational attitudes 
or even tastes. However, such a methodological stance generates, 
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in its turn, insurmountable problems. Treating the ideal of 
rationality as just a modern (Western) cultural construction 
amounts to saying that an apparently rational discussion is the 
mere exhibition of culturally conditioned prejudice and that the 
modern man has been brought up to prefer that kind of an 
intellectual game. While conditions in some societies have 
favoured the development of rational thought, the question is 
whether such thought can claim any validity. Is the intellectual 
pursuit of ' truth' just an expression of the working of one culture 
among many, or can it set standards to which all should aspire? 
As already discussed in Chapter III, the social sciences tried 
to borrow their methods from natural sciences which was 
vehemently opposed by some philosophers of social science. They 
argued that scientific standards of rationality cannot be said to be 
exhausting the entire spectrum of rational discourse. It cannot be 
rational to believe whatever science can establish and to dismiss 
as irrational anything beyond the scope of scientific validation. 
Accepting such a stance tantamounts to a clear-cut and categorical 
admission that natural science has complete monopoly over 
rationality. Besides, the alleged monopoly of rationality by 
science, raises insurmountable and irresolvable problems of its 
own. For example, how are we to study primitive societies whose 
beliefs are deep-rooted in witchcraft and things like that which are 
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thoroughly unscientific. The African Azande are often quoted in 
this connection. They believe in witches and try to protect 
themselves against witchcraft. They consult oracles and practice 
magic medicine. Now several questions arise: whether it is 
rational to believe in the power of witches or witchcraft or is it 
mere superstition? Whether we can simply dismiss these tribes as 
irrational or have they their own definitions and criteria of 
rationality? Against this backdrop emerges the concept of 
relativism of rationality. 
Relativism of rationality basically means relativism about 
rational belief. This relativistic rationality emerged in philosophy 
of science after 1950s. Such a position naturally crystallized after 
critically examining many of the assumptions on which traditional 
philosophy of science rested. Some radical restatements of the 
philosophy of science do suggest that scientific rationality is 
relative to context and has no higher epistemic status than any 
other mode of thought.'''' 
The most influential advocates of relativistic rationality in 
the philosophy of science after 1950s were Paul Feyerabend and 
Thomas Kuhn. Feyerabend holds that every methodological rule 
has justifiably been violated at some stage by scientists. Thomas 
Kuhn, on the other hand, denied the existence of a fixed set of 
transparadigmatic methodological criteria with which to 
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impartially or neutrally judge which of the rival paradigms is 
rationally to be preferred. The Kuhnian thesis of relativism 
maintains that rationality of a particular theory depends on the 
methodological standard which are operative in a given context. 
This relativism of rationality has not been limited to the 
philosophy of science only. A good number of writers have argued 
that relativistic rationality operates in the discourse of the social 
sciences as well. Among these philosophers, the most radical 
position on the cultural relativism of the standards of rationality 
comes from Peter Winch. Now let us see how this relativistic 
rationality has been worked out in the social sciences at the hands 
of its various exponents. 
Peter Winch On Relativism Of Rationality In The Social 
Sciences 
The writings of Prof. Peter Winch have attracted an extra-
ordinary amount of attention in our times. He propounds a 
sophisticated reading of relativism, especially on relativistic 
rationality. In fact, 'rationality' is the key concept in all his 
writings. Peter Winch in his celebrated article 'Understanding a 
Primitive Society'' takes as basis of his discussion Evan Pritchard's 
study of witchcraft-beliefs among the Azande. Azande is a tribe 
who believe in witchcraft. They hold that there is a substance, 
which is called 'witch' which can be transmitted from parent to 
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child. The contradiction becomes apparent when a post-mortem 
examination of a particular person alleged to be a witch, does not 
reveal the presence of a substance witch. In view of the same, 
Evan Pritchard, maintains that the Azande belief-system is 
irrational since it involves totally contradictory positions about 
the witch-substance and its manifestations. Peter Winch's response 
to Pritchard's judgment about Azande beliefs being irrational is 
simple. He holds that we can condemn Azande belief, about witch-
craft or oracle as irrational. However, we must understand that 
Azande are engaged in a different language-game. Azande notions 
of witchcraft do not constitute a theoretical system in terms of 
which they try to gain a quasi — scientific understanding of the 
world. Therefore, Azande culture can not be understood on 
theoretical grounds, whereas our culture is theoretical and needs 
theoretical understanding. '' What is theoretical understanding? 
The word theory is derived from the Greek word ' theora' which 
means contemplation. Theoretical understanding mean to 
understand things or grasp them as they are outside the immediate 
perspective of our goals, desires, and activities. Theoretical 
understanding does not try to understand things merely as they 
impinge on us but aims at a disengaged perspective. This 
theoretical understanding is related to rationality and rational 
understanding is linked to articulation. When we have a rational 
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understanding of something we can articulate it. But everything 
may not be amenable to theory. There can be a perspicuous 
articulation which may not be theoretical. No doubt, the 
connection between the two is very close but this does not mean 
that theoretical understanding is whole of rationality Atheoretical 
cultures may be less rational but we can not declare them to be 
irrational. So Azande having an atheoretical culture can not be 
declared to be irrational on the ground that they are contradicting 
their statements. Azande may not be aware of any contradiction or 
even if they are aware of it, they may be less concerned about the 
apparent contradictions in their beliefs. 
Azandes are not playing any language-game. Moreover, they 
do not bother to give any clarification to anybody who tries to 
understand their culture on theoretical grounds. Sometimes, we 
may feel that these Azande are less rational. We may feel that they 
are not interested in how things really are. In fact, we judge their 
every activity in negative terms. Peter Winch simply rejects this 
view regarding Azande and holds that it smacks of arrogance when 
we judge an atheoritical culture on theoretical criteria."''' 
Winch further points out that our criteria of rationality are 
culture - bound. He further holds that when we try to make the 
practices of another society intelligible to ourselves we simply try 
to judge them by our criteria of rationality. However, our 
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standards of rationality and their (Azande) standards of rationality 
are different. Something can appear rational to someone only in 
terms of his understanding of what is and is not rational. It makes 
no sense to say that something does or does not appear rational to 
them as our criteria of rationality are different. Winch holds that 
the difference between the two cultures is unbridgeable because 
the two have different conceptions of rationality. In fact, be l ief -
forming is a function of our social practices for which there is no 
over-arching basis of criticism and justification. There is not an 
objective world to which a belief system may or may not 
correspond to. 
In a relativistic framework, the fact that some beliefs held in 
another culture seem irrational, is no evidence that they are. 
Rather, it is an evidence to show how our understanding about that 
culture is poor or not upto the mark."'^ Peter Winch further remarks 
that modern conception of rationality is deeply affected by the 
achievements and methods of science. So our concept of 
rationality is deeply rooted in scientific society. It treats such 
things as beliefs in magic, or consulting oracles as an almost 
paradigm-case of the irrational. Here again the question arises as 
to whether we are right in applying our standards of rationality to 
those of others.'*" 
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Barry Barnes And David Bloor On Relativism Of 
Rationality 
Advocates of relativism of rationality hold that a particular 
belief can be assessed within a particular word-view because there 
is no neutral or super-cultural framework in which the rationality 
of the worldviews themselves could be assessed. The advocates of 
relativistic rationality further hold that if we want to understand 
others, we must count them right in most mat te rs / ' In fact, this is 
more applicable while we discuss any belief system. Take it as 
given that most beliefs are correct, in view of the fact that a belief 
is identified by its location in a pattern of beliefs. 
Relativism of rationality has been a powerful perspective in 
the realm of social sciences. Some sociologists and philosophers 
have taken relativism of rationality as self-evident. The argument 
put forward by these sociologists and philosophers is mainly from 
ethical diversity. They hold that in different cultures beliefs, 
appraisals and conflicting strategies are taken as rational in their 
respective paradigms. The thesis of relativism of rationality 
ostensibly emanating from diverse cultural patterns has been 
powerfully defended by Barry Barnes and David Bloor also. 
However, their arguments for relativism of rationality stem from 
the perspective of sociology of knowledge. Both these 
philosophers rejected the universalistic notion of rationality. They 
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advocated relativistic rationality, holding rationality to be relative 
to the context, culture, historical epoch etc. Their argument for 
relativistic rationality is simple. They hold that insisting on the 
importance of investigating the empirical conditions under which 
beliefs arise for an agent merely focuses on causes rather than 
reasons and so has nothing to say about rationality. 
Both these philosophers hold that particulars of perceptual 
experience are ordered into clusters and patterns specific to a 
particular culture. There is not any bridgehead of commonly 
shared perceptual sense. Barnes and Bloor hold that the claim for 
universal criteria of rationality based on inference or "rule of 
coherent judgment" is spurious. For the justification of above 
argument or in defence of their claim for relativistic rationality, 
they use lewis carrls' dialogue "what the tortoise said to 
Achilles". They conclude that tortise demonstrates that any 
attempt at the justification of deduction fails since justification of 
deduction itself presupposes deduction. They hold that a defendant 
of rationality is in the predicament of having to admit that 
ultimately we reach an end-point at which the process of 
justification gets circular. Barnes and Bloor hold that rules of 
inference depend upon the meaning of logical words. They defend 
their argument by referring to A.N prior's demonstration that 
different logical connectivities with different meanings would 
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justify different inferences/' ' So any claim to universality stands 
completely shattered. 
Richard Rorty On Relativistic Rationality In The Social 
Sciences 
Richard Rorty, a contemporary American philosopher is not 
directly concerned with the notion of relativistic rationality. Rorty 
raises the issue in a very different way. He holds that "there may 
not be one over-all framework in which rational discourse can take 
place, there could be many different kinds of discourse". For 
Rorty, epistemology and hermeneutics represent two different 
strategies. Rorty asks as to whether we can find a common ground 
between various discourses or whether such a disciplinary matrix 
uniting all speakers is impossible of formulation. Responding to 
the question as to whether we can have a common rationality,'*'' he 
says: 
For hermeneutics, to be rational is to be willing to 
refrain, from epistemology-from thinking that 
there is a special set of terms in which all 
contributions to the conversation should be put, 
and to be willing to pick up the jargon of the 
interlocutor rather than translating it into one's 
own. For epistemology, to be rational is to find 
the proper set of terms into which all the 
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contribution should be translated if agreement is 
to become possible. For epistemology, 
conversation is implicit inquiry. For 
hermeneutics, inquiry is routine conversation.''^ 
Rorty further holds that knowledge is to be obtained only 
through conversation. Truth is not an objective matter arrived at 
through the correspondence of our ideas to reality. It is a matter of 
negotiation and mutual understanding and compromise, if, indeed, 
it is possible to continue talking of truth at all. Rorty sees 
alternative practices of justification, each presumably having to 
converse with the other, without any notion of objective truth. He 
still feels it important to keep the conversation going. Why then 
should philosophy keep on going with what appears a pointless 
and trivial task? Even allowing for the metaphorical nature of the 
phrase "the conversation of mankind," philosophy seems reduced 
to the level of the idle chatter of a cocktail party. 
The critics of Rorty do ask as to what, indeed, is the status 
of Rorty's own argument? If he is not attempting to provide a 
rational argument it is difficult to see what he is writing for. If he 
is, he must himself be presupposing some framework of 
rationality. 
We may deal with the possibility of rationality at the general 
philosophical and epistemological level, or at the scientific or 
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anthropological level. However, the issue remains as to whether 
rationality is a social practice which is historically conditioned or 
whether it is possible to appeal to a standard of rationality which 
transcends space time imperatives. Generally, the questions about 
rationality are often linked to question about objective truth. If 
reality is independent of thought, a constraint is provided on what 
is reasonable to believe. If reality is created or constructed, as an 
idealist might hold by our beliefs, our standards of what is 
reasonable to believe can be deemed to be approximately adequate. 
However, if our beliefs have no impact on the nature of reality as 
common sense realism might hold, then it is completely possible 
to be led astray by our assumptions about what it is reasonable to 
believe. The general methodological standpoint of Rorty is arrived 
at by rejecting the empiricist theory of knowledge. However, a 
foundationalist epistemology seems to be indespensible to the very 
project of philosophy. Empiriciam overstressed the notion of 
experience of the world without laying any emphasis on the world 
as such. Subsequently, when it is plausibly argued that the 
apparently "raw" experience is itself theoretically or culturally 
influenced by all our conceptions, the world or reality itself seems 
to be merely a theoretical or cultural construct. Such a 
methodological scenario inevitably generates hopelessness and 
despair. We need to have a concept of objective reality which is 
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not tied to the presuppositions of empiricism and also not pinned 
on the method and findings of empirical science. Scientific method 
may be one of the sources of knowledge. However its monopolistic 
claim over knowledge has persuaded many to discard the very 
project of knowledge or of objective truth.'*^ 
How far this illuminates questions concerning alleged 
superstition and possible irrationality in primitive societies? Some 
one with Rorty's view will not invoke rational standards and 
criticize a society for not abiding by them. Their standards are 
different from ours and we must, it seems, endevaour to enter into 
conversation with them without any comforting rational framework 
with which to asses their views. 
Apart from above mentioned philosophers of social science, 
the notion of relativistic rationality is also supported by 
contemporary anthropological investigation. Several substantial 
anthropological accounts can and do make a case for relativistic 
rationality. Numerous evidence can be convincingly cited to 
establish that the very realm or paradigm of Western rationality is 
too deficient, inadequate and irrelevant to explain all the powers 
and forces which motivate humans in their social evolution or 
political organisation. For example, Bruce Chatwin, an 
anthropologist, in his book "Songliness" points out that Australian 
aboriginals do believe that landscapes do occur because of the 
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songs of the animals of their ancestors. In fact, they believe that 
animals of their ancestors doing the world into existence/^ Now, 
Australian Aboriginals may be discarded as too primitive and 
contemporaneously obscolescent to be cited into any 
methodologically informed account of present day natural or social 
sciences. However, even highly advanced cultures do display 
certain features or practices which cannot be deemed to be rational 
in keeping with the requirements or criteria of Western rationality. 
For example, acupuncture is one of the most celebrated techniques 
of Chinese medicine with great preventive and therapeutic value. 
However, upholders of Western rationality are being hardly 
expected to accord any scientific or rational status to acupuncture, 
although the efficacy and therapeutic value of the technique are 
now universally acknowledged. When some beliefs or practices, do 
not accord with Western standards of rationality, we declare them 
to be irrational. However, these beliefs and practices need not 
necessarily be judged by Western criteria. In doing so, we study 
them from a particular methodological or even cultural point of 
view. The fact is that each cultural world has its own criteria of 
rational explanations and its own range of possible metaphors. 
There are no universal constraints on either. 
Symbolists too have their reservations regarding 
universalistic notion of rationality and consequently advocate a 
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kind of relativistic rationality. According to symbolist approach, 
myths, rituals and other such practices are not irrational. They 
may be said to be irrational only when understood at superficial 
literal level. They should be viewed as an indirect expression of 
cosmological observations or metaphysical concerns, or 
classificatory schemes or moral values or social relationships 
etc."*^ Symbolist analysis attributes hidden meanings to beliefs. 
But the suspicions of upholders of rationality are genuine, 
especially, when these meanings are hidden even from believers. 
However, this does not amount to declaring these beliefs to be 
irrational. John Battie argues that: 
Magic is the acting out of situation, the expression 
of desire in symbolic terms; it is not the 
application of empirically acquired knowledge 
about the properties of natural substances.^'^ 
So we can say that myths, rituals and other such practices are not 
necessarily irrational. Viewed from the perspective of primitive 
tribes or believes or understood in the context of the language-
game being played by them, it may well be that myths and rituals 
are quite rational. Anthropologists in their investigations on 
primitive tribes do stress the non-scientific character of the 
primitive beliefs. They do not deem tribesmen to be irrational. 
Anthropologists rather interpret their activities in a different very. 
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Their activities are interpreted not as making things happen but as 
showing how they feel about the events. They underscore the 
expressive and symbolic character of their doings or activities. For 
example, during the severe drought in summers, the rural 
cultivators in Kashmir organise a joint feast or community feast, 
in which wayfarers and poor people are especially offered 
sumptuous victuals presumably to appease God whose merciful 
intervention may ensure timely rainfall for the crops under 
cultivation. Such a celebratory undertaking may be viewed as a 
ritual expressing belief in the importance of rain and may as well 
embody a supplication that it should fall. In any drought-ridden 
society, any apparent rain making rituals will embody these 
attitudes and may be considered potent symbols of something held 
very important. 
Even in Western societies there may be prayers for rain 
where there is a serve drought. Some believers whom we call as 
sophisticated believers may feel that such rituals are not means of 
altering the world but just express our deepest concerns. But there 
are some believers who hold that such rituals will be answered. 
They may be deemed as unsophisticated believers. It is easy to 
assume latter to be wrong. But the question is as to why we 
consider that prayers can make no difference to the world. 
Obviously, we are bewitched by the supposed superiority of 
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scientific rationality and therefore try to find the answer of such 
question in keeping with the criteria of science. We usually 
believe that what can not be explained by science can not occur at 
all. This, obviously is a deep-rooted prejudice assiduously 
cultivated and sustained by modern man especially in the Western 
countries. Positivists have been crying hoarse that science can, in 
principle, explain everything, even though something will for ever 
be beyond the reach of science. Positivists maintain that whatever 
is real is scientifically explicable. However, the snag is that we 
may never be able to explain anything and everything. Therefore, 
we may not be ready to equate science with rationality. 
We cannot restrict our good or bad reasons for contemporary 
scientific beliefs as such. It may be irrational to go against the 
findings of science, but it does not seem rational to be restricted 
by its limitations. It may not be reasonable to say that Earth is 
flat. However, it does not mean that we can refuse to face all 
issues which have not been conclusively settled by science. Doing 
so would be merely to continue allegiance to a narrow positivism. 
Our beliefs can not be judged irrational merely because they 
are non-scientific. The practical rejection of all religious and 
indeed all metaphysics embodies a commitment to standards of 
science which cannot themselves be rationally justified. A 
persistent criticism of those who stressed that the meaning of 
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statements was to be understood by the way they could be 
scientifically verified was that this principle itself could not be 
scientifically verified. It was merely laid down, from the 
beginning as an axion which others were accordingly free to 
reject. The positivist claim that metaphysics is non-sense was 
simply a recognition of science as a source of rationality. It made 
scientific rationality synonymous with rationality as such. 
Accordingly, certain propositions were declared to be rational and 
others defined to be irrational. However, such a position smacks of 
unalloyed dogmatism, nay scientism, rather scientific 
fundamentalism. All non-scientific beliefs about the world cannot 
be summarily dismissed to be irrational.^' 
Concluding Remarks 
Relativism as a critical or methodological position has been 
a pervasive feature of philosophical discourse. Ancient 
philosophers in Greece as well as in India have advanced 
relativistic standpoints stemming from various modes of 
apprehending reality. The philosophical quest for certainty and 
truth has been challenged by relativists of multiple hues and 
colours. The Jaina doctrines of Syadvada and anekantavada 
emphasized on grasping the relativistic positions or points of view 
with regard to the same phenomena whereas pre-Socratic Sophists 
brought out a relativistic critique of philosophy in ancient Greece. 
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In pre modern European thought Montaigne may be said to be a 
radical champion of philosophical relativism. With the advent of 
post modernistic formulations in the second half of twentieth 
century relativism has again been pushed to the center-stage of 
philosophical discourse making it an important facet of 
contemporary intellectual life. The acceptance of relativism has 
been one of the pervasive features of post-modern thought. 
Various historians, sociologists and philosophers have been 
attracted by the notion of relativism in our times and climes. In 
fact, it has become quite fashionable in contemporary 
methodological debates and discussions. 
Man's perennial quest for truth and certainty has crystallized 
into multiple philosophies, ideologies, theologies, moralities 
blueprints and agendas. On the philosophical plane, various ' isms' 
or systems of thought such as idealism, realism, materialism, 
monism, dualism etc., have been worked out as systematic 
accounts of what is ultimately real. On the religious plane, such 
religions as; Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Judaism, Christianity. 
Islam etc., have historically claimed to be repositories of truth. In 
modern times, such movements or ideologies as Humanism, 
Capitalism Socialism, etc., have competed for attention as 
liberating panaceas across the globe. Various religious value-
systems or even secular-rational value-frameworks have also 
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claimed to resolve all the social political and economic problems 
faced by contemporary man. All philosophical, theological, 
ideological and ethical claims have presented themselves as sure, 
certain and true prepositional gestalts. More often than not, they 
have deemed themselves to be sole repositories of truth and 
certainty. During the course of historical evolution, these 
philosophical, theological, ideological and ethical schemes have 
either been dialectically confronting one another or actually 
engaging themselves in bloody competitions. While philosophers 
have mostly been involved in verbal disputations, theological and 
ideological enthusiasts and zealots have been at daggers drawn to 
impose their so-called truth-claims on opposing camps. Adherents 
of Semitic religions such as Christianity and Islam have fought 
long drawn out battles across Asian, African and European lands 
since the advent of Islam with a view to impose their world-views 
in value-systems upon each other. Besides, hundreds of thousands 
of Buddhist, Christian and Muslim missionaries have been engaged 
in Asia, Africa and Europe to preach their respective gospels of 
truth and win as many converts to their folds as possible. These 
theological and ideological disagreements and clashes have been 
widely prevalent throughout twentieth century and may not 
altogether disappear in twenty first century. 
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Exponents of relativism have always argued that these 
world-view and value-systems do not have any absolute and 
objective status, but are relative to traditions, mores, historical 
backgrounds, cultures, patterns of socio-economic development 
and technological wherewithal etc. The rise and fall of these views 
and values is negotiated through concrete historical, geographical, 
cultural and technological conditions. They are not unqualified or 
objective accounts of natural or human phenomena but 
elucidations or formulations operating within given conditions and 
contexts. For example, during the ancient or primitive times, the 
cultural and technological developments were too nebulous to 
allow any elaborate metaphysical or theological formulations. 
Instead elaborate mythological accounts or explanations were 
rampant during the primitive stage of historical development. The 
two millennia from fifth century B.C. upto around fifteenth 
century were ripe for carrying out metaphysical system building 
and religious world-views and value-systems. Critical assessments 
and rebuttals of theologies and philosophies could be worked out 
only in Post-Copernican or post-Renaissance period of European 
history. In ancient and medieval times various cultural traditions, 
by and large, developed and functioned in blissful ignorance of 
one another. However, when various cultural traditions confronted 
one another due to intercontinental explorations and cross-oceanic 
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circumnavigations could modern man take a critical look at well-
entrenched theological pre-suppositions, philosophical 
predilections and ideological prejudices. In fact, the mingling of 
cultures was instrumental in the development of various 
sociological and anthropological sciences. Contemporary 
resurgence of relativism is deeply rooted in massive historical and 
anthropological data available to modern man. Historians 
sociologists, ethnographers, anthropologists, philologists etc., 
have furnished us elaborate accounts of ancient-cultures, 
traditions, mores and myths. Detailed accounts of contemporary 
cultural and ethical diversity have also been furnished to modern 
man with increasing methodological sophistication and rigor. 
Ethical norms and values differ from culture to culture. 
Relativists may account for such variations as a function of 
different historical, geographical, philosophical and economic 
conditions. Like other phenomena, behavioural norms arise out of 
complex sets of circumstances and we find ourselves subscribing 
to various notions of what is right and wrong. Furthermore, the 
relativists argue that cognition or the representation of the world 
to ourselves too reflects the very selective structure of our 
perceptual apparatuses. There are many possible world-views. No 
world-view is so privileged or objective as to see things as they 
"really" are. Objectivity, at its best, is the agreement between 
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individuals about what exists and how the world works. However, 
even such a compromise is obtained within a framework of a 
particular culture. 
For absolutists, beliefs and values are based upon certain 
and universal standards grounded in a trans-human perspective. 
For example, the cognitive and moral certainty of men of religion 
or theologians, is rooted in some sort of supernatural explanations 
of the natural phenomena. Truth is arrived at through divinely 
ordained revelations or by consulting an authoritative text or 
through instructions from a trustedmentor. Knowledge and 
morality are intimately linked to the Absolute in the transcendent 
realm. The supposedly eternal and universal standards stem from 
that very transcendent realm of Absolute. Unfortunately, there 
seem to be a number of rather different Absolutes and valiant 
disagreements as to which of them constitutes the Truth. 
Religionists do not have a patent on absolutism. It can 
operate vehemently and arrogantly in secular discourse as well. 
Non-religious forms of absolutism can display an equal disregard 
for the multiplicity and contingency of human experience. Racial 
ideologies, caste-agendas, fascist, blueprints, patriotic 
interpretations, egalitarian viewpoints, Utopian dogmas etc., all 
seek to monopolise truth, justice and rationality. Thus it is 
assumed that there are things so sacred that they must be protected 
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by the arm of the state from any irreverent challenge. Those who 
scoff at the absolute truth and/or virtue must be punished. Many 
Americans may argue that American flag must be defended at all 
costs. In Communist China it is the monolithic and Utopian 
absolute of the party line which must go unchallenged. Similarly, 
free-market may be dogmatically defended as the only mechanism 
of economic growth. Socialist model of economic management 
may be defended to be the only instrument guaranteeing 
distributive justice. Even scientific arguments may be marshalled 
demonstrating the inherent superiority of the Aryan race or the 
inevitable ascendance of the working class or the inevitability of 
the social stratification or the unavoidability of 'survival of the 
fittest'. 
The so-called secularists, modernists and humanists have put 
up a valiant methodological struggle to set up rationality as a 
foundation for deriving universally acceptable cognitive beliefs 
and ethical values. Relativism always challenges the basis of this 
inherent human wishful thinking and contends that an objective 
rationality against which we could measure or evaluate our ideas 
as to what is true and what is right is impossible of formulation. 
Peter Winch, Bary Barnes, David Bloor, Richard Rorty, Alasdiar 
Maclntyre etc., argue that rationality operates within an already 
given set of assumptions and motives and even our conception of 
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rationality is related to a context. They will never be able finally 
to rationally justify our most fundamental beliefs about how the 
world is or our basic values. These beliefs and values constitute 
the context within which our version of rationality works. 
Thus, there are competing notions of rationality and what is 
rational is ultimately linked to our pre-rational convictions. It 
does not matter whether these convictions are based on authority, 
revelation and tradition or on empirical evidence. A person, 
operating in a religious culture and acceptaning claims of 
scriptural texts is accepted to be a rational person. However, such 
a person is condemned to be irrational by those who espouse a 
scientific or evidential standard of rationality. Thus, both 
secularists and fundamentalists may advance their respective 
claims with impeccable logical and practical consistency and yet 
the grounds for holding their respective claims do emanate from 
conflicting background assumptions. Such a situation entails 
charges and counter-charges of irrationality and nothing 
substantial can be done to eliminate these in ineliminable 
bickerings. For example, the secularists might try to justify his 
world-view by pointing out how it leads to technological 
sophistication, how it generates material wealth, how it promotes 
freedom of thought and expression and how it encourages social 
justice etc. However, our fundamentalist friends may not be 
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persuaded by this kind of pragmatic justification. They may well 
show us the equally fruitful results of their Weltanchauung; its 
social cohesiveness, its impact on moral refinement of the 
individual, its optimism, its never-say-die attitude, its 
purposiveness, its meaningfulness and above all its spiritual 
satisfaction. Thus both these world-views operate quite perfectly 
in keeping with their respective standards, although it needs to be 
stressed that these respective standards emanate from radically 
different assumptions about how the world is how we should act 
and what constitutes a good life etc. The respective assumptions of 
these two world-views and value systems are beyond the pale of 
pragmatic justification. 
Such considerations show that both the fundamentalist and 
the secularist have the ability to offer acceptable justifications in 
support of their respective world-views and values systems. Both 
these camps can demonstrate the coherence of their beliefs and 
values with equal rigor and sophistication. Therefore, both may be 
counted as rational and both need to withdraw the charges and 
counter-charges of irrationality. The secularists can have 
complaints against fundamentalists and vise versa. However, the 
basic ethical and cognitive commitments of any view are not 
themselves open to a rational critique. The criteria justifying 
beliefs, values and goals persued in one culture may seem flawed 
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when judged by the standards of a rival world-view. However, all 
the beliefs, values and goals persued within competing cultural 
frameworks are rooted in pre rational starting points which are not 
amenable to rational evaluation. 
Our cultural and historical legacy generally endows us with 
a set of assumptions. Certain beliefs and values are inculcated in 
every person in his or her numberless interactions and relations. 
These beliefs and values are not premised an rational criteria. 
They are given or handed over to us by multiple circumstantial 
factors. They may be said to be pre-rational assumptions and 
postulates of our understanding or our actions. We want these 
beliefs and values to be self-consistent and can, if the need arises, 
forward plausible reasons with a view to justify them. However, 
there can not be any ultimate justification or validation for these 
beliefs and values. The 'rational' is embedded and elaborated 
within a non-rational context of preferences and assumptions. 
Therefore an ultimately rational justification of values and world-
views generated by human culture can not be worked out. For 
example, men of religion are widely committed to the authority of 
sacred texts. The knowledge and values transmitted by these 
sacred texts serve as the pre-rational set of commitments on which 
their very rationality operates. Suppose we ask a Muslim 
fundamentalist as to why we should establish an "Islamic State" 
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his stock response would be because Allah has asked Muslims in 
the Quran to establish such a State. Now if something is really or 
allegedly divinely ordained or recommended in the Quran then any 
further discussion or debate on the matter would be sacrilegious to 
the fundamentalist. The belief in the divine infallibility of the 
Quran is the ultimate weapon in the armory of the fundamentalist. 
He can not offer a yet more basic commitment to justify his belief 
the in infallibility of the Quran. All our rhetorical skills and 
persuasive strategies will not change his basic belief about the 
Quran. The belief in the truth of the Quran is the cognitive bed-
rock of the fundamentalist. 
The secularist or the rationalist espousing evidence, 
experiment and scientific consensus as the ultimate standard of 
rationality, will also find himself in a quandary if he is asked to 
justify these very features of his rationality. He can try to justify 
his beliefs and values by recourse to scientific rationality. 
However, he has no more basic or fundamental set of arguments or 
reasons to justify scientific rationality itself. For example, 
inductive statements and the so-called law of uniformity of nature 
are beyond the ken of any philosophical or methodological 
justification. Belief in the inductive generalization and regularity 
of nature is itself at the core of scientific rationality. 
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The world has no built-in guidelines as to how we should 
conduct ourselves. There is no ultimate or privileged description 
of what exists and how things fit together. All accounts of 
Absolute seem to be arbitrarily formulated stories. There is no 
ultimate guarantee either for our cognitive stances or for our 
ethical choices. However, the desire to justify one's beliefs or 
values is widely prevalent. Most of us find it important to be self-
consistent by not holding obviously contradictory beliefs and by 
acting according to our avowed values. If we are self-consistent 
chances are we shall be able to offer justifications that are, by and 
large, acceptable. This ability to offer justifications which are 
acceptable to ourselves and others is one general characteristic of 
being rational. 
Philosophers are notorious for engaging in endless 
disputations. Indeed, disagreement is the hall-marks of all 
philosophizing. There are positions and counter-positions, 
arguments and counter-arguments, propositions and counter-
propositions theories and counter-theories, systems and counter-
systems etc., characterizing the core of philosophical dialectic. 
There are idealists and materialists, realists and anti-realists 
empiricists and rationalists, objectivists and subjectivists, 
foundationalists and anti-foundationlists, theists and atheists, 
monotheists and polytheists etc., offering there "isms" as 
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universally and eternally justified and justifiable world-views and 
values systems. All of them hope that in course of time the out 
standing merits of their view-points will persuade their opponents 
to join their camps by giving up their beliefs and values they so 
ardently but unsuccessfully defend. They all hope, their watertight 
compartments not withstanding, for the gradual emergence or 
sudden discovery of an ultimate philosophical consensus on their 
respective philosophical positions. However, pious wishes or 
wishful thinking, fortunately or unfortunately, are no substitute 
for sophisticated methodological analysis. The philosophical 
struggle of thousands of years for hammering out a consensus with 
regard to our beliefs, values and goals and the multidimensional 
contemporary methodological critiquing of such a long drawn-out 
tradition indicate that there is no consensus waiting to be 
discovered by some ultimate philosophers. Philosophers may well 
be like blind men in dark a room searching for a black cat which is 
not there. The ultimate consensus does not remain undiscovered. It 
most probably does not exist. All philosophies, theologies and 
ideologies are attempts to decipher what is indecipherable or say 
what can not be said. All of them struggle to formulate universal 
and eternal panaceas; a project outside the cognitive limits of 
homosapiens. 
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Philosophers have long aspired that the application of reason 
might unite us in a single worldview and value-system. They have 
believed in an ultimate rationality that can deliver a consensus 
amidst multiple disagreements both cognitive and ethical or 
generate a universally agreed upon set of beliefs and values. 
However, the differences in respective positions are radical 
enough to allow such a project to come to fruition. The underlying 
assumptions about beliefs and values are cross-culturally too 
radical to admit of any such reconciliation. Even what counts as 
rational and self consistent discourse may vary from culture to 
culture. Therefore, for two philosophical disputants, there may be 
no shared fundamental value that is binding enough to serve as a 
common ground. Human beings as seekers of knowledge and doers 
of action are inherently prespectival with limited outlooks and 
specific needs. These inherently prespectival cognitions and 
actions are further stamped upon by cultural specifications. We 
may all be rational in the sense that our actions are, in general, 
pragmatically consistent with our motives and our pictures of the 
world. But this conception of rationality still leaves potentially 
unbridgeable gulfs between our motives and our world-views. In a 
world characterized by radical cultural diversity, neither scientific 
nor religious world views and value systems can be supported by 
any ultimate standard of rationality, even though both types of 
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beliefs and values may be respectively self-consistent, 
intellectually satisfying and pragmatically effective. The 
possibility of different perspectives that are equally consistent and 
effective and shaped by multiple or different constraints can never 
be ruled out in view of our limited cognitive resources. Therefore, 
the very project of philosophical inquiry to establish for all times, 
places and persons some ultimate and necessary truth about reality 
can never be worked out or arrived at. The possible success of 
such a project seemed brighter in ancient, medieval and even 
modern phases of philosophical evolution. The assumption that 
some self-evident propositions about the world were waiting to be 
discovered, at some point of time, set the stage for final solution 
to philosophical problems. However, the antifoundationalist turn 
of the post-modern era has called into question the whole project 
of classical objectivity. It is being plausibly argued that the 
correspondence theory of truth is not tenable. Our theories about 
the world have no isomorphic relationship with the world ''in 
i t se l f . They are not evaluated on the basis of their 
correspondence to the world. We are not living in a world 
unconditioned by our points of view, our needs and goals etc. So 
for as we are concerned, there is no theory-independent world. Our 
knowledge is always representation of reality from a particular 
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perspective. Although there may be an ultimate reality our 
knowledge of that reality can never be ultimate. 
Relativism may well undercut the impulse for self-
justification making us perhaps more tolerant of opposing world-
views and value-systems. It may not induce us to consider all 
views and value-systems as equally true or just or justifiable. 
Despite the acceptance of relativism, we have no choice but to act 
according to our local standards of knowledge, ethics and 
rationality. However, we can understand the existence of opposing 
views as the outcome of a set of conditions, not the wilfuil 
distortion of a finally "correct" picture of the world of which we 
are guardians. Intolerance comes from thinking that we are 
privileged in our understanding and that those who fail to agree 
with as are somehow morally blameworthy. Such self-
righteousness can have its roots either in the religions absolutism 
that sees God as the infallible source of knowledge and morality, 
or the secular absolutism that supposes Reason, Nature or the State 
to be the universal arbiter. 
Theoretically speaking, relativism has the potential to 
generate ideological peace, philosophical catholicity and inter-
religious or intra-religious tolerance. However, for all practical 
purposes, there are limits to tolerance generated by relativism. For 
example, as bio-psychologically determined living beings we are 
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inherently or instinctually determined to safeguard our life, liberty 
and happiness. We can not, as relativists, allow anyone to rob us 
of these crucial values or the very infrastructure of life as such. 
Anyone can hold whatsoever views he prefers to have but none can 
be allowed to go scot free if he harms our interests or inflicts 
unacceptable damage to our life, limb and property. Absolutism 
does not only restrict the real or perceived adversarial actions but 
also opposing theologies, philosophies and ideologies as well. 
More often than not, absolutism in the light of its tenets, maintains 
that differing views and values constitute an affront to the 
existence of an alleged true faith. Absolutistic faith often 
reassuring to their adherents. Social, political and economic orders 
are premised on the injunctions and tenets of absolute systems of 
belief and action. Questioning tenets of an absolutistic system 
implies a revolt against the established social, political and 
economic arrangement as well. Moreover, the precarious 
commitment of adherents of absolutism also gets fizzled out once 
it is questioned by skeptics or relativists. In view of the same, 
absolutistic frameworks, whether religious or secular tend to be 
oppressive and stifle dissent and debate at any cost. 
Relativism holds that no cognitive or ethical stance does 
correspond to the way the world is in any ultimate sense. 
Therefore, no world-view or value-system can be deemed to be 
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absolute. No religious rational, scientific or secular scheme of 
beliefs and values or model of interpretation can be accepted in 
absolutistic terms. The basic contention of relativism is that given 
the multi-complex environment man is living in, different 
conditions, backgrounds and needs will definitely lead to different 
solutions or different strategies of interpretation and extrapolation 
or different ontological perspectives and ethical outlooks. 
However, no interpretation, perspective or outlook can be deemed 
to be inherently and ultimately privileged. No onto-cosmological 
framework can be deemed to be universally applicable. No 
philosophical system can be deemed to be final or irrevocable or 
unrevisible or unimprovable. All philosophical perspectives can 
have their justification and all of them can make their 
complementary or supplementary contributions to human situation. 
Therefore, relativism may not only tolerate but even celebrate 
different points of view. It is an open invitation to engage in 
debate, discussion and dialogue and either authenticate one's own 
point of view through such intellectual exchanges or if need arises 
convert oneself to another's point of view. A relativist has to be 
open to new information. He has to have an open-ended view of 
knowledge and ethical values. He has to be prepared to constantly 
or periodically change his cherished beliefs and values. 
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